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Foreword
The Partnershp for Governance Reform n Indonesa s a cooperatve arrangement between the Indonesan govern ment, cvl socety organzatons, the prvate sector and 
the nternatonal donor communty, wth the am of  facltatng 
and supportng governance reform n Indonesa. It s becom-
ng ncreasngly accepted that governance systems cannot be 
changed by practces mposed from outsde. Natonal ownershp 
s the key to change. The Partnershp therefore brngs together 
those elements n Indonesan government and socety who are 
commtted to governance reform and encourages dalogue and 
networkng amongst them. It supports ther efforts by develop-
ng deas, strateges and programs of  acton, especally those that 
can be asssted by the nternatonal communty.
During its first two years, the Partnership for Governance 
Reform produced n-depth dagnostc work on the problem of  
corrupton n Indonesa. 
Based on ths research and a comprehensve publc con-
sultaton process undertaken to develop a natonal acton plan 
to fight corruption, the Partnership started to implement the 
strategy and suggestons n 2003. The Partnershp has launched 
a number of  ntatves on ts own, but has also supported se-
lected partners in the implementation of  projects that fit within 
the Partnershp’s strategy.
To date, the Partnershp has supported and been party to 
a number of  efforts and achevements that deserve to be made 
publc beyond the short-lved coverage normally provded by the 
prnt and electronc meda. They need to be reported n more 
detal as they demonstrate unque and nventve approaches to 
tacklng corrupton. The purpose of  ths publcaton, “Fghtng 
Corrupton from Aceh to Papua”, s to encourage dscusson and 
replcaton n Indonesa and other parts of  the world.
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All 10 stores and the ntroducton were wrtten n Indonesan 
and the Partnershp would lke to express ts grattude to James 
Boyd, who managed to successfully transfer the meanng and 
sprt of  the orgnal texts nto Englsh. We would also lke to 
express our thanks to Muhammad Syafuddn (Ifoed), who has 
captured the essence of  these reports n a thought-provokng 
yet entertanng manner.
The findings, interpretations and conclusions are those of  
the authors of  each report and do not necessarily reflect the 
vews of  the Partnershp. Nether the Partnershp, the members 
of  the Governng Board, the organzatons or governments they 
represent, nor their affiliated organizations, may be held respon-
sble for the accuracy of  the facts and data contaned n ths 
publcaton, or any consequences of  whatever nature resultng 
from ther use.
H.S. Dillon
Executve Drector 
Jakarta, December 2005
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Consolidating the 
Anticorruption Movement 
Introduction by Bambang Widjojanto1
When we menton the word “corrupton”, an nterestng phenomenon worthy of study frequently becomes ap parent. “Corrupton” has become a word n our vo-
cabulary that s on everyone’s lps at the moment. The meda s 
chock-a-block full of reports on corrupton. It s a man topc of 
conversaton among all groups n socety, ncludng those who 
are truly aganst corrupton and those who pay lp servce to the 
struggle but who, n fact, regularly engage n varous forms of 
graft n ther day-to-day actvtes. In short, “corrupton” s the 
talk of the town and s a hot topc n all sorts of forums and 
dscourses.
Just look at the many groups nvolved n the antcorrupton 
movement at the present tme, the plethora of  books analyzng 
corrupton from varous perspectves, and the large number of  
dscussons, semnars and TV talk shows devoted to the prob-
lem. In addton, the number of  non-governmental organzatons 
(NGOs) involved in the fight against graft has mushroomed. 
Meanwhile a significant number of  corruption cases are cur-
rently beng nvestgated or tred, although many more have stll 
to be dealt wth. 
Despte the progress made to date, there are many sgns 
and ndcatons that corrupton s stll wdespread throughout 
Indonesa. In fact, t s qute clear that corrupton s systematc 
and part of  the power structure and socal fabrc n ths country. 
Whle for some, all the talk about eradcatng corrupton may be 
little more than political jargon, serious efforts are nevertheless 
beng made to brng about good governance through wde-rang-
1 Bambang Widjojanto is an advisor to the Partnership.
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ng governance reform.
Nevertheless, t s dsappontng to see that despte an ncreased 
awareness about the need to root out corrupton, there are sgns 
that the problem s actually ncreasng. Ths gves rse to two con-
trastng consequences. Frst, the emergence of a fatalstc atttude 
to the effect that corrupton s well-ngh mpossble to eradcate. 
Ths has resulted n a hgh level of permssveness towards the 
problem, whch, n turn, has the potental to encourage people to 
also try ther hands at graft. Second, the undertakng of varous 
poneerng efforts to consoldate the antcorrupton movement n 
socety through the development of corrupton free zones. Ths 
encourages many people to become nvolved n the antcorrupton 
movement, even if they are not able to contribute significantly. 
The fact s, corrupton must be systematcally fought aganst and 
overcome usng creatve and ntellgent approaches.
The varous wrtngs contaned n ths book are devoted 
to the struggle aganst corrupton n Indonesa. The focus has 
firmly been placed on the concrete efforts that have been made 
by varous cvl socety groups to reduce the room for corrupton 
n Indonesan socety, whle at the same tme encouragng the 
development of  the antcorrupton movement at the grassroots 
level. Whle only 10 case studes are presented here on account 
of  space limitations, there are a great many others that could just 
as well have been used to provde nspraton for those strug-
glng aganst graft, and that are capable of  replcaton so as to 
encourage the takng root of  the movement at the grassroots 
level. The followng general topcs are dealt wth n the wrtngs 
contaned n ths book:
Frst, local antcorrupton efforts (“Uncoverng Corrupton 
n Aceh” and “Antcorrupton Snowball n South Sulawes”).
Second, who s nvolved n the struggle aganst corrupton 
(“When the Kiai help Control Local Budgetng”, “Interfath 
Coalton aganst Corrupton”, and “When the People’s Repre-
sentatves loot the Publc Purse”).
Thrd, the nsttutons that are partcularly prone to corrup-
ton (the wrtngs dscussng corrupton n the General Electons 
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Commsson and local budgetng).
Fourth, strategies for fighting against corruption (“Mobiliz-
ng the People of  Papua to Fght Corrupton”, “Eradcatng 
Corrupton: From Acceptance to Resstance”, and “Trackng the 
Spendng of  Tax Revenues”).
Ffth, developng professonal and honest antcorrupton 
nsttutons (“Establshment of  the Corrupton Eradcaton 
Commsson”).
Wth regard to the three wrtngs dscussng lessons learned 
n the effort to eradcate corrupton n Aceh, Papua, and South 
Sulawes, t s worth notng that two of  these areas (Aceh and 
Papua) possess specal characterstcs wth the result that they have 
been accorded what s termed “specal autonomy” to manage 
ther own affars. Ironcally, ths has become one of  the prncpal 
causes of  ncreased corrupton n these regons.
Aceh was accorded specal autonomy status by Law Number 
18 of  2001, and has subsequently been granted significant ad-
dtonal revenues. In 2001, Aceh only had revenues of  Rp 543 
billion, but this figure increased dramatically over the following 
two years to Rp 1.6 trllon. However, accordng to studes car-
red out by the Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK), 
ths ncrease n revenue was n no wse accompaned by a cor-
responding improvement in the province’s financial management 
capacty, or by ncreased nternal and external oversght/superv-
son. The emergency n Aceh was also avaled of  by local power 
holders to pursue programs that primarily benefited themselves 
– somethng made possble by the almost total lack of  control 
mechansms. As a result of  ths combnaton of  factors, anythng 
was possible in Aceh for those in positions of  influence.
In South Sulawes, the Indonesan Women’s Empowerment 
Legal Ad Insttute (LBH-P2) kcked off  ts campagn aganst 
corrupton wth a study on the lnks between corrupton and 
poverty. Ths was carred out followng a realzaton that the tra-
dtonal local values encapsulated n the terms “sr” (self-respect), 
“lempu” (honesty) and “getteng” (steadfastness n upholdng 
tradtonal, legal and relgous values), were beng abandoned by 
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socety. It was based on ths, and the evdent lnks between cor-
rupton and poverty, that the Insttute’s grassroots antcorrupton 
campagn was predcated.
In Papua, the Insttute for Cvl Socety Strengthenng (ICS) 
specifically found that “as a consequence of  the fact that there 
were no clear accountablty procedures n place, or poltcal or 
socal control over the spendng of  the addtonal fundng, the 
way was left wde open for ncreased corrupton on the part of  
the power-holders and ther crones.”
Gven the crcumstances prevalng on the ground, concrete 
acton was requred to stop the further spread of  corrupton. 
The actvtes undertaken ncluded the followng:
• The Antcorrupton Soldarty Movement (SoRAK) carred 
out a detaled assessment of  the allocaton and utlzaton of  
development funds n the local budget, and comprehensvely 
and efficiently recorded the information it obtained as a 
result of  ths assessment;
• SoRAK identified a number of  key cases believed to involve 
corrupton, and mapped out the relatonshps that facltated 
corrupton among the elte;
• SoRAK successfully managed to consoldate ts antcorrupton 
network and to brng pressure to bear on those nvolved 
n perpetratng corrupton through a wde-rangng meda 
campagn; and
• SoRAK successfully persuaded the courts to recognze the 
legal standng of  cvl socety organzatons n representng 
the publc so as to allow them to brng class actons n re-
spect of  corruption cases that had prejudiced the interests 
of  the publc.
SoRAK managed to construct an antcorrupton network that 
reached up to the natonal level by concentratng on only a few 
key corrupton cases. The brngng to lght of  the corrupton 
case nvolvng now-dsmssed Aceh governor Abdullah Puteh s 
one of  the outstandng achevements notched up by SoRAK n 
its efforts to accelerate the fight against corruption in Aceh.
Meanwhle n South Sulawes, the LBH-P2 successfully led a 
coalton of  about 60 NGOs and other cvl socety organzatons 
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as part of  a campagn nvolvng the provson of  educaton and 
tranng on corrupton montorng n respect of  publc servces 
at the grassroots level. A wde varety of  groups from dverse 
backgrounds partcpated n ths campagn, ncludng buldng 
workers, miners, trishaw drivers, fishermen, sidewalk hawkers, 
artsts, housewves, students, commercal sex workers, pmps, 
and sub-district and district officials. 
It s also nterestng to note the success of  the LBH-P2 
and ts network partners n makng the best possble use of  the 
resources avalable to them n campagnng and provdng antcor-
rupton tranng through alternatve meda, such as comedy and 
theater troupes, ncludng  the People’s Comedy Theater Group 
(Kelompok Teater Komed Rakyat),  the Bugs-Makassar Troupe 
(Khas Bugs-Makassar), the Theater Communty (Korupa), and 
Petta Puang Players.
At least two aspects of  the LBH-P2 campagn are worthy 
of  partcular note:
1.  Focus was placed on forms of  corrupton that affected the 
provson of  publc servces at the grassroots level, thereby 
drectly affectng the people, ncludng the sze of  the water 
blls charged by the local water utlty and the levyng of  
unofficial school fees.
2. The LBH-P2, n collaboraton wth local rado statons and 
newspapers, successfully packaged ts campagn n terms of  
the forms of  corrupton that affected the poor n ther every-
day lves. Ths provded mmense momentum for encouragng 
the poor to participate in the fight against corruption.
In Papua, there are at least two major things that have been, 
and are stll beng, done by the ICS n ts efforts to combat cor-
rupton. Frst, the ICS has establshed a coalton made up of  
ndvduals drawn from NGOs, trbal organzatons, academa, 
local government, the journalistic profession, the prosecution 
servce, and the polce n seven regences and muncpaltes. The 
ICS has played the role of  ntator and facltator n formulatng 
antcorrupton strateges n partnershp wth the coalton. Second, 
the coalton then undertook two thngs, namely:
1.  Revealng corrupton cases nvolvng 22 leaders and treasur-
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ers in connection with development projects funded out 
of  the 2002/2003 provncal budget, and encouragng the 
commencement of  legal proceedngs aganst them. Ths 
process was asssted by the conductng of  audts by the 
Development and Fnance Audt Board (BPKP) and other 
supervsory organs. As a consequence, the cases, whch were 
orgnally expected to be resolved admnstratvely, were n 
the end brought before the crmnal courts.
2. Draftng model local regulatons capable of  provdng a 
bass for the further development of  the antcorrupton 
movement n Papua. A number of  draft regulatons were 
drawn up, ncludng a regulaton on publc partcpaton and 
transparency n the governance of  Papua, and a regulaton 
on an ombudsman commsson for Papua.
Another nterestng case study nvolved the effort to encour-
age the participation of  religious communities in the fight against 
corrupton. The Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and Communty 
Development (P3M) found that there was somethng wrong wth 
our relgous thnkng. In the case of  many people, the stuaton 
could be summed up as one of  “relgon yes, corrupton yes”. 
Perhaps there were also those among the belevers who were 
genuinely concerned about fighting against corruption? As a 
result of the actons taken, an antcorrupton coalton emerged 
n Yogyakarta that was devoted to spreadng the antcorrupton 
message through educaton. Over the long term, educaton would 
be employed to mpart, explan and dssemnate relgous teachngs 
about corrupton, whle n the short term, antcorrupton mater-
als were designed and applied in a number of subjects so as to 
encourage the various religions to accept the challenge of fighting 
against corruption as a joint challenge and a precondition for the 
development of an effectve antcorrupton movement.
The agreement between the two largest popular organzatons 
n Indonesa, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadyah, to work 
together to further the goals of  the antcorrupton movement 
formed the prncpal pont of  entry for encouragng belevers 
to become more nvolved n the struggle and for establshng a 
pesantren-based antcorrupton movement. Based on the prevalng 
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modaltes n socety and the desre to establsh a more progres-
sve vew of  zakat (Islamc alms-gvng), t was decded to focus 
on the revtalzaton of  the bahtsul masail forums for the purpose 
of  ensurng effectve control over publc polcy. Such forums 
were establshed n 12 ctes and were avaled of  by mams and 
pesantren leaders to exercse control over local budgetng and 
government spendng. In fact, the bahtsul masail forums came 
to serve as effectve forms of  control n the effort to reduce 
corruption and ensure greater social justice.
Three aspects of  the Indonesan Socety for Pesantren and 
Communty Development (P3M)’s program are worthy of  par-
tcular note, namely:
1. The process of  nculcatng antcorrupton awareness as part 
of  the revtalzaton of  the bahtsul masail forums not only 
ncreased awareness of  the evls of  corrupton from the 
moral perspective, but also firmly positioned the problem 
as a cultural, poltcal, economc and legal ssue that that 
greatly prejudiced the well-being of  the people;
2. the revtalzaton movement also produced a new breed of  
young, pesantren-based kiai who properly understood the 
nature of  corrupton – somethng that encouraged them 
to establsh crtcal study and budget-montorng forums n 
many areas; and
3. a strct socal sancton was ntroduced for those nvolved n 
corrupton n the form of  a refusal to say funeral prayers 
for deceased “corruptors” untl such tme as the money had 
been returned.
The Yogyakarta Muhammadyah Unversty’s Educatonal 
Development Research Insttute (LP3-UMY) not only managed 
to develop antcorrupton materals but also tested them n 11 
hgher learnng nsttutes n Yogyakarta through ther ncorpora-
tion in a number of  subjects. The results turned out to be highly 
encouragng. A number of  these nsttutes agreed to contnue 
usng the materals. In addton, the local government Relgon 
and Educaton Agency n Yogyakarta Specal Provnce afforded 
opportuntes to the LP3-UMY to gve lectures on the mater-
als to head teachers, other teachers, and relgon nstructors and 
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preachers.
There are three other nterestng aspects worthy of  note 
based on the experences of  the LP3-UMY, namely:
1. The antcorrupton educatonal materals were not only 
targeted at unversty crcles but also at relgous actvsts, 
preachers and relgous communtes;
2. tranng on the use of  the educatonal materals was provded 
to those responsble for teachng them so as to ensure full 
mastery of  the materals; and
3. the growth of  a moral development and acton movement 
was also encouraged among young relgous actvsts so as 
to ensure ther full partcpaton n the war on corrupton.
The actvtes carred out by the Indonesan Forum for Budget 
Transparency (Ftra) and Transparency Internatonal Indonesa 
(TI-I) are also worthy of  study. Fitra was the first organization 
to reveal significant corruption in the General Elections Com-
msson (KPU), whle TI-I has been successful n buldng up 
a publc awareness about corrupton and taxaton ssues. Ftra’s 
experiences provide important lessons as regards fighting against 
corrupton n partcular organzatons. Among the lessons learned 
were the followng:
Frst, the ablty to secure documents and nformaton s of  
the utmost mportance durng the ntal stages. In ths case, Ftra 
was able to get ts hands on detaled, comprehensve nformaton 
and documents revealng budget and spendng rregulartes.
Second, a number of  mportant strateges were employed 
by Ftra at dfferent stages n order to obtan nformaton and 
communicate its findings. These approaches including both co-
operatve and confrontatonal approaches.
Thrd, Ftra was aware that a systematc, serous and n-
depth nvestgaton would be requred before drawng any con-
clusons.
Fourth, whle pursung all of  the above processes, Ftra was 
also fully aware of  the need for a strategc allance of  antcor-
rupton organzatons. Ths was not only necessary so as to 
ncrease publc pressure but also so as to ensure an approprate 
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dvson of  labor n conductng the nvestgaton and n obtan-
ing access to the official agencies capable of  bringing the work 
to a successful concluson; and
Ffth, the forgng of  good relatons and communcatons wth 
the meda s essental not only for the purpose of  communcatng 
findings, but also for developing supervisory methods, applying 
publc pressure and ensurng program accountablty.
The varous efforts undertaken by Ftra n the end bore 
frut and brought before the eyes of  the publc the realty of  
wdespread corrupton n the KPU.
Meanwhle, TI-I s one of  those organzatons that s par-
tcularly serous about keepng the ssue of  taxaton n the fore-
front of  publc dscourse. TI-I has consstently lamented a lack 
of  awareness on the part of  the publc about taxaton ssues 
– somethng that s due to a lack of  nformaton of  taxaton 
and local government charges. In addton, most people have no 
dea about how to go about complanng. In fact, most people 
are not even aware of  the location of  their local taxation office, 
partcularly outsde the sland of  Java. Ths s despte the fact 
that more than 60 percent of  government revenue now orgnates 
from taxes. The trial projects undertaken by TI-I to heighten 
publc awareness of  taxaton ssues n a number of  regences, 
ncludng Tanah Datar, Wonosobo, Kotabaru, and Bulukumba, 
turned out to be resoundng successes.
In these areas, not only were taxpayer forums establshed, but 
regular meetngs were also held for the purpose of  mprovng 
the knowledge and awareness of  the publc so as to allow people 
to crtcally analyze and montor budget and taxaton polces. 
Interestingly, the relevant local governments and tax offices were 
qute supportve of  these efforts. As a result, members of  the 
publc became more vocal n askng questons such as how the 
money they had pad as taxpayers was beng used, why were 
health servces so expensve, why were dlapdated schools not 
beng repared, etc. In short, an awareness was nculcated n 
socety of  the rghts that accrued to people as a result of  ther 
payng taxes, ncludng the rght to be provded wth proper 
xv
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
publc servces by the government. 
Equally mportantly, the TI-I program encouraged regency 
admnstratons to ncrease the supply of  nformaton on local 
taxaton and to create separate accounts for each type of  tax, 
whle a heghtened awareness was created on the part of  the 
publc as regards the mportance of  montorng the allocaton 
of  tax revenues n local government budgets.
Partcularly encouragng was the success acheved n West 
Sumatra n tacklng corrupton wthn the Local Legslatve Coun-
cl. As a result of  the efforts made, 43 members of  the Local 
Legslatve Councl for the 1999-2004 term were found gulty of  
graft, wth the tral court’s decson eventually beng upheld on 
appeal by the Supreme Court.
Ths success provded nspraton to NGOs n many other 
areas and spurred the prosecuton servce nto takng acton n 
respect of  smlar Legslatve Councl corrupton cases.
One mportant lesson that may be gleaned from the artcle 
ttled “When the People’s Representatves loot the Publc Purse” 
s that corrupton cases, even at the hghest levels, can be brought 
to lght f  systematc, creatve and ntellgent approaches are 
employed. Perseverance and doggedness are also essental pre-
requstes to success. In addton, other mportant lessons learned 
from the West Sumatra experence are as follows:
• An ability to properly describe and define issues is required 
so that approprate follow-up acton may be taken;
• The ndcatons of  corrupton, the methods employed and 
the nature of  the crime need to be properly defined so as 
to make sure that all the elements of  a crme are present.
• Focus must be mantaned at all tmes, whle the attenton 
of  the publc and law enforcement agences needs to be 
properly drected n lne wth the gravty of  the problem 
and the set of  prortes that has been adopted. In ths way, 
t may be ensured that prorty cases contnue to attract the 
attenton of  the publc over a prolonged perod; and
• varous approaches need to be employed so as to nvolve 
as wde a range of  groups as possble. The West Sumatra 
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Concern Forum (FPSB) started off  employng a persuasve 
approach, but later swtched to a “repressve” legal ap-
proach.
Another hghly encouragng success story concerned the es-
tablshment of  the Corrupton Eradcaton Commsson (KPK). 
The Commsson s currently breathng new lfe nto the antcor-
rupton effort, and has won the admraton and trust of  the publc 
for ts efforts n the war aganst graft. The successes notched 
up to date by the KPK represent extraordnary achevements on 
the part of  ts leaders and others concerned wth eradcatng the 
cancer of  corrupton from Indonesan socety. 
The first issue that the KPK had to address was trust-
buldng. The ablty to wn the trust of  the publc was of  the 
utmost mportance to buldng up the capacty of  the KPK as 
a professonal nsttuton vested wth wde-rangng powers. The 
drawng up of  codes of  ethcs and conduct, the adopton of  
workng procedures and standards, the recrutment of  the staff  
t needed, and the tranng of  ts staff  were all carred out trans-
parently and wth a hgh level of  accountablty. Every process 
was gone through based on strct and consstent complance 
wth the prncples of  good governance.
Three mportant aspects are worthy of  note as regards the 
nsttutonal development of  the KPK:
1. The KPK accurately defined its needs and was capable of  
puttng ts varous plans nto effect n program form;
2. The KPK was from the outset aware of  the need to prortze 
the setting up an efficient information technology system; 
and
3. the leadershp of  the KPK was aware of  the need to system-
atcally communcate wth all sdes so as to make optmum 
use of  the socal captal possessed by varous elements n 
socety and government.
Indonesan Corrupton Watch (ICW) has earned tself  a 
reputaton as one of  the most steadfast champons n the war 
aganst corrupton, and n ths book descrbes a number of  
nterestng and llumnatng lessons learned durng the course 
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of  ts struggle to date. After conductng an evaluaton of  the 
efforts to eradcate corrupton n Indonesa, ICW started out 
from the proposton that the apparent nablty to accelerate the 
fight against graft was not the result of  fundamental weaknesses 
n the state, but rather mbalances n the relatonshp between 
the state and ts ctzens. Takng ths as the pont of  departure, 
the corrupton eradcaton program had to also pay attenton to 
strengthenng the role of  the publc. Ths was not merely because 
members of  the publc were the prncpal vctms of  corrupton, 
but also because a sold and educated publc would be much 
better equpped for furtherng the antcorrupton cause. 
The ICW appled an upstream-downstream approach to the 
fight against graft. This meant that the program was not only 
confined to the “upstream” level (encouraging the bringing of  
prosecutons and montorng of  the courts), but also nvolved 
the spreadng of  the seeds of  the antcorrupton deal, maxmz-
ing the benefits of  investigations conducted by the public, and 
engagng n campagnng and advocacy.
At least three major breakthroughs were pioneered by ICW, 
namely:
1. Encouragng the settng up of  antcorrupton watchdogs n 
many areas and co-optng them as strategc partners con-
centrating on specialized fields.
2. Introducng an ntal concept for conductng antcorrupton 
investigations and advocacy, and examining judicial decisions 
that offended against the public sense of  justice;
3. tryng out the “report-card system” for publc partcpaton 
n montorng and mprovng the qualty of  publc servces 
n the educaton sector. Ths approach had earler been po-
neered by the Publc Affars Center n Bangalore, Inda.
The experences set out n ths book show that the eradca-
ton of  corrupton s not an mpossblty. Of  course, actvsm 
on its own will rarely be sufficient to defeat graft. Professional 
and well-thought out approaches are also essental, ncludng the 
gatherng of  nformaton and documents, managng and analyz-
ing findings, designing and applying result-orientated strategies, 
buldng up strategc allances, and fosterng communcatons 
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wth all nvolved – partcularly professonal groups, the meda, 
and law enforcers.
The case studes set out n ths book provde ample nspra-
ton for promotng and developng the antcorrupton movement, 
and campagnng on graft cases. Many of  the methods employed 
are capable of  being replicated or fine-tuned to suit different 
contexts. Of  course, t must always be remembered that the 
learnng process n the war on graft s stll contnung.
In concluson, more ntellgent and well-thought out break-
throughs are stll requred before Indonesa’s systematc and 
deeply entrenched corrupton can be eradcated. Now s the 
tme to stop complanng and start resstng, to start offerng 
concrete solutons to the problem, and to change our atttudes 
so that corrupton s no longer acceptable n any shape or form 
n Indonesa.
As time passes, I am becoming increasingly confident that 
the war on corrupton can be won thanks to the sort of  compre-
hensve, ntellgent and systematc approaches that are descrbed 
n the followng pages.
Bambang Widjojanto
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Uncovering Corruption in 
Aceh1
Akhiruddin Mahjuddin
The Corrupt and Untouchable
The extension of  Special Autonomy to the Aceh Special District, and its renaming as Aceh by Law Number 18 of  2001, has apparently only succeeded in increasing the 
sizes of  the provincial and regency/municipalities budgets. In 
2002, the total value of  the provincial and regency/municipality 
budgets in the province stood at Rp 5.2 trillion, while this figure 
increased to Rp 5.4 trillion in 2003. Ironically, the increase in 
the amount of  money available to administrations in Aceh has 
in no wise been followed by an improvement in the quality of  
life of  the Acehnese people.
Just take, for example, the disastrous situation in the educa-
tion sector, where no signs of improvement have been evident 
to date. In the 1980s, Aceh was in the top five best performing 
provinces in the education sector out of a total of 27 provinces 
in Indonesia, and in the top ten out of 27 provinces in the 1990s. 
However, according to the available statistical data, by the year 2000 
the province’s position had declined drastically to 27th out of  31 
provinces in Indonesia. Besides education, the situation as regards 
poverty and unemployment has also worsened dramatically.
These realities obviously give rise to a number of  questions. 
1  This paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Strengthening the Public’s 
Role in Advocating Good Local Financial Management in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam”, which 
ran from 19 May 2003 to 31 October 2004 and was funded by the Partnership for Gover-
nance Reform in Indonesia. It was implemented by SoRAK which has since then split and 
the new organization Gerak Aceh is headed by the author. GeRAK Aceh then collaborated 
with the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia for the purpose of  encouraging 
people to establish Budget Monitoring Committees at the regency and municipality levels, 
including in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Utara-Lhokseumawe-Aceh Jeumpa, Aceh 
Barat and Aceh Jaya (August 2004-May 2005).
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Why has the increase in local budgets not been accompanied by 
a corresponding increase in the quality of  life of  the Acehnese 
people? The answer to this may be found in a recapitulation of  
the data on the extent of  corruption, which shows that a total 
of  137 corruption cases came to light in the province between 
2001 and 2003. The system of  public administration in Aceh is 
currently at an all-time low, as shown by a survey conduct by 
the Bank Indonesia’s Central Bank Study and Education Center 
(Pusat Pendidikan dan Studi Kebanksentralan, PPSK) and Padja-
jaran University’s School of  Economics (FE-Unpad), which was 
published in “Daya Saing Daerah: Konsep dan Pengukurannya 
di Indonesia” (The Competitiveness of  Regions: Concepts and 
Assessment in Indonesia), in February 2002. This survey found 
that Aceh was the most corrupt region in Indonesia.
Given the many other problems they have, the people of Aceh 
no longer pay much heed to the chaotic state of governance in 
their province, or to the corruption, collusion and nepotism that 
has infected the entire state apparatus. As a result, the pillaging 
of public funds has continued unabated, and has even shown an 
increasing tendency. Many of the people’s empowerment programs 
run by the government have become fertile ground for the embez-
zlers and misfeasors, and are unashamedly looted to ensure the 
enrichment of those in positions of influence. Among the schemes 
that have gained notoriety in this regard are the Gema Assalam 
program, the Social Economy Empowerment Fund (PER), and 
the Victims’ Compensation Fund.
Aceh is the scene of  a long-running conflict that has been 
accompanied by a breakdown in effective public service manage-
ment. This has had a major impact on the management of  public 
funds. From a different perspective, we may say that a logical 
consequence of  the situation in Aceh has been the emergence 
of  local leaders who are at liberty to do virtually whatever they 
want, no matter how arbitrary. Take, for example, the case of  
Abdullah Puteh, the Aceh governor, who was the holder of  
supreme executive power at the local level and was free to do 
almost whatever he pleased as a result of  the powerlessness of  
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the Acehnese people to demand transparency and accountability. 
As a member of  the Golkar Party, Puteh had plenty of  sup-
port at the national level with the result that he was well-nigh 
untouchable by the law.
Furthermore, under Law Number 22 of  2000 on local 
government, a governor may only be questioned in connection 
with a criminal investigation after the granting of  permission by 
the President via the Minister of  Home Affairs. This require-
ment was further tightened by Law Number 18 of  2001 on 
Autonomy for Aceh Special District and its renaming as the 
Province of  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. The situation was 
further exacerbated by the imposition of  a civil emergency in 
the province, which meant that the governor was at liberty to 
make unilateral decisions in flagrant disregard of  the views of  
others. These conditions all combined to strengthen the posi-
tion of  Puteh vis-à-vis the law. In reality, however, Puteh only 
represented the tip of  an enormous iceberg of  corruption in 
Aceh, with most of  those involved in the corruption being well 
beyond the reach of  the law.
Conflict and Corruption
Aceh is awash in natural resources. It produces oil and gas 
(which is converted into liquefied natural gas), and agricultural 
commodities such as palm oil, nutmeg, coffee, cacao, coconuts, 
etc. It also plays host to an amazing range of  biological diver-
sity in the Leuser mountain range, which traverses the province. 
Despite this abundance of  natural wealth, however, the vast 
majority of  Acehnese live in abject poverty. In fact, the level 
of  poverty is extraordinary. Based on figures set out in the 
governor’s accountability statement for 2003, the poverty rate 
in Aceh is increasing from year to year. In 2001, 25 percent of  
the Acehnese were categorized as being below the poverty line. 
This had risen to 33 percent in 2002, and reached 40 percent 
of  the total population of  Aceh in 2003.
This is obviously a source of  great concern, especially given 
that the size of  the province’s budget is also increasing from 
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year to year. In 2001, the Aceh provincial budget amounted to 
Rp 543 billion. This increased to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, and 
further increased to Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003. This sort of  money 
was never available in the province previously, such as when it 
was governed by Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Hassan, MBA, or Prof. Dr. 
Syamsuddin Mahmmud in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.
The failure to make proper use of the available funds so as 
to benefit the public is clearly linked to the system of financial 
management employed by Aceh province, which opens the door to 
misfeasance and other forms of corruption on a large scale. Such 
enormous sums flowing into the provincial treasury should obvi-
ously be capable of improving the welfare and lot of the people, 
rather than what is happening at the moment, whereby these 
monies are merely serving to feather the nests of the bureaucrats 
and their cronies. Just look at the budget allocations in Aceh for 
education, which must amount to at least 30 percent of the overall 
budget. A total of Rp 700 billion has been earmarked for educa-
tion in each of the last three years. Thus, from 2002 to 2004 the 
total education budget in Aceh amounted to Rp 2.1 trillion. This 
represents the potential for quite significant improvements in the 
education sector, especially compared to other regions where the 
budget allocations for education only amount to 20 percent.
It is, of  course, true that the needs of  education in Aceh 
are great, and that Rp 2.1 trillion pales into insignificance when 
one realizes just how great the damage caused to the sector has 
been over the last five years. The long-running conflict and the 
disruption it has caused in the sector have had a serious impact 
on the education of  the province’s children. However, given the 
monies available over the last three years, much more could, and 
should, have been done than what we see today. As things stand 
at the moment, it would appear that even Rp 2.1 trillion is not 
sufficient to improve the education received by the children of  
Aceh. This represents nothing more than a great embarrassment 
for the world of  education in Indonesia. It appears that even if  
the education budget were to be increased tenfold, it would still 
be unable to provide a solution to the problems in the sector 
due to the prevalence of  corruption and malfeasance at every 
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turn. This is particularly sad given that education represents the 
best hope for a new and more prosperous Aceh.
Based on the above analysis, it will be clear that much of  
the poverty in Aceh is the cause of  two key factors: the long-
running conflict and corruption.
Thirteen Anticorruption Organizations
As things stand, both the public and NGOs tend to see the 
Aceh question in terms of  crisis resolution, while the government 
in Jakarta tends to view the issue as one of  human rights alone. 
In reality, however, the problems assailing Aceh are the result of  
economic injustice resulting from the excessively centralized and 
inequitable economic policies imposed by the central government. 
These have resulted in glaring disparities, rather then justice, in 
the allocation of  resources by Jakarta to Aceh.
Anticorruption organizations have an essential role to play 
in highlighting the problem of corruption in Aceh and bringing 
it into the realm of public discourse. The establishment of such 
organizations in Aceh was heralded by the emergence of the an-
ticorruption movement at the national level. An example of this 
is Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), which was established to 
bring cases of corruption perpetrated by the dictatorial government 
of Soeharto into the full glare of the public spotlight.
Similarly in Aceh, various anticorruption organizations 
were established in response to the rampant corruption being 
perpetrated by local administrations. The first anticorruption 
organization was set up in Aceh in 2000, and this was quickly 
followed by more – some working at the provincial level and 
others at the regency/municipality level. The emergence of  these 
anticorruption organizations more or less coincided with the 
rolling out of  Special Autonomy in Aceh.
At the present time, there are 13 anticorruption organiza-
tions in Aceh. These are as follows: the Anticorruption Move-
ment (GeRAK), Anticorruption Solidarity Movement (SoRAK), 
and People’s Solidarity against Corruption (SAMAK) in Banda 
Aceh; the Gerakan Anti Korupsi (GeRAK) in Aceh Besar; the 
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Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network (JARAK) in Pidie; 
the Anticorruption Solidarity Association (GaSAK) in Bireun; 
the Anticorruption Movement (GeRAK) in Lhokseumawe and 
Aceh Utara; the Singkil Anticorruption Community (MaTRAS) 
in Singkil; People’s Solidarity for Democracy and Justice (SRDK) 
in Kuta Cane; the Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots Network 
(JARAK) in Aceh Selatan; Solidarity for Anticorruption (SuAK) 
in Meulaboh; Solidarity for Transparency (SAKSI) in Simeulue; 
and the Aceh Jaya Transparency Community in Calang.  
Every cloud has a silver lining, and in these areas the issue of  
rampant corruption is actually moving society in the direction 
of  greater transparency and democracy. This is automatically 
providing greater room for the people of  Aceh to speak out 
about what is happening in their homeland. This process will be 
further advanced if  the people find that the courts are willing 
to convict those involved in corruption as opposed to the past 
when this would have been virtually inconceivable.
The fight against corruption in Aceh is also serving to advance 
the democratic cause at the national level. As cases come before 
the courts and convictions ensue, a number of  knock-on effects 
will become apparent, including the following: First, greater care 
and diligence on the part of  the bureaucrats in managing the 
public purse in Aceh province; Second, the public will become 
more courageous and outspoken in revealing irregularities without 
having to be afraid of  being labeled a separatist – a label that 
would often mean death or disappearance in the past.
The process of  heightening public awareness would obviously 
be more effective if  it was backed up by concrete examples of  
the prosecution and conviction of  public officials on corruption 
charges. This is essential so that the spirit of  the people can be 
restored. In reality, we may say that this long process was all 
about restoring the trust of  the public in the local and central 
governments, even though this was not recognized by many.
While the granting of  Special Autonomy was intended in 
part to reduce the intensity of  the conflict in Aceh, it also re-
sulted in significant increases in the funding made available to 
the province. The benefits of  this increase in funding should 
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logically have been directly felt by the public. However, to date 
no significant changes in the lot of  the Acehnese people have 
occurred – in fact, things have got much worse in the wake 
of  the tsunami. It was this reality that spurred us to critically 
scrutinize the Aceh provincial budget against a background of  
ineffective supervision and oversight by the Aceh Provincial 
Legislative Assembly.
As part of  this process, we were particularly concerned with 
the following aspects: the formulation of  the local budget – a 
process that is supposed to involve the public at large; the needs 
of  the community and the budget’s responses to these, particu-
larly as regards primary needs such as education and healthcare; 
and, finally, the implementation of  the budget.
The Special Autonomy funds being paid out to Aceh prov-
ince, which are obviously intended to improve the welfare and 
well-being of  the Acehnese people, have not in fact been able to 
do so. According to Law Number 18 of  2001, Aceh province’s 
revenues are made up of  its own-source revenue, payments 
from the equilibrium fund, provincial receipts under the Special 
Autonomy scheme, loans taken out by the local government, 
and other lawful sources.
From all of  these sources, Aceh province is receiving much 
more at the present time than prior to the introduction of  Special 
Autonomy. Since the entry into effect of  the Special Autonomy 
legislation, Aceh has also being receiving special funds consisting 
of  payments out of  the equilibrium fund. Another new source 
of  funding is zakat (in Aceh, mandatory contributions to Islamic 
charities), which is included as an item in the province’s own-
source revenue account.
As a result of  all these new sources of  revenue, Aceh 
province’s budget has expanded exponentially, from Rp 543 bil-
lion in 2001 to Rp 1.5 trillion in 2002, Rp 1.6 trillion in 2003, 
and Rp 2.2 trillion in 2004. This increase in funding should be 
accompanied by the instituting of  financial management that 
is based upon the principles of  good governance and better 
financial supervision and management supported by both internal 
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and external oversight. However, in reality both the internal and 
external auditors charged with inspecting the province’s accounts 
lack the powers they need to do the job properly.
Emasculation of  Audit Bodies
The emasculation of  the audit bodies is the result of  the 
issuance of  Local Regulation  Number 11 of  2001 on the 
structure of  local audit boards. This regulation provides that 
the provincial audit board has the power to inspect the ac-
counts of  the provincial government. However, the provincial 
audit board is also part of  the government it is supposed to be 
auditing. Thus, how will it be possible for the audit board to 
act independently, objectively and professionally in performing 
its duties if  the body it is auditing is also the body that employs 
the auditors? Even more incongruous, the results of  the audits 
that are undertaken must be reported to the governor through 
the provincial secretary. Is this sort of  oversight – susceptible 
as it is to manipulation and collusion – the sort of  oversight 
that is likely to win the confidence of  the public?
As regards the local office of  the Development and Finance 
Audit Board (BPKP), Local Regulation Number 11 of  2001 also 
serves to head off  external oversight. As things stand at the 
moment, the BPKP may only audit the provincial budget if  it 
obtains the consent of  the governor.
Emasculation of Law Enforcement Institutions and the 
Courts 
The apparent impossibility of  seeing those involved in cor-
ruption being tried and convicted in the courts led to widespread 
apathy among the public. It was an open secret that the law 
could not be relied upon. The law in Aceh had long been used 
as an instrument of  repression to deal with the security prob-
lem, and appeared to be entirely uninterested in corruption and 
malfeasance committed by public servants in the province. 
Against the background of  a barely functioning legal system, 
legal and human rights activists began to push for breakthroughs 
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in the legal sphere that would allow the public to demand that 
justice be done. The sort of  breakthroughs that were being 
sought included the permitting of  class action and a widening 
of  the definition of  legal standing. There were two principal 
targets in this regard:
1. results target: the achievement of  maximum results in chang-
ing the paradigms adhered to by the law in Aceh so as to 
make it more favorably disposed towards the public;
2. process target: the educating of  the Acehnese people as 
regards their right to sue the government – something that 
was previously taboo but which in reality was legitimate and 
the right of  every Indonesian citizen.
The weaknesses afflicting the law enforcement institutions 
resulted from the legislative framework that had been put in 
place in Aceh as part of  the Special Autonomy arrangements. 
Article 21(6) of  Chapter X of  the Aceh Special Autonomy Law 
(Number 18 of  2001) states that the appointment of  the Aceh 
Provincial Police chief  shall be made by the Republic of  Indo-
nesia National Police chief  with the approval of  the governor 
of  Aceh, while Article 24(2) of  Chapter IX of  this Law states 
that the appointment of  the Aceh Provincial Chief  Prosecutor 
shall be made by the Republic of  Indonesia Attorney General 
with the consent of  the governor of  Aceh Province. These ar-
ticles serve to greatly strengthen the position of  the governor 
as a virtual untouchable, and it was these articles that allowed 
Abdullah Puteh to indirectly get his men into the posts of  Aceh 
Police chief  and Provincial Chief  Prosecutor. In reality, what-
ever the circumstances, these institutions should be independent 
and free from extraneous influences rather than being rendered 
subordinate to the administration.
Emasculation of  the Provincial Legislative Council
As a house made up of  the representatives of  the people, 
a Local Legislative Council must be capable of  advancing the 
rights of  the people. In order to do so, it needs to exercise 
oversight and control over the executive so as to ensure that not 
one rupiah of  public money is embezzled or wasted. However, 
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such hopes will be difficult to realize when the members of  the 
Legislative Council have either sold their souls to the devil or 
have been cowed into submission. In Aceh, the type of  oversight 
and control exercised by the Legislative Council was primarily 
concerned with administering temporary shocks to the executive 
so as to increase the bargaining power of  the assembly in order 
to advance the political and financial interests of  its members.
Thus, the members of the Aceh Provincial Legislative Coun-
cil abused their positions to blackmail the executive in order to 
feather their own nests. This was the result of a number of fac-
tors, including the yawning gap between those sitting in the house 
and the constituents they were supposed to be representing. The 
mechanisms available for eliciting the views of the public in Aceh 
were very limited and more formalistic than real, with the result 
that those efforts that were made, on paper, to reveal the views 
of the public amounted to little more than window dressing.
The reality was that the Aceh Provincial Legislative Council’s 
function of overseeing the work of the provincial executive lacked 
the support of accurate information and data on the issues pre-
sented to the Assembly by the executive. As a result of this, the 
members of the Council were unable to put up much of an ar-
gument against the administration, even if they wanted to do so, 
which was rare. Most members of the Council lacked the technical 
skills and knowledge necessary to appraise budgetary proposals, 
while the executive had the benefit of finance experts on its side. 
In addition, there was not enough time available to the Council 
members to properly perform their function of budgetary oversight. 
As a result of all these factors, the oversight role of the Provincial 
Legislative Council was rendered entirely ineffective.
Lack of  Accountability on the Part of  Local Officials
The budgetary process consists of  a number of  aspects 
including planning, implementation and oversight. A further, 
and particularly important, aspect is accountability. Governor 
Abdullah Puteh was required by law to account for the imple-
mentation of  the 2000 Aceh provincial budget. However, he 
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failed to do so, arguing that three governors had served in Aceh 
during 2000, namely, Syamsuddin Mahmud, Ramli Ridwan, and 
Abdullah Puteh himself. In reality, whatever the circumstances, 
it was still the responsibility of  the serving governor to account 
for budget implementation given that such accountability does 
not constitute personal accountability, but rather accountability 
on the part of  the local administration.
It should be noted in this regard that accountability had 
long been a rare commodity in Aceh, and public documents and 
information on financial management were well-nigh impossible 
to access. In addition, public participation in government in Aceh 
was virtually non-existent. As a result of  this lack of  account-
ability and public participation, the way was left wide open for 
the looting of  the local government treasury.
Essentially speaking, a government accountability statement 
is intended to present information of  use to decision makers 
and to account for the management of  the resources entrusted 
to the administration. Accordingly, an accountability statement 
must, at a minimum, contain the following information: First, 
information on resources, allocations and use. Second, information 
on the local government’s cash position and how it proposes to 
fund its activities; Third, information that is of  use for evaluat-
ing the capacity to secure funding and ensure the fulfillment of  
obligations; and, fourth, information on the local government’s 
financial position and any changes thereto, and information on 
the management and use of  resources in accordance with the 
budget and the prevailing rules.
It goes without saying that budgetary accountability must 
be backed up by proper proofs and be discharged in line with 
the provisions of  the laws and regulations in effect through the 
presentation of  a summary of  resources, allocations and uses.
The 2001 Aceh Provincial Budget was proposed to the lo-
cal legislature without the prior preparation of  a Strategic Plan 
(Renstra). In the science of  local administration, a Strategic Plan 
provides guidelines and yardsticks for the legislature in appraising 
and assessing the performance of  the executive. This failure to 
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prepare a Strategic Plan constituted a violation of  the law and 
a betrayal of  the public trust.
The old saying, “Anything goes in Aceh”, seemed to be 
borne out. We only have to look at how Puteh manipulated the 
legislature to secure its approval for the budget in the absence 
of  a prior accountability statement from the governor. Also very 
noticeable in Aceh was a persistent tendency for officials of  
integrity to be transferred to less “prospective” units, or even 
to be threatened and ostracized.
The above description shows that Governor Abdullah Puteh 
was more than willing to flout the law. He clearly violated the 
Local Government Law (Number 22 of  1999), Government 
Regulation Number 108 of  2000, Government Regulation Number 
105 of  2000, and Minister of  Home Affairs Decree Number 29 
of  2002. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that there 
were no mechanisms allowing for real public participation, or 
to allow interested members of  the public to access informa-
tion. Thus, it came to be recognized that it was essential for 
such mechanisms be incorporated into local legislation by way 
of  local regulations (or qanun as local regulations in Aceh are 
now known).
‘Birds of  a Feather flock together’
In Aceh, it is not only the devout who flock together to pray, 
but those partial to corruption and self-enrichment also like to 
congregate in large groups. If  a superior engages in corruption, 
then his subordinates will do likewise. The almost religious zeal 
with which bureaucrats strive to get their hands on taxpayer 
funds is legendary and as a result, not surprisingly, just about 
every effort to improve the welfare of  the public amounts to 
little more than high-sounding proposals on paper. This means 
that the effort to uncover corruption cases is urgent and will 
need the full involvement of  the public, both active and passive, 
so as to create an anticorruption community. In order to do so, 
the first step is to analyze and advocate budgetary propriety.
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Budgetary Advocacy 
The setting in motion of  a budget advocacy movement was 
one of  the methods adopted by the anticorruption organiza-
tions in their efforts to ensure justice for the public at large. 
This budget advocacy movement involved two approaches: the 
bringing of  class action and the widening of  the definition of  
legal standing. 
These two aspects represented uncharted territory for the 
anticorruption organizations as the institutions accorded legal 
standing by the law were confined to the Indonesian Forum 
for the Environment (Walhi) under the Environmental Protec-
tion Law (Number 23 of  1997) and the Forestry Law, and the 
Indonesian Consumers Foundation (YLKI) under the Consumer 
Protection Law (Number 8 of  1999). This lack of  recognition 
meant that a number of  anticorruption organizations that had 
brought actions saw them fail due to lack of  legal standing. In 
reality, there were no precedents or legal grounds in Indonesian 
law that would permit anticorruption organizations from bring-
ing actions.
Legal Standing in Aceh 
The fact that actions brought by anticorruption organiza-
tions in other parts of  the country had been thrown out by the 
courts did nothing to diminish the enthusiasm in Aceh as regards 
conducting advocacy in respect of  the 2001 Aceh draft budget. 
The movement was motivated by the fact that a strategic plan 
had not been drawn up prior to the formulation and drafting 
of  the budget, which would obviously have an impact on the 
effort to assess the performance of  the executive. In addition, 
the development process in Aceh had long lacked coherent fo-
cus and objectives. In reality, the formulation of  a strategic plan 
was indispensable as this would set out the local government’s 
vision, mission, objectives, and work programs. According to 
the law, such strategic plans must be drawn up based upon the 
views and aspirations of  the public and be bottom-up in nature 
rather than top-down.
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A strategic plan was not only required for the purpose of  
assessing the success of  the development process in Aceh but 
was expressly required under Government Regulation Number 108 
of  2000 on accountability procedures for local chief  executives. 
Thus, the drafting of  the 2001 Aceh provincial budget without 
the prior drawing up of  a strategic plan by the executive and 
legislature constituted a blatant attempt to pull the wool over 
the people’s eyes. For the anticorruption organizations in Aceh, 
the bringing of  an action was essential as both the executive 
and legislature were guilty of  making decisions that violated 
Government Regulation Number 108 of  2000.
It was pretty much a foregone conclusion that the effort to 
avail of the law would be thwarted by the judicial mafia. However, 
in an interim ruling the court held that the case could proceed.
Unlike the action against the draft 2001 provincial budget, 
the attempt to challenge the failure by the governor of  Aceh 
to submit his accountability statement to the legislature in 2002 
did not meet with success. Although it failed, all was not lost, 
and a major legal breakthrough resulted that was of  significance 
for anticorruption organizations throughout Indonesia. In its 
decision, the court held that the anticorruption organizations 
had legal standing to challenge the governor. This was a major 
change, and represented a significant step forward in the effort 
to uphold the law in Indonesia.
The major principles involved in the case were as follows: 
First, the 2002 budget was effective from 1 January 2002 until 
31 December 2002. Article 6(1) of  Government Regulation 
Number 108 of  2002 states that an accountability statement 
shall be read out by the local head of  government in front of  
a plenary session of  the Legislative Council not less than three 
months subsequent to the end of  the budget year.
Second, based on the above explanation, Abdullah Puteh 
should have made his accountability statement before the end of  
March 2003, the final time limit set by Government Regulation 
Number 108 of  2002. However, Puteh only made his statement 
on 11 August 2003, a full four months and ten days after the 
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expiry of  the deadline.
Third, not only did Puteh violate the provisions of  the 
legislation, but, even worse, the statement he delivered was full 
of  “lies”. Proof  of  this is the finding of  many irregularities by 
the Local Legislative Council’s own committees. According to 
our records, 20 Council special committees found examples of  
clear irregularities involving different modus operandi. In addition 
to the findings by the local legislators, the Aceh Anticorruption 
Grassroots Network (JARAK) reported a case involving a ficti-
tious loan to a member of  the Council to the Aceh Provincial 
Prosecutor’s Office in 2003. At the same time, SoRAK uncovered 
a number of  cases that reeked of  impropriety and corruption in 
the management of  public funds, including the following:
1. Misuse of  2002 Aceh budget funds through the depositing 
of  money belonging to the Aceh Provincial Government in 
an account with the Aceh Development Bank (BPD) to pay 
for the procurement of  an electrical generator by a supplier 
of  PT PLN (Persero). The said generator was worth Rp 5 
billion, as stated in the relevant documents (Gubernatorial 
Decree Number 42 of  2002 on revenue, activities/articles 
and the amendment of  the 2002 budget, page 288, article 
2P.05.01.004 – project name: Aceh Government Equity 
Investment, point 5). Meanwhile, the approval in principle 
issued by the Aceh Legislative Council, Number 900.3.5.501 
dated 25 November 2002 allocated a total of  Rp 20 billion 
for the project. In reality, a total of  Rp 25 billion has been 
paid out to date through BPD. Thus, this case involved the 
illegal disbursement and use of  Rp 20 billion in flagrant 
contravention of  article 25 of  Government Regulation 
Number 105, which reads as follows: “Any act that results 
in the expenditure of  funds from the budget shall not be 
permitted prior to the enactment of  the local budget regula-
tion and its publication in the local gazette.”
2. The finding by SoRAK Aceh following an inspection of  
the accounts of  PT Seulawah NAD from 1 January to 31 
December 2002, which showed that the firm suffered a loss 
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of  Rp 9,348,000,000 and that it had received Rp 6 billion out 
of  the local budget. The said loss meant that the investment 
of  these taxpayer funds did nothing to increase own-source 
revenue, and, in fact, did exactly the opposite by imposing 
a cost/burden on the budget. This finding highlighted the 
weaknesses afflicting both the performance and degree of  
accountability of  the executive in Aceh.
3. The finding by SoRAK Aceh of  suspected misfeasance in-
volving the 2002 Aceh budget in connection with differences 
between the reported disbursement of  funding for the So-
ciopolitical Organizations Development Fund (Project Code 
2P.0.19.1.01.9) – which was funded out of  the 2002 Aceh 
budget – and the real amount disbursed. The differences 
between the reported disbursements and the real disburse-
ments were evident from the documentation. According 
to the budget documents, a total of  Rp 1,069,250,000 had 
been paid out for this purpose in 2002. However, according 
to the receipts, only Rp 633,250,000 had been distributed 
among a total of  225 institutions, leaving an unaccounted-
for difference of  Rp 436,000,000.
4. The mark-up in the purchase of  a Mi-2 helicopter worth Rp 
12.6 billion by the government of  Aceh province in 2003, 
and the extending of  fictitious loans worth Rp 75 million per 
loan to all of  the members of  the Local Legislative Council, 
making a total of  Rp 4,050 billion, and irregularities in the 
management of  funds for a community information project 
involving the purchase of  a newspaper printing press worth 
Rp 4.2 billion.
5. Strangely, the dozens of  committees set up by the Aceh 
Legislative Council to monitor the budgetary performance 
of  the executive still accepted the governor’s accountability 
statement even though they found many irregularities in the 
management of  budget funds. This encouraged the bringing 
of  an action not only against the executive (1st defendant), 
but also the joining of  the speaker of  the Local Legislative 
Council as the second defendant.
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The action quickly gained the attention of  the public. Re-
porters flocked to the courthouse to cover the case, even though 
most people were predicting that it would fail miserably – not 
due to lack of  evidence but rather due to a lack of  integrity on 
the part of  the law enforcement institutions and courts.
In its judgment, the Banda Aceh District Court held that there 
were three general requirements that had to be fulfilled before 
a non-governmental or other organization would be regarded as 
possessing the necessary legal standing for bringing an action, 
namely: 1) the non-governmental or other organization had to be 
established as a legal entity or foundation; 2) the statutes of  the 
non-governmental or other organization had to expressly state the 
objectives of  the organization; and 3) the activities undertaken 
by the organization were in line with its objects.
Specifically with regard to the action brought by SoRAK 
against the governor of  Aceh and the speaker of  the Local 
Legislative Council, the court held that SoRAK met the require-
ments for bringing an action. While the statutes of  SoRAK did 
not state that the organization was a foundation, article 6 of  the 
said statutes stated that SoRAK Aceh was the equivalent of  a 
foundation as it was a non profit-making organization.
In addition, the Banda Aceh District Court said that the sec-
ond requirement had been fulfilled in the SoRAK notarial deed, 
articles 3 and 4 of which expressly stated that the objectives of 
the organization were to encourage people to become involved in 
the anticorruption effort and to develop a popular anticorruption 
movement. As regards the third requirement, the Court was also 
of the opinion that this had been satisfied as SoRAK had brought 
the action before the Banda Aceh District Court.
Learning from Experience
Upon a detailed reading of  the judgment, it becomes apparent 
that the challenge by SoRAK against the 2001 provincial budget 
failed due to the fact that SoRAK was found not to have carried 
out activities based on its statutes. This was unfortunate as, in 
reality, SoRAK had carried out many such activities in the past. 
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However, due to an oversight on the part of  the organization’s 
lawyers, these were not presented to the Court. 
Learning from experience, in SoRAK’s second challenge, this 
time in respect of  the governor’s 2002 accountability statement, 
SoRAK made sure that all three requirements were fulfilled so 
that there would be no reason for the Court to throw out the 
action. Nevertheless, the challenge was still rejected by the Court 
as a result of, we belief, various irregularities. The reasonable-
ness of  SoRAK’s position and stance was later borne out by the 
conviction of  Governor Abdullah Puteh (by this time suspended) 
by the Anticorruption Court, which found Puteh guilty beyond 
all reasonable doubt of  have defrauded the taxpayer of  Rp 4 
billion in the purchase of  the Mi-2 helicopter referred to above. 
Puteh was sentenced to 10 years in jail – two years more than 
sought by the prosecution.
The same applies to the ostensible loans worth Rp 4.050 
billion extended to the members of  the Aceh Provincial Leg-
islative Assembly for the 1999-2004 period. In this case, four 
former leaders of  the Assembly during the 1999-2004 period 
have been charged as suspects by the Provincial Prosecutor’s 
Office. This case is still being investigated and it is quite possible 
that further suspects may be charged. This case was followed by 
the bringing of  an action by the Masyarakat Transparansi Aceh 
Singkil (Aceh Singkil Transparency Community/MaTRAS), an 
anticorruption organization active in Singkil regency, against the 
regent of  Singkil arising out of  alleged corruption involving the 
2003 local government budget.
While, once again, this action failed, it nevertheless spurred 
the authorities into action with the charging of  the regent, 
deputy regent, regency secretary and a former regency treasurer 
as suspects. 
Budget Reviews
A provincial draft budget should reflect the administration’s 
real outlook and commitment. In addition, it should also be 
properly structured, accountable and be adopted in a timely 
fashion. However, in Aceh the budget is always late, despite the 
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fact that a year or more is spent on its deliberation. This habit is 
well-ingrained and will be exceedingly difficult to change. A side 
effect of  this is the tradition of  procuring goods and services 
by way of  direct appointment rather than open tender, with the 
excuse being that the project in question is urgent. Given these 
circumstances, the only people to benefit are senior officials and 
their cronies.
The habitual and undue delay in adopting the provincial budget 
is the result of a conspiracy between the executive and legislature as 
part of a grand design to advance the interests of those in power. 
No regard is had to the fact that such delay further worsens the 
quality of development taking place in the province. All that is 
important for those involved in projects is ensuring that they are 
completed in accordance with the deadlines that have been set. 
Regard for the interests of the public is rare.
There were a number of  aspects that needed to be studied 
as part of  a review of  the budgetary process in Aceh province, 
namely:
1. The public participation aspect – to what extent are the 
public involved in the planning, implementation, oversight 
and accountability processes;
2. The transparency aspect – how easy, or difficult, as the case 
may be, is it for members of  the public to access informa-
tion on budget and financial management;
3. The accountability aspect – how well is financial manage-
ment accounted for to the public;
4. The justice aspect – to what extent does the budget accom-
modate the interests of  vulnerable groups (women, children, 
parents and the poor).
Based on this review, it was found that almost every year 
the budget allocations for the local government (expenditure on 
the running of government) was much greater than the expen-
diture earmarked for advancing the interests of the public, with 
between 60 percent and 65 percent being devoted on average to 
the administration of government and only between 35 and 40 
percent being allocated for advancing the interests of the public. 
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In the light of these figures, there is clearly something wrong with 
the provincial government’s scale of priorities. It has consistently 
lacked any sense of crisis and has been content to muddle through 
without any form of evaluation of the performances achieved in 
previous years.
Accordingly, it was decided that organized and focused criti-
cism of  the budgetary process in Aceh was required in order to 
encourage the adoption of  instituting of  professional financial 
management by the provincial government. The combining of  
forces by anticorruption organizations in Aceh in the Aceh Da-
mai Tanpa Korupsi (Peaceful Aceh without Corruption/ADTK) 
Working Group, in which the Aceh Anticorruption Movement 
(GeRAK) played a pivotal role, served to strengthen the capac-
ity of  the individual organizations in transforming the campaign 
into a mass movement. However, in order for this movement 
to be successful, local regulations would be needed guaranteeing 
the right of  the public to participate in the budgetary process, 
and, no less importantly, the right of  the public to access in-
formation.
Budget Monitoring
Budget monitoring was urgently required in order to reduce 
irregularities in the management of  public funds. Monitoring 
needed to be carried out not just at the implementation stage 
but also at the planning stage. In addition, such monitoring 
would help ascertain the extent to which the interests of  the 
public were being accommodated and reflected, and reduce the 
likelihood of  corruption.
In reality, “corruption planning” actually starts when the 
draft budget is discussed at the executive level. Starting in the 
relevant agency, the lowest level, and continuing up through the 
Provincial Planning Board (Bappeda), and the executive’s and 
legislature’s budget committees, the chain of  corruption goes on 
and on. In order to ensure that its projects are approved, the 
relevant agency bribes the members of  the Provincial Legisla-
tive Council, or resorts to some other modus operandi, such as 
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promising the projects to members of  the Council who also, by 
happy coincidence, happen to be businessmen. This not only 
negates healthy competition, but also results in poor quality 
work and shoddy results. As a result of  these shenanigans, even 
at this early stage the draft budget is becoming divorced from 
the needs and interests of  the public, namely, the alleviation of  
poverty, reduction in employment and improvements in public 
welfare.
The next stage where monitoring is required is the imple-
mentation stage. Is the work being carried out in accordance 
with the plans? Are procurements of  goods and services being 
carried out in line with the Presidential Decrees that govern 
public procurements? Monitoring at this stage is intended to 
ensure that project implementation is in line with the plans in 
order to prevent taxpayer losses and damage to the national 
business climate.
The monitoring carried out by the Aceh Anticorruption 
Movement (GeRAK) in Aceh in 2002 uncovered various mo-
dus operandi by which corruption was perpetrated. Many cases 
involving the use of  budget funds were found not to be in line 
with the regulations (illegal payments to members of  the Aceh 
Legislative Council), or involved markups, fictitious projects, direct 
appointments, the use of  monies for purposes for which they 
had not been allocated, monies not being paid to the proper 
recipients, commencing projects prior to the allocation of  budget 
funds, duplication of  budget allocations, bribery, failure to comply 
with specifications, and the shifting of  project locations. All of  
these irregularities and abuses showed once again how willing 
those in power were to betray the mandate of  the people.
Reporting Findings
The reporting of  findings of  likely corruption started with a 
report on suspected graft by the former regent of  Simeulue, M. 
Amin, to the Banda Aceh Prosecutor’s Office. This case involved 
a fictitious project that defrauded the taxpayer of  Rp 1 billion.
The efforts made by the anticorruption organizations in this 
case bore fruit: M. Amin was sentenced to one year in jail by 
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the court of  first instance.
Rp 75 million loan scandal: Dressing Mutton up as Lamb
This case may be traced back to the promise of  Abdullah 
Puteh to purchase cars imported from Singapore for each mem-
ber of  the Provincial Legislative Council, apparently in order to 
ensure the acceptance of  his accountability statement. However, 
time went by and the promise remained unfulfilled. Under pres-
sure from the councilors, Puten decided to take money from the 
provincial contingency fund and use it to pay each member Rp 
75 million. The modus operandi in this case was quite cunning. 
The money was first deposited in the Aceh Development Bank 
(BPD) before being disbursed to the councilors so as to make 
the payments look like loans. In this case, potential taxpayer 
losses of  Rp 4,050 billion were involved.
The findings in the case were reported by JARAK to the 
Aceh Provincial Prosecutor’s Office on 28 April 2003, and were 
accepted by Deputy Chief  Prosecutor Andi Amir Achmad (cur-
rently Aceh Chief  Prosecutor). However, the investigation was 
officially discontinued in May 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor’s 
Office through the issuance of  an SP3 certificate. Subsequently, 
the findings were reported by the Peaceful Aceh without Corrup-
tion Working Group  (Aceh Damai Tanpa Korupsi ADTK) to 
the Corruption Eradication Commission, with the case file being 
received by Corruption Eradication Commission representative 
Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas at the Commission’s headquarters.
Following the conducting of  an analysis, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission sent a letter to the Attorney General. At 
his urging, the Aceh Prosecutor’s Office reopened the investiga-
tion. To date, four people have been charged as suspects, namely, 
Muhammad Yus (former speaker of  the Aceh Provincial Legisla-
tive Council during the 1999-2004 period and now a member 
of  the Republic of  Indonesia House of  Representatives for the 
United Development Party/PPP), T. Bahrum Manyak (former 
deputy speaker of  the Aceh Provincial Legislative Council for 
the 1999-2004 period and now a member of  the Assembly 
for the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party/PDI-P), Mursid 
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Minosra (former deputy speaker of  the Aceh Provincial Legisla-
tive Council for the 1999-2004 period for the Golkar Party), and 
Farid Wadjidi Ali (former deputy speaker of  the Aceh Provincial 
Legislative Council for the 1999-2004 period for the Indonesian 
National Municipality/TNI).
The investigation into this case was temporarily halted by the 
tsunami disaster that devastated parts of  coastal Aceh. However, 
with the normalization of  government activity in the province, 
the investigation has been restarted with a number of  councilors 
from the 1999-2004 period having been questioned to date. The 
Aceh Provincial Prosecutor’s Office has also stated that other 
suspects may be charged, including Tantawi Ishak, the Aceh 
Provincial Secretary.
Markup in the Purchase of  Mi-2 Helicopter
The Mi-2 helicopter purchase, besides involving a markup, 
was also carried out without going through a competitive tender. 
Puteh allocated Rp 12.6 billion for the purchase of  the helicopter 
out of  the provincial budget, besides also raiding regency/mu-
nicipality budgets in 2001. This shows just how widespread cor-
ruption was in Aceh under the Puteh administration. As a result 
of  the purchase of  this helicopter, the taxpayer was defrauded 
of  Rp 4 billion. The first indications of  a markup became ap-
parent when it was discovered that similar helicopters purchased 
by the Navy only cost Rp 3.5 billion. Following this revelation, 
the issue became a source of  major public controversy.
The suspicions of  corruption in the procurement of  the 
helicopter were first reported to the Aceh Provincial Prosecutor’s 
Office, but no response was forthcoming. This, however, did not 
discourage those involved, who then reported the case on 21 
January to the Corruption Eradication Commission – which had 
only recently been established – where our representatives were 
received by Corruption Eradication Commission representative 
Tumpak Panggabean.
This was the perfect opportunity for finally bringing Puteh to 
justice. It was the first case in which the Corruption Eradication 
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Commission had named a suspect and obviously the Commis-
sion would not want to see the prosecution fail. In bringing the 
prosecution, the Corruption Eradication Commission was acting 
on the promise made by the government of  President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to come down hard on corruption. After 
being tried in open court, Puteh was sentenced by the Anticor-
ruption Court to 10 years in jail – two years more than had been 
sought by the prosecution. The news was greeted with rejoicing 
by the people of  Aceh, and provided a ray of  hope amid the 
misery caused by the earthquake and tsunami.
Constraints on Blowing the Lid on Corruption
The effort to blow the lid on the web of  corruption that 
has long prevailed in Aceh has been far from easy or straight-
forward. The way in which resources are used and strategies 
put into effect needs to be regularly assessed so as to ensure 
that the campaign is in reality on target and taking root. The 
opportunities that arise do not just fall from trees – more often 
than not, before an opportunity may be fully availed of, various 
constraints will need to be overcome.
This was our experience in blowing the lid on the Puteh case, 
one of  the most difficult that has ever been brought before the 
court in Indonesia. Bearing in mind the state of  justice in Aceh 
and the position of  Puteh as well-nigh untouchable, many said 
that we were embarking on a “mission impossible”. However, 
the necessary information and facts were assembled piece by 
piece. Information was gathered from whatever sources were 
available, including friends and colleagues, and eventually began 
to form a coherent picture. 
However, many constraints were encountered during the 
process. On one occasion we were invited by a media outlet in 
Aceh to collaborate with it in organizing a public discussion on 
“working hand in hand with the people to eradicate corruption”. 
However, this was in reality an effort to tarnish the reputation of 
our organization as it turned out the funding for the event had 
been provided by Puteh. In addition, efforts were made to weaken 
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our resolve by offers of money and other inducements. Attempts 
like these were made on many occasions by figures close to Puteh. 
After these attempts to subvert our resolve failed, the Puteh camp 
resorted to other tactics: I myself was summoned by the Aceh 
Police chief and questioned over various statements I had made 
on corruption. This attempt to undermine our movement also 
failed, as did all the efforts by the Puteh camp to distort the facts 
and change the focus from corruption to politics.
In Aceh, those in power frequently use politics to cover up 
their corrupt activities and stifle criticism from the public, keep 
the people pliant and allow those in power to continue using 
the public purse as a private source of  income.
There now follows a list of  the main constraints encountered 
in blowing the whistle on corruption in Aceh:
• The process of  obtaining permits was quite long-drawn-out 
as a result of  the military emergency and the ensuing civilian 
emergency;
• Military Emergency Commander (PDMD)’s Directive Number 
6 of  2003 on national non-governmental organizations and 
national press outlets required the PDMD’s approval for the 
holding of  a media conference.
• The processing of  permits turned out to be more convoluted 
and long-drawn-out under the civilian emergency than it had 
under the military emergency.
• The busy schedules of  policy makers meant that only limited 
time was available for meeting with and lobbying them.
• Lack of awareness on the part of the public of the need to 
institute good governance, and the lack of shared strategies 
among the stakeholders for the creation of good gover-
nance.
• With regard to general elections, many pressing activities 
had to be postponed as a result of  the security situation. 
• Lack of  mechanisms/ethical standards for assessing the reli-
ability of  those involved in the anticorruption struggle.
• Absence of  a Provincial Regulation on public participation 
and public access to information.
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• The continued application of  Provincial Regulation Number 
11 of  2001 on the structure of  the provincial audit board, 
which only serves to emasculate the provincial audit board 
and the Aceh Office of  the Development and Finance Audit 
Board (BPKP).
• Law Number 18 of  2001, which provides that both the 
Aceh chief  of  police and chief  provincial prosecutor can 
only be appointed based upon the approval of  the governor. 
This renders both of  these law enforcement institutions 
subordinate to the Aceh government.
• Weak oversight and supervision on the part of  the Aceh 
Provincial Legislative Council. In fact, it was found that 
corruption often involved collusion between the legislature 
and executive.
• Serious constraints on the uncovering of  corruption in the 
military, particularly during martial law and the civilian emer-
gency in Aceh. The lack of  information from the military 
bureaucracy and the climate of  fear in the province were 
the most serious problems in this regard.
Factors Supporting the Fight against Corruption
Besides the constraints enumerated above, there were also 
a number of  factors that operated in favor of  the fight against 
corruption in Aceh province, namely:
1. One of the pillars of the so-called integrated operation was 
law enforcement, particularly the tackling of corruption. This 
assisted with the uncovering of two major corruption cases 
involving Puteh: the Mi-2 helicopter case and the Rp 30 billion 
case involving the procurement of an electrical generator.
2. The coming into effect of  Law No. 30 of  2003 on the 
Corruption Eradication Commission.
3. The Puteh case was the first to be handled by the Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission. Consequently, the Commis-
sion did not wish to see it fail. This in turn gave renewed 
hope to those involved in the fight against corruption. It 
also represented a form of  shock treatment designed to 
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restore the confidence of  the public in law enforcement in 
this country.
4. The change in government from that of  Megawati Soek-
arnoputri to the administration of  Susilo Bambang Yud-
hoyono, who had made the eradication of  corruption one 
of  his campaign platforms.
5. The appointment of  Abdurrahman Saleh as Attorney General 
forced provincial and state prosecutor’s offices to ramp up 
their performances.
Developing Anticorruption Networks
The effort to increase public awareness of  the need to 
combat corruption, and the eliciting of  public support for this 
purpose, were of  the utmost importance. However, well thought-
out strategies would be required to achieve these goals given 
the high level of  apathy prevailing in Acehnese society. What 
had to be done was to gather information on corruption cases 
and make sure that convictions ensued. The actions against the 
governor and Provincial Legislative Council were the points of  
departure for convincing the public that results could in fact be 
achieved, despite the obstacles.
Such renewed public trust then needed to be steered in the 
direction of  forming an anticorruption network at the grassroots 
level. The establishment of  the Aceh Anticorruption Grassroots 
Network (JARAK), in which the Anticorruption Working Group 
played a pivotal role, represented proof  positive that a popular 
movement could bring about improvements in the system of  
government.
Anticorruption Education
The effort to eradicate corruption also entails studying 
strategies, monitoring, tracing, and analysis as regards data and 
information sources. In addition, the public must also understand 
all of  the systems involved in public administration, including 
powers and authority, accountability and financial management. 
Of  particular importance are the budgetary planning process, the 
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development process, supervisory mechanisms, and accountability 
mechanisms as regards governmental performance. In reality, those 
members of  the public involved in the fight against corruption 
should know as much about the system of  government as the 
Provincial Audit Board, Development and Finance Audit Board 
(BPKP), and the Provincial Development Planning Board.
This knowledge is essential so that members of the public may 
fully comprehend the effects and dangers of corruption regarding 
their own lives, and the weaknesses (both internal and external) 
inherent in the current system of government, which provide fertile 
ground on which corruption can flourish. If the people understand 
all of these things, then they will become more highly motivated 
in applying pressure with a view to seeing the establishment of 
clean and good governance. An awareness will arise among the 
public to always be on the lookout for corruption in the corridors 
of power, with the ultimate goal being the creation of a society 
in which the people are more willing to speak out and challenge 
corruption and the arbitrary use of power.
Collaboration with the Media 
The public need to be continuously informed of  the progress 
being made in the fight against corruption. One of  the ways 
this may be achieved is through collaboration with the media, 
which has an immense role to play in the dissemination of  in-
formation. However, it must be admitted here that achieving this 
goal is no easy task. In general, the media in the past tended 
to focus on political and human rights news. The situation in 
Aceh was compounded by the fact that only one daily paper 
was published locally.
At that time, the media was not free from intervention by 
those in power and those opposed to the anticorruption move-
ment. This reality resulted in media coverage that only served to 
cover up abuses of  power by officials. Of  course, made-to-order 
reports designed to discombobulate the public and obfuscate the 
true state of  affairs were packaged very neatly so that they were 
not immediately recognizable as plants. One clear example of  
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such news coverage was the polemic over Aceh Culture Week in 
2004, where the local daily ran stories designed to sway public 
opinion in favor of  this “Puteh project”, the funding for which 
had been taken from the education budget.
In fact, it very often appeared that the local daily was little 
more than a mouthpiece for those in power. It was an open 
secret that media people were frequently bribed. This is where 
the national media has a role to play in reporting on this sort 
of  abuse at the local level, and in providing alternative news 
sources.
In the light of  the above description, it is clearly of  the 
essence that constant efforts be made to convince the media to 
provide more space to public policy monitoring and the report-
ing of  major corruption cases. When the news first broke about 
the civil action being brought against Puteh, the people were 
amazed as such a thing had never happened before. Thus, any 
institution or personage, no matter how strong, may be chal-
lenged provided that those launching the challenge are equipped 
with comprehensive information and facts. This is the principle 
that must be kept at the forefront of  the minds of  all those 
engaged in the struggle against corruption.
Eliciting the Support of  Students 
In order to ensure that the anticorruption movement is not 
thwarted by those in power, as much support must be raised as 
possible. Students represent one group, both in Aceh and elsewhere, 
that can provide a great deal of support for the struggle. They are 
also trusted and will be listened to by the public. Learning from 
the reform movement of 1998, we encouraged the students’ unions 
from a number of universities in Aceh to take to the streets. In 
this regard, the students also played a role in disseminating infor-
mation about corruption, and the corruption cases that had been 
uncovered. This collaborative effort with Aceh’s students was a 
resounding success and served to even more firmly implant an 
anticorruption outlook in Acehnese society.
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Getting Public Figures on Board
The voices of  informal (non-governmental) leaders also 
needed to be heard. Such leaders, as well as ulama(Islamic scholars) 
are highly respected in Aceh and are listened to by the people. 
Take, for example, the statement made on 25 March 2005 through 
the Serambi Indonesia daily by Dr. Tengku H Muslim Ibrahim MA, 
the chairman of  the Provincial Consultative Council of  Ulama 
(MPU), and Drs. Tengku H. Djamaluddin, the chairman of  the 
Bireun branch of  the MPU, in connection with irregularities 
involving the supply of  cement by PT Semen Andalas Indo-
nesia (PT SAI). The two ulama condemned all involved, both 
government officials and whoever else, in diverting supplies of  
cement intended for the rebuilding of  mosques and  pesantren 
(Islamic boarding schools). This statement highlighted the fact that 
patience with corruption was growing exceedingly thin among 
the Acehnese at all levels.
Changing Times in Aceh
The fight against corruption in Aceh kicked off  back in 
2000, with the focus then being on budget advocacy. Now, the 
focus is on advocacy in connection with the reconstruction of  
the province following the tsunami. When the Puteh case broke, 
many were pessimistic. However, for us, even if  things had gone 
wrong, what was important was the work that had already been 
done. We were determined to persevere and not stop until every 
corrupt official in Aceh was brought to justice. As a result of  
this determination, a significant change has been brought about 
in Aceh in the public policy arena and in public perceptions of  
corruption. Given the successes to date, we hope to see a society 
emerge that is proud of  its anticorruption credentials and its fight 
against policies that prejudice the interests of  the people.
Policy Changes
One of the most significant changes that has taken place has 
been the issuance of a presidential decree on the coordinated and 
2  Presidential Decree Number 5 of  2004 on the Acceleration of  Corruption Eradication.
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synchronized eradication of corruption, collusion and nepotism.2 
This Decree has give rise to more practical mechanisms for 
the taking of  action against those involved in corruption. This 
has been reflected in the replacement of  the Aceh Provincial 
Chief  Prosecutor, who was viewed as being suspect, and the 
decision of  the Aceh Provincial Legislative Council to reject the 
governor’s accountability statement due to various irregularities 
in the management of  public monies. These important changes 
were also supported by the introduction of  sharia law in Aceh 
in 2004, followed by the designation of  2004 as “Corruption-
Free Year”.
Changing Processes and the Attitudes of  Stakeholders
The public are becoming increasingly aware of  the dangers 
posed by corruption, while the political parties, public officials 
and the media are now all trying to outdo each other in uncover-
ing corruption cases. In fact, a number of  Regency/Municipality 
Legislative Councils have rejected the draft budget estimates 
proposed by their local chief  executives in circumstances where 
a strategic plan had not been drawn up beforehand. To date, 
the favorite topic of  discourse, in public at least, among party 
members, public officials, and military and police officers is the 
problem of  corruption.
Increasing the Knowledge of  Stakeholders
The increased awareness of  the public as regards the evils of  
corruption and the weaknesses of  the oversight and supervision 
system in the province of  Aceh imbued people with a strong 
spirit to challenge all government decisions that appeared tainted 
by corruption or which only served to prejudice the interests 
of  the public. In addition, people became more courageous in 
reporting, both directly and indirectly, suspicions of  corruption 
to the authorities or to anticorruption organizations. This shows 
that the public is now quite responsive to corruption issues and 
better understands what needs to and can be done to overcome the 
problem. In one unusual case, a group of  blind people reported 
the Provincial Social Services Agency to the press for misfeasance 
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involving funds that were earmarked for the blind.
Keeping the Ball Rolling
The work that has already been done in fighting against 
corruption must be sustained. There are many aspects of  gov-
ernment in Aceh that still need to be overhauled, and thus 
require the constant scrutiny of  the public. For example, it is 
absolutely essential that both the internal and external oversight 
and supervision systems be reformed.
The dissemination of  information on corruption must be 
continued. The organizing of  stakeholders and the requirement 
that the villages be involved in the budgeting process constitute 
significant advances in this struggle, and will have a direct influence 
on improving the system of  government. We feel confident that 
these efforts will bear fruit in breaking the chain of  corruption 
and the rent-seeking practices that have for so long served those 
in power well. However, a local regulation on the participation 
of  the villages in the budgeting process is still awaited, as are 
regulations on village financial management and budgeting.
No less significant is the increasing democratization of  
Aceh, including the holding of  direct elections for heads of  local 
governments. This should produce leaders who are answerable 
and accountable directly to the people. In other words, the way 
will finally be open for the election of  persons of  high integrity, 
competence and ability to the most senior positions in Aceh, 
Uncovering Corruption in Aceh

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Gerakan Anti Korupsi (Aceh Anti-
corruption Movement/GeRAK) was 
established on 29 November 2003 (by 
a deed dated 3 December 2004), by six 
activists, namely, Akhiruddin Mahjud-
din, Bambang Antariksa, Hemma Mar-
lenny, Muhammad Ibrahim, Keuchik 
H. Jailani Hasan Riseh, and Misran 
Nirto.
Akhiruddin Mahjuddin is 
the coordinator of  the Ger-
akan Anti Korupsi (Aceh 
Anticorruption Movement/
GeRAK).
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Anticorruption Snowball 
in South Sulawesi1
 Elyas Joseph
Spreading the Good Fortune Around
South Sulawesi is a veritable heaven on earth for those up to their necks in corruption! While this statement may sound bombastic, it is nevertheless true, as shown by the fact 
that the cultural values summed up by the words siri’, lempu’ and 
getteng – among the Bugis-Makassar people siri means self-respect 
or dignity, lempu means honesty and getteng means steadfastness 
in upholding tradition, legal and religious values – are no lon-
ger respected in the community. The reality is that the moral 
values handed down by the ancestors of  the Bugis-Makassar 
people – who make up the majority of  the population in South 
Sulawesi – and which were adopted in the 15th century by the 
local royalty, and then government leaders and law officers, not 
only no longer serve as references, but in fact are now more 
often than not ignored. 
These ancestral values are summed up in the local language 
by the maxim, tanuallei jangang ri lerammang, tanukucingkai bayao ri 
kambotimmang, tanuallei kaluku sibatummang, rappo sipaemmang, which 
loosely translates as follows: Don’t steal a chicken belonging 
to your own people, don’t steal an egg from your own people 
and don’t steal even one coconut or areca nut from your own 
people.
According to cultural observer Alwi Rachman, the values 
1  This paper describes the empirical histories of  three consecutive programs, the latter two sup-
ported by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, titled respectively, “Corruption 
and the Poor” (July 2001, a study run in collaboration with the Bina Swadaya Foundation 
Jakarta and World Bank), “Encouraging the Public To Fight Against Corruption: “ (January 
- September 2002), and “Institutionalizing Public Participation in the Fight Against Corrup-
tion” (January 2004 - June 2005).
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encapsulated in the words siri’, lempu’ and getting are now as good 
as dead, and are currently being readied for burial, both socially 
and politically. Alwi says that these values have been slowly dying 
out over the last two to three decades, or, in other words, during 
the same period that the New Order regime was in power. 
The laudable values that once characterized Bugis-Makassar 
society have now been supplanted by opportunism, superficiality 
and tolerance of  all manner of  ethical and moral violations.
For example, if  a public official suddenly becomes inor-
dinately wealthy, the people accept this, saying that it is only 
natural that an official should be wealthy. When South Sulawesi 
Governor H.M. Amin Syam and Bulukumba Regent Pabokori 
threw extravagant wedding parties for their offspring – draw-
ing the wrath of  NGOs and cultural observers in the process, 
who castigated the officials as going far beyond the bounds of  
extravagance permitted by local tradition – the people of  South 
Sulawesi deemed their behavior to be entirely reasonable as gov-
ernors and regents in the province are now regarded as akin to 
petty royalty. It never appears to enter into people’s minds that 
all the wealth and extravagance could actually be derived from 
the suffering and sweat of  the people.
The same sort of thing happens at the grassroots level. When 
the parents of school-children are asked to pay all manner of 
unofficial fees, they consider this acceptable as teachers are badly 
paid. If the Office of Religious Affairs in Makassar charges Rp 
600,000 for a couple to get married – Rp 420,000 more than 
the official charge – the people accept this as normal, and even 
praiseworthy, as the good fortune of the happy couple is being 
spread around among others. In fact, if between 40 percent and 
55 percent of the earnings of trishaw drivers, sand miners and 
construction workers in Dangko subdistrict, Tamalate district, and 
Makassar municipality (in 2000) did not have to be “donated” in 
unofficial fees for non-existent public services, they might actually 
be able to afford education for all of their children.
On the other hand, among the bureaucrats, the political elite, 
law enforcement officers and court officials, the ancient values of  
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the Bugis-Makassar people have been turned on their heads to 
serve as shields for the crimes those in high places so regularly 
commit. To refer to corruption in the bureaucracy or among the 
political elite is now construed as siri’, meaning doing something 
shameful and defamatory. So, anyone brave enough to highlight 
the prevalence of  moral turpitude among the elite is likely to 
find himself  in the dock on criminal defamation charges.
Corruption and Poverty 
Taking as its point of  departure the reality described above, 
particularly at the grassroots level, the Indonesian Women’s Em-
powerment Legal Aid Institute (LBH-P2i), together with the Bina 
Swadaya Foundation, Jakarta, and the World Bank, conducted a 
study between June and July 2001 on corruption and the poor 
in Makassar. The objective of  this study was to identify the 
perceptions prevailing in the community as regards corruption, 
poverty, and the connection between corruption and poverty, 
as well as to map out the situation as regards corruption at the 
local level and identify the dubious bureaucratic practices that 
have traditionally not been categorized as corruption in South 
Sulawesi. 
Based on the findings of  this study, it was recommended 
that steps would have to be taken to change tolerant attitudes 
toward corruption at the grassroots level if  poverty was to be 
satisfactorily addressed. This was particularly important given 
that poverty always affects women and children more than other 
people. In line with the study’s findings, the first step taken was 
to design measures that would serve to encourage disadvantaged 
people to stop paying unofficial/illegal “contributions” to the 
bureaucracy, while at the same time attempting to “prick the 
consciences” of  those levying such unofficial contributions by 
highlighting to them the consequences of  their behavior. As 
part of  these activities, communities were to be encouraged to 
set up corruption monitoring groups.
These measures were then packaged as a grassroots cam-
paign against corruption. Titled “Encouraging the Public To 
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Fight Against Corruption”, this LBH-P2i program – which 
was supported by the Partnership for Governance Reform in 
Indonesia – involved 22 non-governmental organizations/civil 
society organizations in Makassar, Bone and Pinrang in carrying 
out a series of  activities focused on providing basic education 
and training for the monitoring of  corruption in the provision 
of  public services at the grassroots level. The program was also 
intended to pave the way for public access to, and control over, 
the processes involved in the provision of  public services, and to 
facilitate anticorruption advocacy. The target groups selected for 
the program were as follows: construction workers, sand miners, 
and trishaw drivers in 12 districts of  Makassar, fisherfolk on 
Barrang Lompo island, hawkers in five local markets, scavengers 
at Antang dump, district and sub-district officials in Gowa re-
gency, members of  Community Empowerment Councils/Village 
Empowerment Councils, artists, journalists, housewives, students, 
commercial sex workers, pimps, and the unemployed.
In order to ensure that the program’s targets would be 
achieved and its scope widened, the first stage of  the anticor-
ruption campaign, which lasted six months (February-July 2002), 
involved the participation of  the media, including a private ra-
dio station with 28 local affiliates, TVRI in Makassar, and local 
newspapers such as the Fajar, Barita Kota and Pedoman Rakyat 
dailies, for the purpose of  publicizing indications of  corrup-
tion uncovered by those involved in the program. In order to 
anticipate “corruption fatigue” on the part of  the local media 
(many of  the forms of  corruption at the grassroots level tended 
to be the same throughout the coverage area), the program also 
published its own monthly anticorruption bulletin in tabloid 
form, titled Satu Indonesia (United Indonesia).
Other methods employed to spread the anticorruption 
message included “people’s theater” put on by two popular Bu-
gis-Makassar comedy troupes named Komunitas Rumah Panggung 
(Korupa) and Kelompok Sandiwara Petta Puang respectively. Unlike 
the sort of  community theater promoted by the Department 
of  Information and TVRI during the New Order, which only 
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served to cover up the excesses of  the power holders, the Ko-
rupa and Petta Puang troupes were specifically established for the 
purpose of  removing the stigma attached to community theater 
since the Soeharto days. In its performance titled Karang Tojeng, 
Korupa turned the original concept of  community theater on 
its head and, instead of  supporting the government and power 
holders, highlighted the corruption prevalent in the provision 
of  public services and policy-making. This new departure came 
as no surprise, however, as Korupa was not only made up of  
theater performers, but also student activists, journalists and 
NGO activists. Thus, the messages presented in all of  their 
performances were very far removed from the sort of  messages 
formerly associated with community theater. The shows put on 
by Korupa and Petta Puang never concerned kings and nobility, 
invulnerability, government successes, development, Pancasila or 
the citizen’s duty to pay tax. Instead, what they portrayed was 
the imposition of  unofficial fees for ID cards, under-the-counter 
payments of  millions of  rupiah just to get into police academy, 
people demanding official tickets when pulled over by the traffic 
police, people refusing to give gratuities to sub-district officials, 
and people willing to risk going to jail in order to spill the beans 
on corrupt officials to the press.
The Snowball Effect
Changing the face of community theater so as to draft it into 
the fight against corruption turned out to be a highly successful 
experiment, and one that produced a very encouraging response 
from the public. For the entire duration of the program, each per-
formance by the two troupes was attended by at least 500 fired-up 
spectators – all of them regularly punching their fists in the air, 
clapping rapturously and screaming out anticorruption slogans.
The first stage of  the war on corruption at the grassroots 
level may be likened to a snowball getting bigger as it rolls 
along. Bit by bit, grassroots communities began to develop a true 
awareness of  the meaning of  corruption and all of  its associated 
evils. Slowly, it began to dawn on people that their poverty was, 
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at least in part, caused by corruption. One indication of  the 
emergence of  this new awareness was newfound courage on the 
part of  the public to stage demonstrations at Local Legislative 
Councils to protest at the poor services provided by district/sub-
district administrations and agricultural boards, and the levying 
of  unofficial fees for public services, such as those provided 
by local community clinics (Puskesmas) and state hospitals, the 
local police, markets and schools.
During meetings with members of  Local Legislative Councils 
participating in village meetings or during protests in front of  
the Councils themselves, the people were not only courageous 
enough to demand the dismissal of  local district and sub-district 
heads, but also of  officials responsible for levying unofficial fees, 
a practice that the people now realized constituted corruption. 
In a number of  the sub-districts targeted for the first stage of  
the program, the people refused to pay garbage collection bills 
that had been enclosed with their electricity bills. Meanwhile, 
they would now also demand receipts for any payments made 
to Community Empowerment Councils/Village Empowerment 
Councils, and schools over and beyond those paid to the School 
Committee. Protests by residents against water bills that were 
far in excess of  the amount of  water actually consumed were 
launched in 14 districts, and these eventually forced the mayor 
of  Makassar to change the billing system. 
The anticorruption messages carried in the media also drew 
a response from the public. On private radio, these messages 
were presented in talk shows covering incidences of  corruption 
that affected the public at large. The hosts of  these shows would 
deliberately keep the discussions simple so that they could be 
understood by most people, with the focus being firmly placed on 
such abuses as unofficial levies imposed on road users, unofficial 
levies and fees at the sub-district level and in the schools, and 
various other forms of  unofficial charges that were commonly 
imposed on the public. During the shows, the interviewers would 
encourage those being interviewed to condemn the perpetrators 
of  corruption. Among those interviewed were Legislative Coun-
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cil members, academics, NGO activists, court officers, and law 
enforcement officials. In order to steer the discussions in the 
desired direction, groups of  “listeners” were readied to phone 
in with comments.
This campaign proved highly popular with the public, as 
shown by the fact that around 60 corruption monitoring groups 
were set up in Makassar, Bone and Pinrang as a direct conse-
quence of  the radio shows.
A Shift in Focus
The general elections of  2004 and the election of  a new 
mayor in Makassar, also in 2004, provided a good backdrop to the 
rolling out of  the second stage of  the anticorruption program. 
Also supported by the Partnership, this second-stage was titled 
“Institutionalizing Public Participation to Fight Against Corrup-
tion: Follow Up of  the ‘Corruption and the Poor’ Project in 
Makassar II”. Together with six selected non-governmental and 
civil society organizations, LBH-P2i designed a program that was 
not only focused on the grassroots level, but also attempted to 
address the problem of  corruption at the policy-making level. 
There were a number of  reasons why it was considered 
necessary to reorient the focus of  the program more in the 
direction of  the policy-makers. These included the fact that the 
interval between the completion of  the evaluation process for 
the first stage of  the program and the start of  the second stage 
was more than one year (July 2002 until February 2004). During 
this period, the corruption question became overshadowed by 
other local issues of  major importance to the public, such as 
widespread evictions, the election of  12 regents/mayors and the 
gubernatorial election, all of  which took place between August 
2002 and August 2003.
Given these circumstances, it proved impossible for the or-
ganizers of  the first stage of  the program to maintain pressure 
from the corruption monitoring groups. In reality, of  the original 
60 monitoring groups, mentored by the 15 NGOs involved in 
running the program, only 20 groups remained relatively active 
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by the start of  October 2004. 
The first move to take advantage of  the opportunities 
provided by the 2004 elections was to revitalize the anticor-
ruption monitoring groups at the grassroots level. Civil society 
organizations were encouraged to start monitoring the provision 
of  public services once again in their respective areas, and to 
become involved in discussions about public policy with the 
members of, or the candidates running for, the Local Legisla-
tive Councils. These discussions were intended to allow the civil 
society organizations to convey the unease and disquiet felt by 
the public over corruption to the politicians, and to encourage 
them to respond to the wishes of  the people in their manifes-
toes. Accordingly, the candidates running for mayor of  Makassar 
for the 2004-2009 period and the candidates running for the 
Local Legislative Councils were encouraged to incorporate the 
anticorruption agenda in their manifestoes, and, should they be 
elected, to ensure that it was also reflected in public policy and 
the administration of  government.
These activities were supported by efforts to prepare the 
infrastructure necessary for good governance through the draw-
ing up of  white papers incorporating draft local regulations that 
would permit public participation in the planning process and in 
deliberations in the Local Legislative Councils, and allow the public 
to effect control over the implementation of  public policy.
The second stage of  the program, which involved six non-
governmental organizations and civil society organizations and 
ran from January 2004 to May 2005, was also intended to spur 
public participation in the policy-making process and the draft-
ing and enactment of  local legislation so as to ensure that the 
opportunities for corruption could be minimized. As an initial 
step in this regard, the LBH-P2i mobilized various components 
of  society to become actively involved. This included their par-
ticipation in a public dialog titled “Analyzing the anticorruption 
vision of  the two Makassar mayoral candidates” with a view to 
ensuring that the candidates would sign up to a political contract 
committing themselves to fighting against corruption. Among 
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the societal groups that participated in this effort were non-
governmental organization/civil society organization activists, 
academics, cultural observers, religious leaders, legal practitioners, 
journalists, the urban poor community, sidewalk hawkers, com-
mercial sex workers, domestic helpers, the gay community, port 
workers, students, and non-partisan activists etc.
A similar approach was adopted by the program organizers 
during a series of  focus group discussions (FGDs) held with 
candidates standing in the 2004 elections. During these FGDs, 
the frontrunners in the Makassar mayoral race and the candidates 
running in the local legislative elections were asked to prove their 
anticorruption credentials by promising to resign from office if  
they failed to fulfill the political contracts they had signed. This 
was considered necessary to prove their sincerity about instituting 
good governance and fighting against corruption.
The program organizers were, of  course, aware that these 
political contracts were not enforceable and in many ways 
were little more than political clichés. In order to address this, 
volunteers from the community organizations working with 
each of  the program organizers were asked to foster a climate 
whereby the public would become convinced that those making 
such political promises could be called to account should they 
break their word, and even removed from office. Thus, if  the 
candidates failed to live up to their promises, various forms of  
action could be taken, such as swaying public opinion among 
the members of  other community groups to back the moves 
to oust them.
The results of  these efforts were highly encouraging. 
Grassroots protests were held to demand better public services, 
particularly in the education and health sectors, and to “com-
pel” local legislators to urge the mayor of  Makassar to publicly 
announce official charges for services in community clinics and 
prohibit the levying of  additional fees in the schools, which he 
eventually did. In addition, the eviction of  hawkers from Pantai 
Losari, the determination of  public transportation routes, and the 
setting of  new public transportation fares following fuel price 
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increases were no longer to be carried out unilaterally, but would 
now have to involve all those affected by such decisions. 
All of  this provided a valuable lesson for the mentoring 
groups to the effect that in the fight against corruption it was 
not enough to just attack the criminals. Rather, just as much 
headway could be made through the involvement of  the pub-
lic in the policy-making process at both the Local Legislative 
Council and administration levels. This involvement could be 
realized if  the relevant local legislation provided adequate room 
for public access as a collective right in the administration of  
government.
The second stage of  the program not only focused on po-
litical contracts and publicizing the anticorruption agendas of  
politicians, but also attempted to strengthen the anticorruption 
discourse through cultural and religious approaches. These were 
considered important as local cultural values were frequently 
distorted by the elite to obstruct the efforts to combat graft. 
Community leaders, politicians, and government officials accused 
of  engaging in corruption would generally react strongly and, with 
the assistance of  their lawyers, attempt to portray their accusers 
in the non-governmental organization/civil society organization 
sector as being maliciously out to shame and defame them, and 
tarnish their good names and reputations (mappakasiri’). On this 
basis, those in respect of whom allegations were laid would then 
bring charges of defamation and discredit the government against 
their accusers.
Focusing on Negative Issues
Issues such as corruption, alleviating poverty and strengthen-
ing the social economy were all touted by the candidates during 
the election campaigns at the legislative and executive levels in 
Makassar. However, the media preferred to concentrate on the 
political strife and infighting that accompanied the elections, which 
were considered by the media to be much more newsworthy. As 
a result, the public’s attention became focused on internal party 
splits, demonstrations at the local elections commission, disputed 
election results, the question of  bogus diplomas, the distribution 
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of  election supplies, and so forth. By contrast, the political prom-
ises made by the legislative candidates to wipe out corruption 
were not considered to be particularly newsworthy. Meanwhile, 
the public was also being lured with handouts of  food and other 
basics, T-shirts, hats, money, and bus fares, not to mention the 
opportunity for extra money by participating in “rent-a-crowd” 
demonstrations organized by the various candidates. 
The political turmoil during the 2004 election season not 
only resulted in anticorruption issues being sidelined, but also 
diminished the zeal of  the civil society organizations in consis-
tently highlighting incidences of  corruption. Most of  the grass-
roots dialogs held by the program organizers were now mainly 
attended by wives rather than their husbands. This complaint is 
not intended to denigrate the role played by women and mothers 
in the efforts to eradicate corruption, but is an acceptance of  
the reality that in order to apply pressure, the men are needed 
to participate in demonstrations for the purpose of  influencing 
policy implementation on the ground and policy formulation in 
the Local Legislative Councils.
It has to be acknowledged that the weakening of  the anti-
corruption movement at the grassroots level in the run-up to 
the 2004 elections was a serious constraint, and one that the 
program organizers found very difficult to overcome. Confronted 
with this situation, the LBH-P2i formulated a new strategy to 
revitalize the anticorruption movement on the group – a strategy 
that may best be compared to a rolling snowball.
The objectives of  this strategy were as follows:
• To spur renewed zeal for the fight against corruption on 
the part of  mentor groups/corruption monitoring groups, 
and grassroots anticorruption networks.
• To promote the more widespread growth of  anticorruption 
sentiment. This was based on the realization that it was not 
enough to inculcate anticorruption sentiment at the grassroots 
level alone. Rather, such sentiment had to exist among all 
social strata.
• To accelerate the fight against corruption at a higher level 
bearing in mind that resolute action against those involved in 
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stealing public funds had already been taken in areas outside 
of  South Sulawesi, including the arrest of  local councilors 
in a several provinces. This was particularly important given 
that a number of  reputedly corrupt politicians (known in 
Indonesia as politisi busuk – rotten politicians)2 had been 
reelected, and the existence of  widespread suspicions that 
many members of  the South Sulawesi Provincial Legislative 
Council and the Makassar Municipal Legislative Council were 
actively involved in corruption.
The successful achievement of  the above objectives was 
expected to impact positively on the anticorruption movement at 
the grassroots level. The basic problem to be addressed was the 
persistent prevalence of  paternalism in society, while the main 
constraint was the fact that it would be virtually impossible for 
the program organizers and mentor groups to get the snowball 
rolling given that the scope of  both the first and second stages 
of  the program were confined to the concept of  “corruption 
and the poor”.
In order to bring the war against corruption to the elite, 
a new weapon would be required to get the snowball rolling. 
This new weapon would need to be solid in the sense of  being 
supported by the necessary human resources, data processing 
capabilities, strong networking, and access to data and the media. 
The support of  public figures would also be required.
All of  the above strengths would be required bearing in mind 
the organizers’ experiences in combating corruption up to that 
time, which showed that it in order to mobilize the public to 
fight against corruption, it was necessary to package and pres-
ent corruption cases involving the power holders in a way that 
accorded with the perceptions prevailing in society, and to have 
the media firmly on board.
Accordingly, the LBH-P2i made a decision to exploit a number 
of concrete but difficult-to-prove “negative” issues that had attracted 
public attention for the purpose of getting the snowball rolling. 
Among the negative issues focused on were the following:
2  For more information on “rotten politicians”, see the article in this book by Teten Masduki, 
“Eradicating Corruption: From Resignation to Resistance”.
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The Makassar Mayoral Election
• The prevalence of  money politics involving a number of  
members of  the Makassar Municipal Legislative Council 
(1999-2004). No action had been taken against them by the 
electoral authorities.
• The proposal to recall three members of  the Golkar Party 
faction in the Makassar Municipal Legislative Council who 
had not voted for Ilham Arief  Sirajuddin (the chairman of  
the Golkar Executive Board in Makassar) in his bid for the 
Makassar mayorship, despite the fact that these three Golkar 
members had topped the polls in the legislative elections.
• Interference by the governor in his capacity as the chairman 
of  the Golkar Provincial Executive Board. The governor 
controversially supported his wife’s bid for the deputy may-
orship. She was standing as second-in-command on one of  
the strongest tickets in the mayoral race.
Post-Election Issues
• The Makassar/South Sulawesi Provincial Election Supervisory 
Committees failed to take any action on foot of  allegations 
of  money politics and other violations during the elections 
by candidates running for the House of  Representatives 
(DPR), Provincial/Regency Legislative Assemblies and the 
Regional Representatives Council (DPD) during the period 
prior to the official start of  campaigning.
• Between 60 percent and 70 percent of  those elected to the 
South Sulawesi and Makassar Local Legislative Councils were 
old hands and cronies of  the power holders.
Ongoing Issues
• A lack of public trust in local administrations and legislatures 
(even after the elections), with no signs of change in sight.
• The public still did not believe that the Members of  Par-
liament would press the legal authorities to take action to 
eradicate corruption at the subordinate levels (sub-district/
district/religious affairs office/police/ public clinics). 
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Besides the focus placed on these issues, public opinion was 
also shaped by a column written by Ahmda Ali (a lecturer in 
Hasanuddin University, Makassar, and a member of the National 
Commission on Human Rights - Komnas HAM), in the Fajar 
daily, who popularized the slogan, “Don’t use a dirty broom 
to sweep a dirty floor.” In addition, the many speeches made 
by candidates standing in the elections postulating that the war 
on corruption must start at the top, and the frequent reports 
carried by the national media of  local councilors being arrested 
for malfeasance, were also highlighted as part of  the anticor-
ruption campaign.
Anticorruption Coalition
Negative issues had now been readied for exposure and 
public opinion was continuously being shaped. The question 
now was how to manage public opinion and the said negative 
issues so as to ensure that the anticorruption snowball would 
start rolling and gathering pace in South Sulawesi? Bearing in 
mind the basic character of  the people of  both South Sulawesi 
and West Sulawesi – stubbornness and a willingness to go against 
the odds – appropriate advocacy strategies would be required so 
as to give rise to collective anger against corrupt administrations 
and politicians.
As the leading actor in the second stage of  the anticor-
ruption program, the LBH-P2i faced quite a dilemma. If  the 
snowball were set in motion solely by the organizers and sup-
porters of  the second stage of  the program, the anticorruption 
movement would not be capable of  producing any significant 
change. This belief  was based on a number of  considerations, 
including the following:
• The scope of, and the stakeholders in, the second stage were 
confined to the grassroots and middle classes.
• The lack of  expert human resources.
• The people of  South Sulawesi, and Makassar in particular, 
were highly skeptical bearing in mind the lack of  success 
up to that time in prosecuting misfeasors and embezzlers 
of  public funds in the courts.
Anticorruption Snowball in South Sulawesi
0
Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Accordingly, it was concluded that new support would be 
required from outside the multi-stakeholder forum that had been 
established. In May 2004, the LBH-P2i’s dilemma was resolved 
with the establishment – unintentionally – of  a loose pressure 
group involving the Sulawesi Anticorruption Committee (ACC); 
the Patria Artha Higher Education Foundation (Yasasan Pendi-
dikan Tinggi Patria Artha) in Makassar; the Sulawesi Legislature 
Monitoring Committee (Komite Pemantau Legislatif  – Kopel); 
the Makassar Legal Aid Foundation (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan 
Hukum – YLBH) and the LBH-P2i itself. This was dubbed the 
South Sulawesi People’s Anticorruption Coalition (KMAK) by 
the local and national press.
As a loose coalition, it was originally planned that the KMAK 
would highlight the findings of a study by Bastian Lubis (from 
Patria Artha) that revealed corruption in the management of the 
South Sulawesi provincial budget. The study took as its point of 
departure the fact that although the provincial government collected 
motor vehicle tax every year, the revenue raised by this tax was 
never spent on the provision of improved services or acceptable 
public infrastructure. Thus, the question arose, where did all the 
money go? This question was particularly pertinent given that the 
proceeds from the levying of motor vehicle tax accounted for 80 
percent of South Sulawesi province’s total own revenue.
The study found that between 60 percent and 70 percent of  
the regional own revenue was earmarked for a number of  budget 
allocations that benefited the members of  the Local Legisla-
tive Council. In the 2003 South Sulawesi provincial budget, for 
example, the allocations for income supplements and expenses 
for Local Legislative Council members increased by almost 500 
percent compared to the previous year. In addition, there was 
no legal basis for most of  these allocations in the provincial 
budget legislation. The findings of  the report made it clear that 
the taxpayer was truly being bled dry in South Sulawesi. 
The report was eventually published and circulated widely 
in South Sulawesi, and, accordingly, corruption in the South Su-
lawesi Provincial Legislative Council was selected as the starting 
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point for the waging of  a wider campaign against corruption in 
the province. On 16 June 2004, KMAK held a media briefing 
attended by 50 journalists from both local and national media 
outlets. During this briefing, Patria Artha highlighted irregulari-
ties involving some Rp 18.2 billion of  public money based on 
an audit conducted in accordance with the principles applied by 
the Finance and Development Control Board (BPKP). This was 
followed by a discussion by the Sulawesi Anticorruption Com-
mittee of  the legal aspects having regard to Law Number 31 of  
1999. Then, the Legislative Monitoring Committee reviewed the 
case from the perspective of  the procedures employed by the 
Local Legislative Council’s budget committee, while the Makassar 
YLBH discussed the responses of  the law enforcement agencies 
in connection with the case. Concluding, LBH-P2i highlighted 
the links between corruption, poverty, the role of  women, public 
participation and good governance.
The snowball was now well and truly gathering pace. Follow-
ing the making public of  the study’s findings on 16 June 2004, 
the scandal dominated the headlines in the local newspapers and 
on local radio and television for a full three weeks. One week 
after the media briefing on 16 June 2004, a wave of  student 
demonstrations broke out to pressure the law enforcement agen-
cies to take action. Among those organizations participating in 
the demonstrations were the students’ unions from the Alauddin 
State Islamic University, the Makassar State University, and the 
Muhammadiyah University.
The disclosure of  corruption in the South Sulawesi Provincial 
Legislative Assembly and the ensuing student demonstrations 
gave rise to conflicting responses. Demonstrations (presum-
ably engineered) were even held to support to Local Legislative 
Council and attack KMAK. Among the ruses employed were 
the use of  local cultural symbols, and attempts to exploit ethnic 
and religious differences. KMAK was even accused of  having 
a political agenda and being bent on destroying the dominant 
political parties in South Sulawesi in the 2004 elections.
The politicians in the Local Legislative Council were not 
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going to give up without a fight, and a number of  “non-govern-
mental organizations” were hastily set up to defend the honor-
able members. They quickly got talk shows broadcast on local 
television and radio, and organized a series of  “seminars” and 
“workshops” in luxury hotels, all for the purpose of  discredit-
ing the allegations of  corruption laid against the councilors. 
Experts in administration, finance and the law were drafted in 
to lend their support to the pro-status quo campaign. At one 
seminar, held at the Panakukang Mas Country Club to discuss 
the amendment of  the Local Government Law, Prof. Dr. Ryaas 
Rasyid and one of  the co-chairmen of  the South Sulawesi branch 
of  the Indonesian Accountants Association were wheeled out to 
claim that there was no corruption in the South Sulawesi Local 
Legislative Council.
One of  the major factors that supported the coalition’s 
campaign was the natural tendency of  journalists to focus on 
corruption cases involving politicians, and this had a profound 
influence on shaping public opinion in the province. While con-
sistently maintaining independence and balance in their reporting, 
and despite the various internal and external pressures they were 
subjected to, local dailies such as Fajar, Ujungpandang Ekspres and 
Tribun Timur ran a series of  interviews with different KMAK 
activists on the Local Legislative Council corruption scandal, as 
well as interviews with independent experts capable of  counter-
ing the misleading statements made by speakers at pro-Council 
seminars, not to mention the many threats of  legal action by 
councilors against KMAK activists.
The Power of  Money
Following the publication of  the study’s findings, the KMAK 
reported its suspicions of  corruption in the South Sulawesi Pro-
vincial Local Legislative Council to the Provincial Prosecutor’s 
Office on 24 June 2004. The financial data and analyses, including 
a summary of  the KMAK audit (conducted in accordance with 
BPKP audit procedures – four former senior auditors of  the 
BPKP in Makassar were also executives of  Patria Artha), and 
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other documents were all handed over to the Chief  Prosecutor 
for South Sulawesi, even though it was expected that the KMAK 
complaint would be quickly followed by attempts to pervert the 
course of  justice by the governor and Local Legislative Council. 
This proved to be exactly what happened, although the precise 
way in which it was accomplished was somewhat unexpected. 
The then Chief  Prosecutor for South Sulawesi, Prasetyo, SH, an-
nounced on 25 June 2004 that the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office 
had to decline the case as the South Sulawesi Provincial Police 
had already taken charge of  the investigation. Prasetyo argued 
that it would be unethical for the prosecution service to launch 
an investigation into the case in these circumstances. 
This prime example of  legal obfuscation only served to bring 
public opinion further onboard. The KMAK now took on the 
role of  think-tank in mobilizing journalists, non-governmental 
organizations/civil society organizations and academics to keep 
the Council corruption issue alive, particularly after it became 
apparent that the South Sulawesi Provincial Police were succumb-
ing to political pressure and the temptations of  bribery.
Seeing that the local police investigation was going nowhere, 
the KMAK brought the case directly to the attention of  the 
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which later submit-
ted it to the National Police chief, who in turn forwarded it to 
the South Sulawesi Anticorruption Unit. According to the KPK, 
the case involved simple, conventional forms of  corruption, and 
therefore should be capable of  being dealt with quickly. 
Despite the straightforwardness of  the South Sulawesi 
Council corruption scandal, to date the KPK has never made 
public the results of  its monitoring of  the progress being made 
in the investigation. In fact, although the South Sulawesi Police 
investigation has been underway now for around one year, the 
investigators have only managed to complete the files on three 
of  the 14 suspects. These three cases files have been rejected on 
a total of  eight occasions by the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office 
on the grounds that the police were not applying the appropriate 
provisions of  the criminal law.
Anticorruption Snowball in South Sulawesi
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The toing and froing of  the case files between the police 
and the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office gives rise to two alterna-
tive questions: Are the police incapable of  doing their jobs, or 
is the Prosecutor’s Office deliberately attempting to stymie the 
investigation?
Amid the controversy over the case files and public confusion 
about the direction of  the legal process came the statements by 
two members of  the KPK on a visit to Makassar at the end of  
May 2005. Both of  them asserted that the KPK had no inten-
tion of  taking over the investigation from the police as to date 
the KPK was not aware of  any irregularities or violations dur-
ing the investigation process. This despite the statements made 
by a number of  sources in the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office 
(as reported in the Ujungpandang Ekspres on 16, 17, and 19 May 
2005) to the effect that while the prosecutors had rejected the 
case files on three suspects on a total of  four occasions and 
returned them to the police with recommendations on how to 
complete the files properly, the police were continuing to insist 
that indictments be brought based on the original case files. Ac-
cording to these sources, from the very outset the prosecutors had 
consistently urged the investigators not to employ Government 
Regulation No. 110 of  2000 (on the financial status of  leaders 
and members of  Local Legislative Councils), as this had already 
been annulled by the Supreme Court. The prosecutors had also 
requested that the police not confine their investigation to the 
speaker of  the Council, but to also question other members of  
the Council leadership. In addition, the prosecutors had told the 
police to widen the investigation and not confine it to irrelevant 
matters such as unusually high electricity, water and telephone 
bills run up the Council.
It should be noted that the current speaker of  the South 
Sulawesi Provincial Legislative Council served as a deputy speaker 
in the previous Council. Meanwhile, according to the sources in 
the Prosecutor’s Office, the main reason for rejecting the case 
files submitted by the police was that they would never stand 
up in court. Thus, it would be pointless to accept them as the 
suspects would get off  scot-free.
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“Coalition Boom”
While the establishment of  the Coalition had not been of-
ficially planned, it turned out to be a potent force. By applying 
constant pressure, the snowball was now quickly gathering pace 
– expanding and intensifying the war on corruption, and involv-
ing a much wider spectrum of  society than heretofore.
Optimism had definitely been in the air ever since the mak-
ing public of  the study findings, with the anticorruption spirit 
now spreading to every regency and city in South Sulawesi, and 
even spilling over into West Sulawesi. In the one month follow-
ing the release of  the KMAK findings, the coalition experienced 
something of  a boom. At least 40 civil society organizations 
devoted to the fight against graft were set up in 18 of  the 24 
regencies/municipalities of  South Sulawesi. In general, these 
groupings were made up of  newly elected members of  Local 
Legislative Councils, traditional community leaders, NGO activ-
ists, academics, businesspeople, veterans, and others.
The names adopted by these new civil society organiza-
tions were also encouraging. Among these were the People’s 
Anticorruption Coalition Front (Koalisi Barisan Rakyat Anti 
Korupsi – KOBAR), the People’s Anticorruption Commandos 
(Komando Rakyat Anti Korupsi – KOAR), the People against 
Corruption Coalition Front (Barisan Koalisi Rakyat Melawan 
Korupsi – BAKAR), the People’s Front for the Eradication of  
Corruption (Barisan Organisasi Rakyat Pembongkar Korupsi 
– BONGKAR), and many more with similarly rousing names. 
These organizations not only publicly declared their existence 
and readiness to fight against graft, but also highlighted specific 
instances of  corruption in government institutions and Local 
Legislative Councils, and the involvement in graft or misfeasance 
of  regency/municipal officials, regents/mayors, councilors and 
law enforcement officials, such as police officers, prosecutors 
and judges.
 This was a radical departure in the history of  the anti-
corruption movement in South Sulawesi. The courage to levy 
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corruption accusations against senior government officials and 
the members of  the political elite was not something that was 
to be expected given the demise of  traditional values in South 
Sulawesi. In fact, this courage and willingness to take action 
became even more pronounced after President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and Vice President Muhammad Jusuf  Kalla outlined 
their “100 days in office” vision, which placed great stress on 
the fight against corruption.
As the zeal for the war against corruption began to spread 
rapidly throughout the community, the euphoria that accompanied 
it became rather worrisome given past experiences of  how quickly 
such collective high spirits and emotions could dissipate. 
This would not have been such a cause for concern had 
the response of  the law enforcers – the police and prosecution 
service – been adequate. The problem was, however, that these 
institutions appeared far from ready or willing to act on the 
great tide of  graft reports being published in the media and 
reported by civil society organizations. Up to June 2005, none 
of  the reports of  corruption filed by community organizations 
with the police and prosecution service had produced any con-
crete closure.
Of  the 60 reports of  suspected corruption reported by civil 
society organizations to the law enforcers, progress had gone no 
further than the naming of  serving and former Local Legislative 
Council members as suspects –for example, 14 members of  the 
South Sulawesi Provincial Legislative Council, 40 people from the 
Tana Toraja Legislative Council, and 17 people from the Mejene 
Legislative Council in West Sulawesi province. All of  the other 
people involved had only been questioned as witnesses. Despite 
the large number of  suspects charged by the prosecution service 
and police, between September 2004 and June 2005 only two 
cases actually made it to court – a case involving the sale of  a 
store owned by the Makassar Health Office worth Rp 1.6 bil-
lion which involved the former Makassar mayor, HB Amiruddin 
Maula, and a case involving the purchase of  the Taka Bonerate, 
a ferry that linked the South Sulawesi mainland and Bulukumba 
regency on Selayar island. This case implicated Akib Patta, a 
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former regent of  Selayar.
From the very beginning of  the judicial process in these two 
cases, it was clear that they were not been dealt with seriously. 
In the health office store case, the Makassar District Court dis-
charged Amiruddin Maula as the principal defendant before it 
had even examined the substance of  the charges. The court held 
that the indictment presented by the public prosecutor (from the 
South Sulawesi Provincial Prosecutor’s Office), was unacceptably 
vague. The response of  the prosecution was unusual in that it 
appealed the Court’s ruling rather than opting to submit a new 
indictment against the former Makassar mayor.
Amid the impression that legal shenanigans were afoot – an 
impression heightened by the glaring differences between the 
urgency felt by the non-governmental organizations/civil society 
organizations and that felt by the legal authorities – reports re-
ceived by the KMAK from various sources pointed to a number 
of  factors operating to hamper the administration of  justice in 
South Sulawesi, including the following:
1. Intervention by the political elite and government officials 
through the Local Leaders’ Forum (Muspida) plus regents, 
police chiefs, chief  prosecutors, military commanders, District 
Court presidents, and Local Legislative Council speakers. 
This forum worked to thwart criminal proceedings against 
local leaders, regency/municipality officials, and politicians 
using the following methods:
• Playing out the investigation process at the police/pros-
ecution service level. This ruse was adopted as it was 
politically difficult to halt the investigations altogether 
due to the likely strong reaction from non-governmental 
organizations, the press and the public. An example of  
this ruse in operation was the graft case involving the 
South Sulawesi Provincial Legislative Council.
• Employing intimidation and terror – using third parties 
– and arresting and even trying those levying graft al-
legations. For example, those who blew the whistle on a 
corruption case involving the construction of  highways 
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that implicated the Pangkep regent, Gaffar Patappe. In 
this case, the District Court tried and convicted five 
members of  KOBAR in Pangkep regency on charges 
of  defamation and disseminating unfounded allegations. 
The five were given suspended sentences. No action was 
taken to satisfactorily investigate the allegations they had 
made. In Tana Toraja regency, members of the Toraja 
Journalists Alliance and the Toraja People’s Anticorrup-
tion Alliance were physically terrorized by thugs3 hired 
by nervous officials and politicians following the reveal-
ing of  suspected corruption involving the regent and 
members of  the Local Legislative Council for the 1999-
2004 term. An “army” of  these thugs – consisting of  
gamblers, cock-fighting aficionados, drinkers and habitual 
brawlers – had been recruited in 2000, and they were 
used as enforcers to prevent demonstrations against the 
regent. If  a demonstration was held by anticorruption 
supporters on one day, the thugs and paid protesters 
would hold a counter demonstration on the following 
day. In addition, the thugs also terrorized those journal-
ists courageous enough to report on corruption in the 
local government.
2. The willingness of  the police to go after the big-fish mis-
feasors and embezzlers was seriously in doubt. In most of  
their investigations they would confine themselves to netting 
those on the periphery of  the action rather than arresting 
those orchestrating the show. An example of  this was the 
investigation into alleged corruption involving the leader-
ship and members of  the South Sulawesi Local Legislative 
Council. The investigators never questioned the key figures 
believed to have been involved in looting the public purse 
through the 2003 local budget.
3.  Between 80 percent and 90 percent of  the reports of  cor-
ruption submitted by the publicto the police and prosecution 
3  The Indonesian phrase “Preman kiriman pejabat” (thugs sent by officials), was employed by 
local publication Kareba, Tana Toraja, Week IV, April 2005.
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service were not accompanied by detailed financial audits or 
a detailed identification of  the laws that had been broken. As 
a result of  this, it was easy for the authorities to set aside 
the reports by saying they were premature or not backed 
by sufficient prima facie evidence. This, in turn, gave rise 
to other problems, such as the following:
• The corruption allegations submitted by the public would 
frequently be turned on their heads and used by the law 
enforcers to put pressure on the deponents.
• The reports were also often employed as evidence in 
civil or criminal defamation cases brought by those ac-
cused of  corruption.
Aside from the question of how long the zeal to fight against 
corruption would last, or the manner in which the graft cases 
reported by the public were being handled, the anticorruption 
snowball was now well and truly gathering pace, and was both 
directly and indirectly leading to improved public services at the 
grassroots level, including health services, family planning services, 
the provision of rice to the poor, birth and death registration ser-
vices, garbage collection, and the awarding of scholarships under 
the Social Security Net scheme. Such improvements were evident 
to one extent or another in Makassar municipality, and in Bone, 
Pinrang, Soppeng, Wajo, Sidrap, Tana Toraja, Enrekang, Polewali 
Mandar (West Sulawesi) and Mamuju regencies.
One noteworthy improvement was the instituting of  greater 
transparency in the levying of  local government charges. While 
previously the actual amount of  charges was unclear, following 
public pressure they were now publicly posted up at the service 
counters. The levying of  unofficial charges gradually became 
less prevalent, although this does not yet seem to be the case 
with the traffic police in Makassar. In addition, police officers 
in Makassar, Pare-Pare, Tana Toraja, Bone and Palopo are still 
involved in the old practice of  releasing suspects charged with 
minor offenses (gambling, brawling, petty theft) in return for a 
Rp 1,000,000 bribe.
Meanwhile, local governments have started to publicize the 
village/sub-district assistance scheme and the grants available, 
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with meetings being held in each village/sub-district to discuss 
community proposals for assistance under the scheme.
The effect that the rolling snowball produced among the 
corruption monitoring groups during the second stage of  the 
program was also highly encouraging from the quantitative 
perspective. In Bone and Pinrang – both of  which areas were 
covered by the second stage of  the program – corruption 
monitoring groups established a new network involving sidewalk 
hawkers, fishermen, and farmers. In Makassar, KORUPA assisted 
with the setting up of  at least 11 new groups involving women 
and fishermen, while the People Concerned with Information 
Institute (LMPI) helped with the establishment of  at least 143 
groups in 14 districts.
Six monitoring groups set up by Watampone Anticorruption 
(WAC) in Bone regency linked up with more than 30 groups 
in coastal and highland areas. The Community and Pesantren 
Development and Studies Institute (LKPMP) helped with the 
establishment of  two groups made up of  public transportation 
and motorcycle taxi drivers. These have now mushroomed to a 
total of  twelve drivers’ groups following a realization that the 
problems faced by the drivers on each route were different.
Gathering Pace
The snowball was now moving faster. The goal of  ensuring 
public participation in the fight against graft had been achieved. 
The major constraints on the success of  the campaign were 
now to be found the law enforcement and legal arenas – among 
the police, prosecution service and the courts. The weaknesses 
bedeviling the corruption reports submitted by the public were 
partly the cause of  this, but the problem can be overcome 
through training so as to impart the skills necessary for effective 
corruption monitoring. 
In order to achieve its goals, and to convert issues and 
public opinion into the substance of  public advocacy and effec-
tive corruption reports, KMAK employed a pattern that could 
possibly be replicated in other areas. This pattern is shown in 
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the following diagram:
Explanation:
Stages 1, 2 and 3 describe the general processes that are 
normally gone through by non-governmental organizations, 
civil society organizations, etc., in publicizing their suspicions 
of  corruption.
Stage 4: This consists of  conducting studies to ascertain 
public opinion trends in society so as to ensure that the KMAK 
findings will attract public attention. The legal aspects also need 
to be studied so as to determine whether the findings actually 
amount to corruption, and whether they concern the public 
interest or system of  governance, or merely serve to further 
the interests of  particular parties. Finally, focus is placed on 
the identification of  topics that are newsworthy so as to ensure 
continuous media coverage for at least one month.
Stage 5: Journalists from all types of  media are invited to 
a press conference. It is particularly important that journalists 
from national media outlets be involved so as to reduce the 
threat of  intimidation. During the press conference, the findings 
are not only presented, but detailed explanations are furnished 
on the financial, legal and budgeting rules, and how these have 
been broken. In addition, predictions are made as regards the 
response of  the law enforcement authorities, and the connection 
with good governance is highlighted.
Stage 6: This involves the accommodation of  feedback – the 
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reaction of  the public to the KMAK statement is assessed. Should 
efforts be made to obfuscate the issue, KMAK executives will 
provide additional explanations and clarifications to the media.
Stage 7: After it has been ascertained that the support of  
the public has been secured, an official report is then filed with 
the prosecution service by KMAK. Should the response of  the 
police or prosecution service be found to be lacking – possibly 
due to political interference or bribery – the report is sent di-
rectly to the KPK.
Stage 8: In order to ensure that the investigation of  the 
case proceeds as it should and that the public remain engaged, 
the case is monitored by KMAK through critical analysis of  the 
performance of  the law enforcement authorities and the courts. 
Should irregularities be found in the handling of  the case, then 
press releases are issued highlighting the relevant legal provisions 
and how the case should in fact be processed. Should there be 
indications of  attempts to pervert the course of  justice, then 
this will also be made known through a press release.
Among the lessons learned from the first and second stages 
of  this program are the following:
1. The civil society organizations (coalitions, forums, etc.) that 
are established need to be made up of  members drawn from 
various disciplines. Accountants and auditors are particularly 
needed.
2. The civil society organizations need to have very close per-
sonal relations with journalists from both local and national 
media outlets.
3. Prior to the making public of corruption findings and their 
reporting to the authorities, it must be ensured that there is 
sufficient prima facie evidence for the launching of an official 
investigation. If possible, such reports should be backed up 
by documentary evidence. It should be noted in this regard 
that:
• the authorities must not be inundated with reports of  
suspected corruption. Instead, reports should be sub-
mitted on an incremental basis. This is essential given 
continuing doubts about the seriousness of  the authori-
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ties in responding to such reports.
• reports of  major, wide-ranging corruption cases involv-
ing particular groups, such as Local Legislative Council 
members, should not be all filed simultaneously, even if  
significant losses to the taxpayer are involved. Instead, 
it is better to select particular items that are easy to 
come to grips with (for example, allowances for meals, 
official travel, meetings, etc.). The purpose here is to 
apply “shock therapy” to those involved and those who 
might be tempted to engage in corruption in the future. 
In addition, this approach helps avoid reports being 
rejected on the grounds of  lack of  evidence, makes the 
monitoring of  the case easier, and avoids the allegations 
in the report being used to pressure the deponents. 
4. The uncovering of  corruption cases needs to start with 
indications of  the involvement of  senior officials at the 
provincial/regency/municipal level, such as the governor, 
deputy governor and Local Legislative Council members 
from the strongest factions.
5. The cases that are focused on need to have a connection 
with enduring public perceptions, such as distrust in the 
government apparatus, law enforcement agencies and the 
courts, and Local Legislative Councils. 
6. The making public of  suspected corruption cases needs 
to have regard to the general character of  the local people 
and local cultural values, which are frequently used by those 
accused of  corruption and their supporters to cover up or 
conceal the crimes they have committed.
Once Again: Technical Knowledge and Expertise
In our experience since 2002 of  encouraging the public to 
rise up against corruption, it has been quite difficult to sustain 
the anticorruption groups and civil society organizations that 
sprang up in South Sulawesi, including during the “coalition 
boom”. This is a result of  the actual conditions prevailing on 
the ground, where the majority of  people are living in what is 
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still basically a feudalistic society. Consequently, it is highly un-
realistic to expect critical and objective attitudes to public and 
governmental institutions to be sustained indefinitely.
In addition, the abuses taking place in the law enforcement 
arena and the courts, plus question marks over the ethics of  
those involved in upholding the law, will also have a bearing on 
the enthusiasm of  the public to combat graft. Thus, if  continued 
public participation is to be ensured, we will need to focus on, 
and help to resolve, various fundamental constraints hamper-
ing the work of  the anticorruption civil society organizations, 
namely:
1. Internal constraints:
• Lack of  knowledge and skills on the part of  activists
• Insufficient involvement of  experts
• Organizational problems
• Individual integrity
• Lack of  funding
2. External Constraints
• Pressure from third parties, law enforcement officials, 
and pro-status quo groups, including the offering of  
inducements
• Limited media exposure, with the result that it is often 
difficult to synchronize the making public of  cases with 
what is taking place in society as a whole. For example, 
the making public of  suspected corruption cases in 
Bulukumba, Sinjai and Bone was overshadowed by the 
Aceh tsunami, fuel price hikes and the conflict over the 
Ambalat block, respectively.
In order to overcome these constraints, the first thing that 
needs to be done is to prioritize capacity-building among civil 
society organizations. This will involve furnishing them with the 
necessary skills and knowledge – not just basic monitoring skills, 
but also how to conduct investigations and make use of  the 
media – to enable them to uncover corruption cases using public 
documents, thus avoiding difficult and protracted investigations. 
For this purpose, the LBH-P2i and KMAK are currently design-
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ing various training programs for the members of  anticorrup-
tion non-governmental organizations/civil society organizations, 
with the minimum target being the provision of  training to one 
non-governmental organization/civil society organization in each 
regency/municipality so as to ensure that they have at least one 
or two volunteers who possess the necessary skills and expertise 
to uncover graft cases and simultaneously motivate the public to 
become involved in the fight against corruption.
Initial tryouts have already been conducted in this regard, 
and have produced encouraging results to date. As part of  these 
tryouts, budget analysis training has been provided to members 
of  the Toraja Journalists Alliance and the Toraja Anticorruption 
Community. One week after the holding of  the training workshop 
in Tana Toraja, these two civil society organizations published 
their findings on corruption in the Local Legislative Council. 
As a result of  this, since May 2005 a total of  40 members of  
the Tana Toraja Legislative Council (1999-2004), including 12 
members who were reelected to the current Council, have been 
declared suspects by the South Sulawesi Provincial Prosecutor’s 
Anticorruption Snowball in South Sulawesi
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Elyas Joseph, born in 1953, has worked 
as a journalist since 1971 for various local 
newspapers in South Sulawesi, as well as the 
South Sulawesi correspondent for a Jakarta 
daily. He established his own anticorruption 
newspaper, Satu Indonesia (United Indonesia), 
in 2002. Together with his wife, Christina, 
he founded the Indonesian Women’s Em-
powerment Legal Aid Institute (LBH-P2i), 
followed in 2000 by the United Indonesia 
Foundation. Following the death of  Chris-
tina on 14 February 2003, he was elected 
chairman of  the LBH-P2i.
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Something Rotten 
in the KPU1
Arif  Nur Alam
Lack of  External Oversight
The legislative and presidential elections of  2004 marked a major change in Indonesian political life. Prior to 2004, the public voted for political parties, who then selected 
members to sit in the national legislature, and these subsequently 
elected the President and Vice President. Following the enactment 
of  Law No. 12 of  2003, however, the public were finally allowed 
to elect the members of  the legislature, and the President and 
Vice President directly. 
It was expected that the General Elections Commission 
(KPU) would play a major role in ensuring the clean and success-
ful conduct of  the legislative and presidential elections . Under 
Law Number 12 of  2003, the KPU was to no longer be made 
up of  government appointees and functionaries of  the political 
parties contesting the election. Instead, the members of  the KPU 
– which was to be independent, autonomous and permanent in 
nature – were to be selected by the House of  Representatives, 
and appointed by the President. 
During the 1999 election, the quality of  the ink used to 
mark the hands of  those who had already voted drew protests 
as it was capable of  being washed off  – thereby allowing the 
possibility of  multiple voting. This clearly reduced the credibility 
of  this election. In addition, leakage and indications of  corrup-
1  This Paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Encouraging Budgetary 
Transparency in the 2004 Elections so as to Ensure Clean Elections”, which ran from De-
cember 2003 to May 2005, and the program titled “2004 Election Transparency and Budget 
Monitoring”, which ran simultaneously from December 2003 to April 2005. Both programs 
were supported by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia/ European Com-
mission and the Ford Foundation.
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tion in the procurement of  flags and political party paraphernalia 
were not sufficiently acted upon legally, even when proof  in the 
form of  receipts was available.
In order to prevent such abuses from reemerging during the 
2004 elections, oversight and advocacy was required on the part 
of  civic groups in connection with the spending of  the election 
budget, which amounted to Rp 6.7 trillion, paid out of  both the 
national budget and local government budgets.
Officially, oversight was to have been conducted by a dis-
ciplinary committee made up of  members of  the KPU itself. 
Thus, the KPU had already violated its own Code of  Conduct, 
which had been drawn up by the KPU itself, as there was to 
be no external oversight as regards the spending of  taxpayers’ 
money. In fact, such oversight should have been exercised by the 
Finance and Development Audit Board (BPKP). Meanwhile, it 
was to be expected from the start that the work of  the Election 
Supervisory Committees (Panwaslu) would turn out to be inef-
fective as the members of  these committees were appointed by, 
and were accountable to, the KPU. Thus, while the committees 
were originally supposed to conduct oversight and supervision as 
regards the conduct of  both the elections and the candidates, in 
the end they confined their activities to supervising the conduct 
of  the candidates.
The electoral legislation states that bodies accredited by the 
KPU will be entitled to monitor elections for the House of  
Representatives (DPR), local legislative assemblies and the Re-
gional Representatives Council (DPD), with the results of  such 
monitoring subsequently to the reported to the KPU. Thus, these 
monitoring bodies were in a way subordinated to the KPU, and 
were forbidden from publishing the results of  their monitoring 
until these had been vetted by the KPU. As a consequence, 
monitoring was primarily confined to making observations and 
collecting data, without much in the way of  follow-up or advo-
cacy so as to prevent irregularities or violations.
The absence of  a powerful body to monitor the spending 
of  the election budget opened the door wide to all sorts of  
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irregularities in the holding of  the election. The KPU was set 
up as an untouchable superbody that both spent and supervised 
the spending of  the election budget.
Given this reality, the Indonesian Forum for Budgetary 
Transparency (FITRA) started in February 2003 to conduct 
monitoring and advocacy for the purpose of  encouraging the 
holding of  a clean, credible and corruption-free election.
From the very beginning, there was an obvious lack of  
transparency on the part of  the KPU about the management 
and spending of  its budget. This was clear from the lack of  
detail given in its budget accounts for operational expenditure, 
and a lack of  clarity about the spiraling cost of  the registration 
of  electors and data collection drive, which came in at Rp 19.3 
billion over-budget. The portion contributed by local govern-
ments to this depended on their respective policies at the regency, 
municipality and provincial levels.
The KPU quickly began to draw criticism due to the tardiness 
of  its preparations for the elections. Various stages of  the work, 
such as registering electors and the drawing up of  the definitive 
list of  candidates standing in the legislative elections, suffered 
serious delays, while the procurement of  election materials also 
fell far behind schedule.
The public became increasingly frustrated with the work of  
the KPU and its failure to educate the voters about the country’s 
new electoral system, while at the same time the members of  
the Commission were falling over themselves chasing official 
cars and overseas trips.
FITRA established forded connections with those institu-
tions that were in some way or another involved in the holding 
of  the elections, including the KPU, election supervisory com-
mittees, State Audit Board/Finance and Development Control 
Board (BPK/BPKP), local government audit boards (Bawasda), 
the House of  Representatives, the Department of  Home Af-
fairs, the Department of  Finance, the Indonesian Association 
of  Accountants (IAI), and other organizations and institutions. 
Previously, FITRA had already mapped out the possible weak 
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points where leakage could occur during the course of  the elec-
tions. It had also identified the institutions and parties involved 
in budget processes that were susceptible to corruption, and it 
was these weak spots and institutions that were then subjected 
to close monitoring.
Among the aspects considered during the process of  identi-
fying potential weak spots and institutions were, first, the regula-
tions on cost management and the state finances, second, the 
organizational structure, work mechanisms, and budget processes 
within the KPU, third, the state and other institutions involved in 
planning, implementation and execution, as well as accountability 
and auditing, and, fifth, the NGOs involved in monitoring the 
elections and the work of  the KPU.
The potential opportunities for leakage that were identified 
are shown in the following chart:
Following the completion of  the mapping and identifica-
Planning
Accountability
Auditing
Opportunities for Leakage during Budgeting Stage 
– Institutions Involved 
Implementation/Execution
Institutions/Officials of DPR, KPU, 
Dept of Finance by setting ceilings 
higher than general price standards 
Procurement of specific goods/services 
– direct indications of corruption 
involving vendors and KPU
Manipulation of accountability reports 
– adjusted in line with budget ceilings: 
DPR and KPU
Coverups and manipulation of audit 
results: BPK, DPR, and KPU
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tion process, a small team was established, with the allocation 
of  tasks to each member being preceded by the identification 
of  the relevant electoral and budget management legislation and 
other materials. These were then tracked down in the relevant 
institutions using both official and unofficial approaches. 
At the same time as unofficial approaches were being made 
to access budget documents, an official approach was made 
through the sending of a letter to the Chairman of the KPU on 
7 March 2003, notifying him of the establishment of the FITRA 
monitoring team. In the said letter, it was stressed that the cost 
of the monitoring work to be conducted by FITRA would be 
paid for entirely out of its own resources. On 31 March 2004, the 
KPU responded by stating that the standard spending supervision 
mechanism involved oversight by one’s immediate superior.
In addition, the said letter stated that internal supervision in 
a department/institution was conducted by the inspector general 
or the head of  the oversight unit in the department/institution 
in question, while external oversight was conducted by the BPK. 
Meanwhile, oversight as regards party finances was conducted 
by the KPU in collaboration with the IAI.
The highly legalistic nature of  this letter clearly showed that 
the KPU was intent on closing the door to public participation 
and control as regards its budget management processes and 
performance, and only tended to increase the suspicion that 
the ground was being laid for the wholesale theft of  taxpayers’ 
money.
Prior to the actual start of  the monitoring work, various 
sources had suggested during informal discussions or conversa-
tions that tight monitoring would be unnecessary given that the 
members of  the Commission were drawn from among the ranks 
of  academics, intellectuals, reformists and idealists. Given such 
a membership makeup, many thought it inconceivable that the 
Commission could become involved in wholesale fraud, decep-
tion and embezzlement.
FITRA responded to these suggestions by saying it was 
still uneasy given the unforthcoming responses of  the KPU 
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and massive amounts of  money involved. Accordingly, FITRA 
was of  the opinion that budget monitoring and advocacy was 
still required.
Following the failure of  the official approaches to the KPU 
to produce results, FITRA decided to resort to informal/personal 
approaches to members of  the KPU and the KPU secretariat. 
The members of  the FITRA team took turns as part of  an 
“underground campaign” trying to monitor the procurement 
of  election materials, and obtain access to KPU budget docu-
ments. The same methods were employed with the House of  
Representatives, Department of  Finance and other institutions 
after the House and the Department of  Finance failed to provide 
concrete responses to FITRA’s queries.
On one occasion, two members of  FITRA were roughly 
evicted from the KPU offices by KPU members, even though 
they had introduced themselves politely and explained that they 
were seeking information on which KPU documents were avail-
able to the public. Once again, this only proved the fact that the 
members of  the KPU regarded information about the spending 
of  taxpayers’ money as an official secret. In other words, the 
public were to have no role to play in monitoring and control-
ling the processes involved.
The various efforts to obtain the relevant information and 
documents through closed-door meetings with KPU members 
and staff, as well as both official and unofficial approaches to the 
Department of  Finance and relevant officials, failed to produce 
much in the way of  breakthroughs. However, through further 
closed-door interviews, “guerrilla” tactics, and the monitoring 
of  the meetings of  the KPU and other institutions, the FITRA 
team eventually managed to assemble a collection of  loose-leaf  
documents containing the cost allocations for the 2004 election, as 
well as detailed budgetary information for various institutions. 
After this collection of  loose pages had been assembled, 
the intensive tracing of  documents was continued through the 
covert monitoring of  all meetings at which budget documents 
were discussed. Documents were also obtained from whistle-
blowers, who took the initiative of  forwarding documents to 
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FITRA on condition that their identities be kept confidential. 
In fact, so afraid were they of  being discovered that some of  
them even insisted on their identities being kept secret from the 
members of  the FITRA team, and would leak the documents 
by leaving them in designated places where they would later be 
picked up by FITRA.
After building up an initial database containing official data, 
the FITRA team then analyzed and investigated the informa-
tion it contained so as to obtain an overall picture of  budget 
management and allocations in the KPU. This analysis looked 
at these aspects from the perspectives of  both reasonableness 
and budgetary justice/equity. The results of  this analysis showed 
that there were a number of  expense accounts that were likely 
to be highly susceptible to corruption, including the KPU op-
erational expenses account, the official residences account for 
11 members, two secretaries and one deputy secretary of  the 
KPU, and the operational budget for the voter registration and 
data collection officers. There were also a number of  accounts 
whose real purpose was far from being clear. In addition, the 
standard budget allocations, procurement processes and tenders 
for the supply of  election materials also lacked transparency.
In order to further enrich and sharpen the results of  the 
analysis that had been conducted, the team took the initiative of  
inviting representatives from the KPU and various other relevant 
institutions to attend a meeting to discuss the findings of  the 
analysis, and give their views and explanations on these. One 
day before the discussion, however, the KPU said it would be 
unable to attend without giving any reasons. As a result of  the 
KPU’s decision, the meeting had to be cancelled given that the 
KPU was the key institution in the whole process. This sort of  
thing happened repeatedly.
In the light of  the KPU’s opaque and closed attitude and its 
refusal to attend meetings with community groups and NGOs, 
FITRA started to work together with other NGOs, including 
those involved directly in election monitoring and those concerned 
with advocacy in the policy field. For FITRA, such consolidation 
between NGOs was essential if  successful monitoring of  KPU 
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spending was to be effected. After a number of  meetings to 
discuss the work of  the KPU and the potential for corruption 
there, it was decided to make public the results of  our analysis 
and findings to date. This would require coordination with our 
friends in the media.
Following the meetings referred to above, it was agreed to 
hold a public discussion that would simultaneously publicize 
the roles of  election spending monitors, and voice criticism of  
the KPU’s opaque, non-participatory, and unaccountable budget 
policies and management. Our findings as regards the potential 
for corruption within the KPU would also be highlighted. Fol-
lowing this meeting, the response of  the electronic and print 
media was very encouraging. The KPU, however, was enraged, 
and even claimed that FITRA’s findings were nothing more than 
“coffee shop gossip”.
While the KPU raged, the work of  tracing budget documents 
continued apace. The same was also true of  the investigations, 
analysis, and monitoring in respect of  goods and services procure-
ments. Coordination and regular meetings with our fellow NGOs 
as well as other agencies and institutions also continued.
After conducting its analyses and studies, FITRA again wrote 
to the KPU, enclosing the results of  its findings, to request a 
meeting with KPU members Mulyana W. Kusumah, Chusnul 
Mari’yah, Valina Singka Subekti, Hamid Awaluddin, and Ramlan 
Surbakti and KPU Deputy Secretary Sussongko Suhardjo. The 
result? No response whatsoever.
FITRA felt obliged to provide the information it possessed 
to the public. To this end, it held a press conference and issued 
a press release highlighting the indications of  irregularities, waste 
and corruption within the KPU. This produced a quick denial 
from the KPU, which also condemned FITRA’s decision to go 
public before seeking a clarification from the Commission. 
FITRA’s sent its findings – obtained through collaboration 
with the other NGOs – by mail to the members of  the KPU, 
with the letters being addressed to KPU Deputy Chairman, on 
4 September 2003. However, no response or explanations were 
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forthcoming from the Commission. Again and again, FITRA 
published the results of  its findings and analyses at media confer-
ences and through press releases. As a result, besides the gist of  
these releases being reported in the media, a number of  informal 
discussions were convened on various occasions.
Each time FITRA published its findings, the KPU responded 
angrily. Nazaruddin Syamsuddin, on behalf  of  the KPU chairman, 
lodged a complaint with the Jakarta Metropolitan Police about a 
statement by NGO activists that was carried in the Media Indo-
nesia daily. In response to the complaint, the Police summoned 
Laode Ida for questioning as a witness. Laode had stated that 
members of  the KPU benefited from double payments when 
attending meetings held by local offices of  the KPU and other 
institutions – one payment from the central KPU and one from 
the local KPU.
However, the KPU’s complaint did not deter FITRA from 
continuing its work, or from adopting a critical attitude in order 
to encourage transparency and accountability in KPU budget 
management.
In fact, the KPU’s decision to go to the Police actually 
strengthened FITRA’s resolve to pursue its investigations, con-
solidate its network, continue lobbying and campaigning, and 
to intensify its public exposure of  what was happening in the 
KPU. This was based on the belief  that the more an institution 
was closed to public scrutiny and oversight, and rejected input 
and criticism from the public, the greater the likelihood that 
something untoward was afoot.
FITRA’s experience had consistently shown this belief  to 
be well-founded. Administrations, both at the local and central 
level, were always very resistant when FITRA published reports 
of  budgetary duplication, leakage, and illegal budget allocations 
(both at the legislative and executive levels), as FITRA had been 
doing for a number of  years in the case of  the Jakarta Special 
Capital District, and Special/Plenary Sessions of  the House of  
Representatives. In those cases, what had happened was that the 
budgets would be revised behind closed doors (sometimes even 
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on public holidays), or in special places so as to prevent access 
on the part of  the public and media. The relevant national or 
local budget would then be amended. However, even these 
amendments were never enough to make the budgets reasonable 
or fair to the public, particularly the poor.
While FITRA’s work in this regard had never been enough 
to put the wrongdoers in the dock, it least it had served to re-
awaken a public awareness of  people’s rights in the budgeting 
process after these rights had been abrogated for so long by a 
corrupt and ruthless regime.
From Cooperation to Confrontation
The opaque and frequently angry reaction of the KPU to input 
and criticism from the public was countered by growing public 
support for election budget monitoring and advocacy. This support 
was greatly encouraged by the media. As a result of this emerging 
public awareness of irregularities in the KPU, FITRA decided to 
abandon its cooperative approach and resort to open campaigning. 
Such a confrontational approach would require a lot more energy 
and time, as well as a honing of FITRA’s analytical tools.
Before updating its mapping and investigation work, FITRA 
decided to strengthen its lobbying effort, consolidate its network 
and increase its efforts to educate the public and heighten their 
awareness – all for the purpose of  enlisting support for the 
collective effort to control how the KPU spent public money. 
These efforts were carried out on a phased basis and in tandem 
with each other. With regard to the mapping and investigation 
effort, this involved focusing on the targets of  monitoring, in 
particular, budget planning and allocation, the tender processes 
for all election materials, operational costs for the holding of  the 
elections, funding for the public information campaign, etc. The 
first stage in the strategy involved the publication of  all of  our 
findings to date (particularly in the light of  the strong support 
we were receiving from the media), followed by expanding our 
fluid alliance of  civil society organizations.
Our findings are set out in the following table:
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Table 1: Publication of Findings Timeline 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
14 May 2003
13 August 2003
16 September 2003
17 October 2003
7 November 2003
15 January 2004
24 January 2004
4 March 2004
5 April 2004
April 2004
12 April 2004
24 April 2004
24 April 2004
13 May 2004
21 July 2004
Press 
conference
Press 
release
Press 
conference
Press 
release
Press 
release
Press 
release
Press 
conference
Press 
conference
Press 
conference
Press 
conference
Public 
discussion 
Public 
Discussion 
Press 
conference
Press 
conference
Public 
discussion 
Indication of  misuse of  P4B (second round 
voter registration) budget, mark-up in pro-
curement of  LAN
Procurement of  KPU official vehicles 
without tender. KPU efforts to get off  
the hook
Evaluation of  KPU performance – lack of  
transparency in procurement of  election 
materials and spending
Angry reaction of  KPU, threat to sue FI-
TRA. FITRA ready to face any lawsuits
Cancellation of  appointment of  winner of  
tender for election cards. Not witnessed by 
other tender participants.
Direct appointment in procurement of the 
paper for the ballots, neglect of transparency 
and public control, budget management 
Waste of  taxpayers’ money in procurement 
of  ballot boxes
President should declare emergency as re-
gards procurement of  election materials
10 evaluations on preparations for elections 
on 5 April 2004
Quality of  ink to be used to mark voters’ 
hands called into question
Evaluation of  KPU performance and spend-
ing, recommendation that the BPK and KPK 
carry out audit and get to the bottom of  
suspected corruption in KPU
Lack of  transparency and accountability, and 
many opportunities for corruption in KPU 
budget management  
Possibility of  corruption affecting 2004 
election budget 
DPR asked to press BPK to audit KPU, dis-
semination of  findings in fact-sheet form
Performance of  KPU and swelling of  elec-
tion cost, recommendation that cost overrun 
of  Rp 357.79 billion be reported to KPK
Reported  in the 
print and elec-
tronic media
Idem
Idem
Idem
Idem
Published in 
print media
Reported by 
print and elec-
tronic media
Idem
Idem
Idem
Idem
Published in 
print media
Idem
Published in 
print media 
and forwarded 
to DPR
Idem
No. Date Activity  Finding/Issue Notes
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In tandem with the public information campaign described 
in the above table, intensive investigative, lobbying and network 
consolidation efforts were underway. Further investigations were 
carried out, including the monitoring of  meetings with companies 
participating in KPU tenders for the supply of  election materials. 
Members of  the FITRA team then made covert personal ap-
proaches to elicit information from both winning and losing firms 
that had tendered for the supply of  goods and services. These 
were intended to ascertain the addresses and places of  business 
of  these firms, as well as the market prices of  the goods and 
services supplied. Lobbying was conducted with other agencies 
and institutions connected directly with the election budget. In 
addition, parties with influence, both internal and external, were 
lobbied, including public and religious figures, and reformists. 
Meanwhile, network consolidation was effected through efforts 
to strengthen the alliance among NGOs, students, civic organi-
zations and other community institutions.
In order to increase public support for its efforts, FITRA 
organized a workshop in Jakarta on the monitoring of election 
costs. Among those invited were representatives of NGOs, students, 
civic organizations, political parties, academia, district supervisory 
committees, the BPK, the Department of Finance, the IAI, and 
the chairmen of polling station committees. FITRA disseminated 
guidelines for the monitoring of election costs to the public and 
among the members of its network. It also established a hotline 
complaints services that was accessible by text message. At the 
same time, a campaign encouraging the monitoring of election 
costs was being mounted using stickers. All complaints received 
– whether directly by FITRA members in the office or via tele-
phone/text message – were investigated and analyzed.
Despite the various findings published by FITRA in the 
media, the KPU continued to display a haughty and overly 
sensitive attitude. In addition, it attempted to politicize the issue 
through the media, claiming that “certain persons” and “certain 
groups” were attempting to subvert the elections. Criticism levied 
against it was portrayed as an effort to undermine both it and 
the elections.
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FITRA then made efforts to further solidify the alliance. 
Based on the routine monitoring conducted by FITRA and the 
other members of  the network, including the Forum Masyarakat 
Pemantau Parlemen Indonesia (FORMAPPI), Indonesian Pro-
curement Watch (IPW), Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu 
(KIPP) Indonesia, and the Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) 
Jakarta, it was suggested that a coalition of  NGOs should be 
established. This was done and the new coalition was named the 
NGO Coalition for a Clean and Successful Election.
In order to strengthen the credibility of  its findings, FITRA 
arranged to have the quality of  the ink to be used in the first 
round of  the presidential election tested by a well-known and 
reputable laboratory. This involved the testing of  samples taken 
from three different constituencies. The results of  the labora-
tory tests showed that the nitrate content of  the ink was much 
lower than the required 4 percent. This meant that the KPU 
had not complied with the regulations, which left the way open 
for unscrupulous firms to commit violations. The fact that the 
nitrate content was lower than required meant that the ink was 
easy to erase, thus giving rise to the possibility of  multiple vot-
ing. Together with its NGO partners, FITRA reported its find-
ings to Indonesian Police Headquarters on 26 July 2004, while 
simultaneously holding a press conference.
On 11 August 2004, the Coalition reported its preliminary 
findings on suspected corruption worth Rp 343 billion within 
the KPU to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The 
Coalition was responded to warmly both by the media and the 
KPK, as well as other elements of  society. Following receipt of  
the report, the KPK recommended that the BPK immediately 
commence an audit on the KPU. Meanwhile, besides declaring 
their support for the Coalition, other members of  the public 
were also helping out by providing further information concern-
ing the procurement of  election materials.
The House of  Representatives’ Budget Committee then 
invited representatives of  the Coalition to a hearing for the 
purpose of  discussing the report submitted by the Coalition 
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to the KPK on suspected corruption in the KPU. Following 
the hearing, the House of  Representatives firmly rejected the 
KPU’s request for supplementary funds for organizing the first 
round of  the presidential election. Furthermore, the House of  
Representatives also recommended that the BPK audit the KPU. 
That was not all. The House also questioned the Department 
of  Finance’s decision to disburse Rp 500 billion to the KPU 
without the approval of  the House of  Representatives. Repre-
sentatives of  the KPU were then summoned by the House to 
account for their actions.
Other election observers, including those from the Euro-
pean Union – which had earlier certified the elections as being 
free and fair – were taken aback by the Coalition report to the 
KPK. The Coalition was invited to a meeting for the purpose 
of  explaining its findings to these monitors and at the same 
time embark on a joint monitoring effort for the second round 
of  the presidential election.
FITRA continued its investigations. Besides coordinating with 
law enforcement agencies – both at a personal and institutional 
level – it also held meetings with the KPK and the BPK’s team 
of  auditors to encourage them to speed up their audit and in-
vestigation, as well as seek information on the progress of  the 
audit and investigation. Meanwhile, a hearing with Commission 
III of  the House of  Representatives, newly elected in 2004, led 
to the establishment of  the Team of  11 to investigate corrup-
tion in the KPU.
Not long after the Team of  11 started its work, the Jakarta 
Metropolitan Police issued the first of  two summonses to NGO 
Coalition activists Arif  Nur Alam (FITRA) and Hermawanto 
(LBH Jakarta). They were summoned for questioning following 
a defamation complaint filed with the Police by the chairman 
of  the KPU. In response, the Coalition convened a press con-
ference at which it expressed its readiness to face accusations 
by the KPU.
In order to fight the charges, the Coalition elicited the sup-
port of  various lawyers’ and legal aid associations, both on an 
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individual and institutional basis. After a number of  meetings, 
the Coalition Defense Team was established. Consisting of  75 
members, it was led by Iskandar Sonhadji. The defense team and 
representatives of  the Coalition held a meeting with the KPK 
to seek witness protection, while Indonesian Police Headquar-
ters was urged to halt the criminal proceedings against the two 
Coalition activists.
In March 2005, the BPK made public the preliminary results 
of  its audit on two types of  election supplies – ballot boxes 
and ballot papers. It said that the sums spent by the KPU were 
indefensible and as a result the taxpayer had been defrauded of  
some Rp 90 billion.
The preliminary audit results came like a ray of  light illuminat-
ing the dark world of  KPU finances. Together with its Coalition 
partners, FITRA immediately held a press conference. In order 
to accelerate the investigation into the suspected corruption in 
the KPU, the Coalition urged the President to suspend all of  the 
members of  the KPU, including those serving in his Cabinet. 
In addition, the Coalition recommended that the KPK urgently 
block the accounts of  all KPU members, while the BPK was 
urged to quickly complete its investigative audit into all election 
supplies procured by the KPU.
Despite all the coordination with law enforcement agencies, 
the public was nevertheless surprised to learn of  the arrest on 9 
April 2005 of  KPU member Mulyana W. Kusumah by the KPK, 
working in collaboration with a member of  the BPK team of  
auditors. Mulyana was apprehended in connection with the alleged 
bribery of  a BPK auditor at the Hotel Ibis, Slipi, Jakarta. This 
arrest opened the door further to uncovering the real extent of  
corruption within the KPU, and represented the culmination of  
the efforts by FITRA, its coalition partners, students, the com-
munity, other relevant institutions and the media.
A Series of  Data Deviations
The success of  the efforts to uncover the web of  corrup-
tion in the KPU was intimately connected with the strategic 
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processing and packaging of  information in such a way as to 
make it easily comprehensible to the public. The information 
was first analyzed and studied in depth, and then packaged in a 
simple and communicative manner. In this regard, the role of  
the press was essential as it was able to keep the issues involved 
before the eyes of  the public, and therefore also the policy-mak-
ers. Modern communications technology was also of  enormous 
benefit, including the internet and websites, as were alternative 
media, such as leaflets, bulletins, newsletters, stickers, etc.
The strategy of  packaging and developing information so as 
to keep it in the minds of  the public was adopted right from 
the time of  establishment of  the KPU. The estimated cost of  
the election submitted by the Commission kept increasing. The 
first estimate was Rp 3.023 trillion over four fiscal years (2002-
2005). In the end, the elections cost a total of  Rp 7.2 trillion 
– a 139 percent increase and something that showed the inability 
of  the KPU to properly plan its spending. The cost overruns 
are set out in detail in Table 2 below. The cost of  election sup-
plies exceeded the ceiling of  Rp 608.116 billion that had been 
budgeted for the procurement of  ballot boxes, voting booths, 
ballot papers, distribution, validation and IT.
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Table 2: Cost Overruns in 2004 Elections
Source: Cost Estimates for 2004 Election and Proposed Operational Budget for KPU presented to 
House of  Representatives Budget Committee, July 2004.
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
7
 
No Procurement  Ceiling Actual Cost Overrun Percent
Ballot boxes
Voting booths
Ballot papers
Ballot papers
Karft paper
Distribution
Validation
IT
Total 
    
235,600,200,000 
     
23,028,000,000 
    
180,842,167,200 
    
372,587,500,000
 
                         
- 
     
28,577,198,660
 
                         
- 
    
      
355,625,523,800 
     
   55,601,881,997 
    
  247,256,866,240 
   
   
470,963,145,850 
  
       
4,124,953,550 
  
    
204,622,195,680 
    
    18,000,000,000 
   
120,025,323,800 
   
  32,573,881,997 
    
 66,414,699,040 
    
 98,375,645,850 
     
 4,124,953,550 
  
 176,044,997,020 
    
 18,000,000,000 
   
  92,556,580,835 
  
51
 
141
37
26
100
616
100
46
58
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Irregularities in Ballot Box Procurement 
There was a lack of  clarity about the price of  ballot boxes. 
In the document produced for the hearing between the KPU 
and the House of  Representatives’ Commission II on 12 May 
2004, it was stated that the cost of  procuring the ballot boxes 
would be Rp 324,156,077,080, while in the document explaining 
the proposed cost estimates for the 2004 elections and proposed 
2005 KPU operating budget, which was presented to the House 
of  Representatives on 15 July 2004, the cost of  procuring the 
ballot boxes was stated to be Rp 335,625,523,800. In fact, both 
of  these documents were presented after the legislative elections. 
This indicates that losses of  Rp 31.46 billion were inflicted upon 
the state, not including differences amounting to Rp 5.1 billion 
between the prices charged by PT Tjakrindo, CV Almas, and 
PT Survindo.
Irregularities in Procurement of  Voting Booths
As shown in Table 2, there was a 141 percent increase in 
the number of  voting booths, while there was only a 51 percent 
increase in the number of  ballot boxes. The reason given for 
the dramatic increase in the number of  voting booths required 
was that there had been an increase in the number of  polling 
stations. This excuse is, however, unacceptable given that the 
number of  ballot boxes and voting booths in each polling sta-
tion is the same. There were also inconsistencies in the prices 
charged by PT Jakrindo and CV Almas. In total, there were 
indications that losses of  Rp 1.8 billion had been inflicted on 
the taxpayer.
Overrun in Cost of  Printing Ballot Papers
The overrun in the cost of  printing ballot papers cannot 
be explained logically. The cost actually rose by a massive Rp 
66 billion, or 37 percent. According to the KPU, the increase 
in the cost of  printing was due to an increase in the number 
of  voters from 143,192,484 to 147,642,971 (3 percent), and an 
increase in the reserve supply of  ballot papers from 2.5 percent 
to 10 percent, representing a 7.5 percent increase. Meanwhile, 
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the percentage tolerance for defective ballot papers was increased 
from 5 percent to 10 percent (an increase of  5 percent). Based 
on these arguments, the number of  ballot papers was increased 
by 15.5 percent (3% + 7.5% + 5%). However, the cost in-
creased by 37 percent, leaving an inexplicable difference of  21.5 
percent. Thus, the KPU needed to explain how the cost could 
have swollen by an additional 21.5 percent, or Rp 38.88 billion 
in monetary terms.
Overruns in Cost of Paper used for Ballot papers and Forms
The cost of  the paper used for ballot papers and forms 
increased by 26 percent from Rp 372.58 billion to Rp 470.963 
billion. The reasons given for the increase were that there had 
been a 3 percent increase in the number of  electors, a 7.5 percent 
increase in the reserve supply of  ballot papers, as well as various 
other reasons. These excuses were, however, unacceptable as in 
reality there was an excess of  ballot papers. In other words, the 
KPU was incapable of  conducting efficient and focused planning. 
In fact, the KPU was guilty of  wasting taxpayers’ money. In 
other words, there were indications that the KPU had misused 
Rp 98.75 billion in public funds.
Cost Overruns in Distribution of  Election Materials
There were cost overruns in the distribution of  election 
materials amounting to Rp 176.04 billion (616 percent), with 
the original estimate of  Rp 28.57 billion coming in eventually 
at Rp 204.62 billion. As the KPU had failed to carry out fac-
tual verification on the production capacities of  its ballot paper 
printers, the printing process encountered serious delays. This 
in the end led to the termination of  printing contracts with a 
number of  firms after they were found to be incapable of  ful-
filling the contracts. As a result, besides wasting time, the cost 
also increased significantly.
Cost Overruns in Information Technology Field 
From the time when it was originally conceived, the bud-
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get for the KPU’s IT system experienced four major increases 
– from Rp 130,548,207,240  (based on the estimate given at a 
meeting of  provincial KPU offices on 23-26 May 2004) to Rp 
189,000,000,000 (based on explanations concerning the 2003 
State Budget given during a hearing between the KPU and the 
House of  Representatives’ Commission II on 17 November 
2003), then Rp 202,776,000,000 (based on the cost estimates 
for the 2004 election given during a hearing with the House 
of  Representatives’ Budget Committee on 15 July 2004), and 
finally to Rp 295,332,580,835. None of  these increases were 
ever satisfactorily explained. 
The cost of  the KPU IT system seemed to be much greater 
than the potential value and benefit that would be obtained from 
it. Making optimal use of  IT is not facilitated by the legislation. 
In other words, there is no legal foundation for electronic vote 
counting, so that the results of  the count must still be based 
on the manual count.
Price Variations for Ink
In the legislative elections, the KPU used 90,000 bottles (30 
cc/bottle) of  locally produced ink, and a total of  1,117,000 bottles 
(also 30 cc/bottle) of  imported ink at a price of  Rp 28,500 per 
bottle. During the presidential election, however, the KPU used 
locally produced ink costing Rp 19,975 per bottle. Thus, in real-
ity the KPU should have been able to save Rp 8,525 per bottle 
during the legislative elections. At 1,225,299 bottles x Rp 8,525, 
the saving would have amounted to Rp 10,446,673,975.
In addition, tests conducted at FITRA’s behest by a well-known 
laboratory on the ink used in three constituencies showed that the 
nitrate content of the ink was well below the required level.
Unexplained Additional Costs
It was not explained by the KPU how the cost of  the 
second round of  the presidential election could amount to Rp 
419,931,245,000, when the total cost of  the first and second 
rounds came to Rp 787,363,897,817. In other words, the cost 
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of  the second round of  this election amounted to 53 percent 
of  the total cost, despite the fact that the second round was 
only being contested by two tickets. Given this, the cost should 
actually have been lower than the first round, which was con-
tested by five tickets. Logically, the reduction in the number of  
candidates contesting the second round should have led to lower 
costs for ballot boxes, forms and the vote count, which would 
obviously be much quicker.
Based on the indications of  irregularities that had been dis-
covered, increasing public demands for more transparency and 
accountability from the KPU, and in order to convince the public 
that it was actually telling the truth, the Coalition on 11 August 
2004 reported its suspicions of  corruption in the KPU involving 
five types of  election materials to the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK). The following table shows the Coalition’s 
estimate of  the losses inflicted upon the taxpayer.
Six Lessons Learned
Based on the process of  advocacy for better budgetary 
management in the KPU and for the elimination of  corruption, 
six significant lessons were learned by FITRA. First, in-depth 
analyses of  the information and policies, and identification of  
the institutions and actors involved in the budgeting process 
is required, including both those that are overtly involved and 
those also covertly involved.
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Table 3: Coalition Findings on Suspected Corruption in KPU
Distribution of  election materials
Ballot papers
Official cars for local KPU branches. 2003
- Ballot boxes 
- Unexplained increase in cost of ballot pa-
pers
- Voting booths- 
No Procurement State Losses 
  (in Bn rupiah)
1
2
3
4
5
176.04
56.468
2.775
3.012 - 31.207 
80.10
6.2 
28.554
353.149 – 381.344Total
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Second, better results will be achieved through the build-
ing up of  a coalition with other institutions so as to intensify 
the pressure and level of  advocacy, and establishing a network 
involving elements, both horizontal and vertical, drawn from 
society at large, while all the time maintaining the independence 
of  the movement.
Third, an effective coalition does not have to involve an 
excessively large number of  organization/institutions. What is 
most important is that each organization/institution provides a 
concrete contribution and has a clear role to play in supporting 
the movement on a consistent basis. 
Fourth, in order to ensure that the momentum of  the move-
ment is maintained, an institution is needed that can organize 
regular meetings and promote consolidation, and conduct an 
evaluation each time a strategic action is undertaken.
Fifth, effective advocacy requires continuous pressure on 
all of  the relevant organizations/institutions so as to encourage 
follow-up. Accordingly, a lot of  energy, stamina, and ammuni-
tion will be required.
Sixth, in order to ensure the continued mobilization of  public 
opinion, the issues involved need to be properly organized and 
packaged. It is not necessary that all the findings be described in 
detail. Rather, the publication of  findings – through the media 
– should be undertaken in such a way as to achieve maximum 
effect and avoid any shifting of  focus.
In the case of  the first lesson learned, as described above, 
linear data analysis was conducted based on the aspect of  ef-
ficiency (budget rationality = input/output). Analyses were first 
conducted on the Department of  Home Affairs List of  Activi-
ties (DIK), which allocated the budget for routine expenditure, 
divided up into general administration and election implementation 
(expenditure on staff, procurement of  goods, maintenance, and 
official travel), and, second, Department of  Finance Authoriza-
tion for the operational costs associated with the 2004 elections, 
which came to Rp 3,023,696,822,000 for the four fiscal years 
from 2002 to 2005. In the end, the total budget swelled by 139 
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percent to Rp 7.2 trillion.
The policy analysis conducted on the state budget revealed 
that the regulations expressly require the management of  public 
funds to be carried out in an efficient, effective, transparent and 
accountable manner having regard to the principles of  equity 
and propriety. Among the relevant regulations are:
• Article 23(1) of  the 1945 Constitution, which reads as 
follows: “The public finances shall be managed in a 
transparent and accountable manner so as to improve 
the well-being and prosperity of  the people”;
• Article 3 of  the Public Finances Law (No. 17 of  
2003);
• Article 23 of  Law Number 12 of  2003, and article 2 
of  General Elections Commission (KPU) Directive 
No. 635 of  2003, which states that the funding for the 
holding of  elections shall be derived from the national 
and local government budgets.
• Article 4 of  Government Regulation No. 105 of  2000 
on Local Government Financial Management and Ac-
countability;
• Article 3 of  Presidential Decree No. 80 of  2003 on 
Guidelines for the Procurement of  Goods and Ser-
vices;
• General Elections Commission (KPU) Directive No. 33 
on the KPU’s Code of  Ethics, which states as follows: 
The General Elections Commission shall be responsible 
for organizing and holding general elections, and shall 
be autonomous, permanent, independent, non-partisan, 
impartial, transparent and professional in nature, based 
on the principles of  democratic government and the 
widest possible public participation.”
While it is expressly stated in the above instruments that 
the budgeting process must comply with the principles of  public 
participation, transparency and accountability, opportunities for 
leakage nevertheless arise as a result of  weaknesses in the leg-
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islation and regulations governing the management of  election 
expenses, including the following:
• Presidential Decree No. 42 of  2002 on Public Spending 
Guidelines. Articles 71 and 73 of  this Decree, inter alia, 
state that the spending of  public funds shall be supervised 
by the Finance and Development Audit Board (BPKP). 
These articles also provide that the government may 
permit designated NGOs and civil society organizations 
to monitor and appraise the implementation and speci-
fied other activities. However, these provisions have in 
practice tended to be ignored.
• General Elections Commission (KPU) Directive No. 635 
of  2003 on Amendment of  KPU Directive No. 89 on 
Procedures for the Management of  the 2004 Election 
Budget. Directive No. 635/2003 expressly rules out 
external oversight as regards the spending of  the 2004 
election budget. Article 24(1) of  the Directive states 
that oversight in respect of  all spending connected with 
the 2004 elections will be carried out by the KPU’s 
Secretary-General. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, 
in the regions. Thus, the KPU took upon itself  sole 
responsibility for overseeing the spending of  its 2004 
election budget.
• Presidential Decree No. 18 of  2000 and Presidential 
Decree No. 80 of  2003 on Guidelines for the Procure-
ment of  Goods and Services. These Decrees state that 
Grade I and II officials, and office/work unit heads 
may not be appointed as project leaders or treasurers. 
Rather, a procurement committee must be established 
for all procurements valued at more than Rp 50 million 
(article 10 of  Presidential Decree No. 80 of  2003). The 
reality in the KPU was that KPU leaders and members 
became the chairmen and members of  the procurement 
committees. As a result, control within the KPU was 
rendered ineffective as members of  the KPU manage-
ment sat on the procurement committees.
The analytical approach adopted in regard to the aspects of  
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efficiency, and input, benefit and impact involved an analysis of  
the structure of  election costs and the performance of  the KPU 
– both of  which would have a direct impact on the realization 
of  a “clean and successful” election during the preparatory, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages.
The identification of the institutions and actors involved in 
the budgeting process – both at the planning and oversight levels 
– was necessary so as to ascertain the strength of networking be-
tween the institutions that were to be targeted for advocacy. In the 
context of the electoral budget, these institutions were as follows: 
(1) Planning Stage - Department of Finance, KPU and House of 
Representatives, including donations from other countries, such 
as assistance for the procurement of voting booths and public 
information campaigns; (2) Implementation Stage/procurement of 
goods and services – the suppliers and the KPU, (3) Accountability 
– the House of Representatives and KPU, and (4) Oversight stage 
– State Audit Board, House of Representatives and KPU.
No less important was the identification of  the institutions 
and actors primarily involved in setting both official and unof-
ficial policy, including those overtly and covertly involved. This 
involved, for example, a mapping out, with the support of  the 
factions in the House of  Representatives, of  the process by 
which the members of  the KPU were selected, the structure 
of  the KPU, tender participants, the firms awarded contracts or 
those selected as the winners of  tenders (identifying the owners 
and shareholders), and connections and networks between the 
institutions and actors directly and indirectly involved in budget-
ing (links with political parties, cronies, businesspeople, officials, 
former officials, ideologues, etc.).
With regard to the second of  the above efforts - establish-
ing an inter-institutional coalition to strengthen pressure and 
advocacy, this normally involves the establishment of  a form 
of  collective participation, even though it will be clear from 
the outside that not all agendas and interests will be capable of  
being accommodated. Accordingly, the members of  a coalition 
or alliance are required to make some sacrifices as regards their 
narrower interests for the sake of  the greater good.
Something Rotten in the KPU
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At the outset, the coalition consisted of  elements drawn from 
civil society, election monitoring institutes, the press, the BPK, 
BPKP/ local government audit boards (Bawasda), Indonesian 
Association of  Accountants (IAI), the Department of  Finance, 
the House of  Representatives, election candidates, and even the 
organizers of  the election – the KPU and Election Supervisory 
Committees (Panwaslu). However, as time went on resistance 
became increasingly apparent. In order to prevent the coalition’s 
activities being stymied by this resistance, it proved necessary 
to hold a workshop to consolidate civil society organizations 
in applying pressure for transparency and accountability in the 
election budget, to exchange ideas about the need to establish a 
pressure group to ensure such transparency and accountability, 
and to highlight the importance of  control at each stage of  the 
election.
The vertical network was primarily focused on the institu-
tions involved in decision-making, policy implementation (the 
legislature, executive and election organizers), while active com-
munications were developed at the horizontal level among civil 
society election monitors and other civil society organizations, 
the press, community organizations, students, voters, religious 
leaders, academics, political parties, etc.
As already pointed out in connection with the third effort 
described above, it was not necessary to have a large number of  
institutions in the coalition. Rather what was important was that 
each of  them made concrete contributions, and the existence 
of  a core group. 
In this case, the core group consisted of  FITRA, FORMAPPI, 
IPW, LBH Jakarta, and KIPP. This key group acted on behalf  
of  the NGO Coalition for a Clean and Successful Election as 
the prime mover, initiated regular meetings, and maintained close 
communications with other elements.
With regard to the fourth effort, the activities to be un-
dertaken by each member of  the coalition were related to their 
normal activities, including investigation, research, analysis and 
networking. All of  these activities required regular discussions 
so as to sharpen the focus of  the actions undertaken. The same 
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applied when publicizing the coalition’s findings in the mass media 
or through the network. In addition, it was necessary to have 
an initiator of  meetings so as to energize the coalition. These 
meetings included internal meetings, and meetings with external 
institutions and actors.
Routine consolidation and evaluation activities were con-
ducted separately from the budget advocacy activities, including 
the evaluation of  advocacy processes, results and impacts, as 
part of  an overall effort involving challenges, priorities, analysis, 
networking and the sharpening of  analytical tools in order to 
achieve the goals of  the advocacy efforts.
With regard to the fifth effort described above – applying 
continuous pressure on all relevant institutions – four main 
strategies were adopted. First, research analysis through the 
tracing of  documents, an analysis of  all electoral policies and 
of  budget planning (plans, realization and overall spending), the 
conducting of  investigations, and the legal and political implica-
tions. Before any findings were made public, it was necessary to 
conduct validation. 
Second, dissemination and publication. This was achieved 
through the provision of  training and holding of  workshops, 
and consolidation of  civil society elements into a strategic coali-
tion. This was followed by the packaging of  issues in line with 
the priorities that had been agreed upon, and the publicizing 
of  the issues through stickers, press releases, press conferences 
and public discussions.
Third, the coalition was expanded at the horizontal level 
through a series of  informal discussions with other civil society 
organizations, students, political parties, and the public at large, 
while at the same time expanding the ranks of  the monitors and 
allies through the dissemination of  monitoring manuals and the 
coalition’s findings. Meanwhile at the vertical level, close com-
munications were developed with the officials involved in the 
various stages of  the election. 
Fourth, pressure for the taking of  legal action was applied 
through the reporting of  suspected corruption in the KPU 
Something Rotten in the KPU

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) – or law 
enforcement authorities. This was followed up on by hearings 
with the legal authorities, oversight institutions, the House of  
Representatives, the exposing of  suspected cases of  corruption 
in the media, the eliciting of  public support, and overseeing the 
progress of  the legal processes in respect of  the complaints of  
suspected corruption that had been made.
The above four endeavors were often carried out simultane-
ously in accordance with the circumstances.
In order to ensure that public attention continued to be 
focused on the KPU, the sixth and final effort consisted of  
strategic planning. As part of  this process, the core group would 
initiate and prioritize strategic issues based on the SMART-CS 
approach to strategic planning. SMART-CS stands for “specific”, 
“measurable”, “achievable”, “relevant”, “time-bound”, “challeng-
ing”, and “strength”. Based on this approach, it is hoped that 
pressure can be shifted from changing individual behavior to 
changing collective behavior and producing the policies that are 
desired. However, a need arises to limit the number of  issues that 
will be targeted for advocacy, and a careful consideration will be 
required as to which issues come within the public agenda and 
those that do not. In addition, the question of  how issues are 
to be packaged so as to bring them, and keep them before the 
eyes of  the public will need to be carefully weighed up.
An example of  this arose when a difference was discovered 
between the figures provided by the Department of  Finance and 
those provided by the KPU in connection with the budget for 
the registration of  electors and data gathering drive. It turned 
out there was a difference of  Rp 310.81 billion between the 
two sets of  figures. When attempts were made to confirm this 
with the KPU, the Commission refused to make public the true 
cost of  the registration drive. This lack of  transparency gave 
rise to suspicions that something underhand was taking place, 
particularly in connection with the budget for the procurement 
of  official KPU vehicles, which was carried out without going 
to tender, as well as in the IT system budget, which increased 
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by 46 percent. This was especially suspicious as electronic vote 
counting was not provided for under Law No. 12 of  2003.
In addition, suspicions were also aroused by the frequent 
overseas trips by KPU members on the grounds that these were 
necessary to socialize the new electoral system – this at a time 
when the majority of  people at home were still completely in 
the dark about it! 
The lack of  participation, transparency and accountability in 
the KPU, and the increasingly apparent potential for corruption, 
was elaborated through factual analysis and repeatedly highlighted 
to the public in simple language so that it was capable of  being 
understood by all elements of  society, including those who still 
lacked an awareness of  the importance of  social control over 
public spending. It was essential that all of  the findings of  the 
coalition regarding the KPU be verified so as to strengthen the 
message. The most important thing was credibility and trust-
worthiness.
It was of  the essence to ensure that the issues became the 
subject of  public debate. This was continuously pushed in line 
with the goals of  the advocacy being conducted. In order to 
achieve the coalition’s objectives, it was necessary to bring the 
media on board as an equal partner at each stage in the process, 
and to continuously evaluate the character of  the advocacy so as 
to ensure that the issues involved were highlighted in the most 
effective manner so as to influence decision-makers and elicit the 
support of  the public. The essence of  the entire effort was to 
ensure that the public and policy-makers received the necessary 
information from the media, and that the media received the 
necessary information from the coalition.
When the cooperative approach ran into a dead-end, there 
was no alternative but to resort to a confrontational approach. It 
was hoped that this would serve as shock-therapy for the KPU. 
The uncovering of  this corruption scandal in the KPU will, at 
the very least, have opened the eyes of  policy-makers to the 
importance of  transparency and accountability in the manage-
ment of  public funds.
Something Rotten in the KPU
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The most valuable development, however, was a concrete 
commitment on the part of  the Corruption Eradication Com-
mission (KPK) to help, as manifested in the letter sent by the 
KPK to the Indonesian Chief  of  Police regarding the protec-
tion of  whistle-blowers from criminal defamation prosecutions. 
Given that corruption is no longer regarded as an “ordinary” 
crime, but is rather now classified as an “extraordinary” crime, 
the law enforcement agencies need to first prioritize suspected 
corruption cases before acting upon complaints of  criminal 
defamation arising out of  the same cases.
With regard to those involved in advocacy, the challenges 
are, and will continue to be, almost the same, namely, intimida-
tion in the form of  death threats uttered via text message or 
telephone. It is not infrequently that activists are tailed by per-
sons unknown – something that obviously gives rise to fears as 
to their personal safety.
Another challenge is the offers to ensure a compromise from 
particular parties, who offer inducements but refuse to state their 
identities. This sort of  thing constitutes a major challenge when 
doing advocacy work both at the national and local levels.
Meanwhile, at the legal level, there are still no provisions in 
place that impose strict sanctions on state institutions that fail to 
plan and manage their spending in a transparent and accountable 
manner, despite the fact that this is explicitly  required under 
the Public Finances Law (No. 17 of  2003).
For the future, it is an absolute necessity that the KPU be 
reformed, including its recruitment processes, structure, powers 
and budgetary management, so as to transform it into an in-
dependent and sustainable institution based on transparent and 
accountable financial management.
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Interfaith Coalition 
against Corruption1
Isnaini Muallidin
A Public Tolerant of  Corruption
 
There are a number of  fundamental questions that arise in connection with anticorruption education, namely, whether the behavior and mindsets of  those involved in corrup-
tion have been produced by their education; what is the real 
understanding of  people of  religion and religious communities 
regarding the definition of  corruption, and what are the attitudes 
of  religious people to the problems caused by corruption? There 
are also a number of  other similar questions that have never 
been satisfactorily answered.
These questions arise from the phenomenon that has emerged 
in society whereby a small number of  people in the country 
apparently believe that corruption is not a critical problem in 
Indonesia. Without being aware of  it, some people in society have 
even begun to regard corruption as something that is normal or 
acceptable. If  systematic measures are not urgently designed to 
root out corruption, then the problem will become even more 
acute due to increasing public tolerance of  corruption in line 
with misconceptions regarding its effects and consequences.
One important effort that may be made to weed out cor-
ruption is to employ the educational approach as the education 
system in Indonesia still fails to address fundamental issues such 
as character building. This, together with other forms of  affec-
tive education, besides helping to mold moral capacity at the 
1  This paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Developing the anticor-
ruption movement through educational media in the Yogyakarta Special District”, which ran 
from August 2003 to December 2004. This program was supported by the Partnership for 
Governance Reform in Indonesia.
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theoretical level, will also need to be internalized in the mental 
outlook and attitudes of  individuals.
Anticorruption education – whether defined narrowly or 
widely – is essential in the new Indonesia. One of  the main 
ways of  ensuring the internalization of  anticorruption values is 
through religious/ethics education, which should serve to create 
an awareness of  the moral turpitude inherent in corruption.
From the empirical perspective, religion and the social order 
should be capable of  playing an effective role in eradicating 
corruption. Beyond the issue of  legal control, the question of  
whether or not to engage in corruption must be viewed as a 
moral issue by the community. This means that the effort to 
eradicate corruption cannot be confined to the curative-rehabilita-
tive aspects through the conviction and sentencing of  those who 
commit this particular crime, but must also involve preventative 
aspects through removing the environmental influences that tend 
to encourage corruption. Thus, cultural efforts will be necessary 
to prevent the further  replication of  corruption in society.
Accordingly, effective measures will be required to overcome 
the tolerant attitudes prevailing in the community vis-à-vis those 
who engage in corruption. In addition, anticorruption material 
will need to be incorporated into religious/ethics education, 
anticorruption education training provided to interfaith activists, 
and anticorruption messages included in the sermons and lessons 
delivered by religious leaders in each community.
Based on these considerations, the long-term objective of  
this program was to explain and disseminate religious and ethical 
norms concerning corruption through both formal and informal 
education so as to create good governance in Indonesia. Mean-
while, the short-term objectives were as follows:
• To produce anticorruption materials for incorporation 
into religious/ethics education curricula;
• To encourage private and state educational institutes to 
incorporate anticorruption materials into religious/ethics 
education.
• To encourage the development of  a religious organiza-
tion-based anticorruption movement; and
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• To encourage interfaith coalitions to adopt the drive 
against corruption as their joint focus.
The principal success of  the program was the setting up of  
the Interfaith Anticorruption Coalition in the Yogyakarta Special 
District on 30 December 2004, and the strengthening of  anticor-
ruption initiatives by the various religious communities.
Three Anticorruption Strategies 
In order to achieve the above goals, three strategies were 
employed: first, developing and incorporating appropriate materials 
and anticorruption modules into religious/ethics education cur-
ricula; second, developing an interfaith anticorruption coalition; 
and, third, conducting advocacy by way of  public hearings.
1. Incorporating anticorruption materials in religious/ethics education 
curricula
Availing of  formal education as a weapon in the fight against 
corruption was expected to produce significant results given that 
educated people play a highly important role in society. It is not 
enough that they be equipped with the knowledge and abilities 
needed to do their particular jobs in society. Rather what is more 
important is how they use the knowledge they possess and shun 
the opportunity to engage in corruption. 
The anticorruption materials that were developed were tested 
in 11 institutes of  higher education in Yogyakarta and Boyolali 
(Central Java). In the case of  Yogyakarta, the third level institutes 
involved were the Muhammadiyah University Yogyakarta, the 
Duta Wacana Christian University, the Sanata Dharma University, 
the Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa University, the Yogyakarta State 
University, Gadjah Mada University, the Information Management 
and Computer Science Polytechnic (STIMIK), the Computer 
Applications Academy (Akakom), STIKES (AKPER) Aisyiah 
Muhammadiyah, and the Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University 
Yogyakarta. Meanwhile in Boyolali, the materials were tried out 
by the Buddhist Theology High School.
The anticorruption materials were tested during a total of  
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46 meetings with 20 teachers of  the following subjects: Muslim 
religious education, Catholic religious education, social morals, 
religious education, guidance and counseling for priests, civics, 
Pancasila philosophy, “Taman Siswa” studies, social pathology, 
Buddhist religious education, biblical hermaneutics, “Winaya” 
studies, and Hindu religious education.
Instruction was provided refering to the relevant syllabi in 
each institute and involved three face-to-face meetings plus as-
signments. The first of  these meetings was designed to ensure 
that the students understood anticorruption issues and the 
genealogy of  corruption, and developed a heightened sensitiv-
ity to the problem. The teaching methods employed consisted 
of  brainstorming, exchanges of  ideas and experiences, and the 
furnishing of  explanations. The first meetings each lasted 40 
minutes.
The second meeting was designed to impart an understanding 
to students of  the ethical values involved in the anticorruption 
movement as they related to religious teachings, and to inculcate in 
the students an anticorruption outlook, sufficient self-confidence 
to eschew corrupt behavior and the motivation to play an active 
role in the fight against corruption. Once again, brainstorming 
was the method employed, accompanied by explanations. The 
second meetings each lasted for 60 minutes. The students were 
then given written assignments consisting of  group papers to 
be completed outside of  class time for the purpose of  building 
solidarity and teamwork among the members of  each group. 
The third meeting was intended to motivate the students to 
adopt an assertive attitude against the symptoms of  corruption, 
to improve their capabilities in identifying social problems aris-
ing from corruption and in analyzing corruption cases, and to 
develop the belief  that everyone has the power to do something 
to stop corruption. This meeting consisted of  the presentation 
of  the work papers and group discussions, and lasted for 100 
minutes.
In conducting evaluation, the terms of  reference were drawn 
up based on a planning process, and the collection and analysis 
Interfaith Coalition against Corruption
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of  data. During the initial stage, the student groups being tested 
as respondents were asked to complete an evaluation scale at 
the end of  the course.
A total of  1,006 persons served as respondents. Of  this 
figure, 56 percent were female students and 44 percent were 
male students. Based on the student composition in each course, 
the biggest group of  students was made up of  those studying 
religion (67 percent), followed by students studying general 
courses (33 percent).
Of the ten factors covered by the evaluation scale, it appeared 
that the empirical average for all the factors was higher than that 
hypothetical average. Thus, the students’ overall appraisal of the 
test materials was very positive, with the female students tending 
to give a higher score than their male counterparts.
The evaluation scale results were also analyzed in regard to 
the different courses taken by the students. Based on this clas-
sification, the evaluative study provided detailed information on 
the quality of  the training, both from the perspective of  the 
best lessons and the best courses. It was found that the students 
from the general courses tended to give higher evaluation scores 
than those taking the religious/ethics courses.
With regard to the nature of  the materials in general, it was 
found that many of  the respondents found the materials to be 
straightforward. In detail, 41.1 percent of  the respondents said 
the materials were simple, 1.8 percent said they were very simple, 
22.1 percent said they were quite simple, 30.6 percent said they 
were difficult, and 4.4 percent said they were very difficult.
As regards the focus group discussions, part of  the sample 
said that they now understood what corruption really meant. 
However, with regard to the overall material, many complained 
about lack of  time. Meanwhile, concerning the students’ attitudes 
to those involved in corruption, the majority said they should 
be punished as severely as possible.
2. Interfaith Coalition
This second strategy, the establishment of  an interfaith 
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coalition, was believed to be an effective way of  promoting a 
moral movement and the taking of  action by young activists 
from religious organizations to combine the forces against cor-
ruption, and the equipping of  leaders from each religion so as 
to be able to heighten the awareness of  their followers about 
the evils of  corruption.
In order to translate this strategy into action, anticorruption 
training and training of  trainers for advocacy purposes were 
provided. The objective of  the anticorruption training was to 
develop a critical awareness among religious activists so as to 
enable them to serve as the vanguard in the fight against cor-
ruption. It was expected that this training would improve the 
understanding of  the participants as regards to the eradication 
of  corruption from the legal and religious perspectives; help 
develop an assertive attitude among the participants in respect of  
those involved in corruption; inculcate an understanding of  the 
importance of  the anticorruption movement among the partici-
pants; enable the participants to disseminate correct knowledge 
and understandings about the anticorruption movement among 
people of  religion, and encourage the participants to voluntarily 
take part in the anticorruption movement.
The training was provided over five days with five training 
sessions for each of  the religious groups taking part. The ap-
proach employed in providing the training was the adult education 
approach. Unlike the pedagogical approach, which is one-way 
in nature and primarily consists of  lectures, the adult education 
approach to education not only involves lectures but also the 
presentation of  materials designed to encourage the participants 
to play an active role. Twenty percent of  the participants were 
women. Each recruit was assigned to take part by a particular 
organization, with these organizations consisting of  church/
mosque or temple-based youth organizations, religious organiza-
tions active in institutes of  higher education, and religion-based 
community organizations.
The output of this training saw each religion forming an an-
ticorruption community. Among the Muslims, those who partici-
Interfaith Coalition against Corruption
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pated in the training set up the Muslim Students’ Anticorruption 
Network, while anticorruption communities were also established 
by the Protestant, Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist-based groups.
After the anticorruption training had been provided, the re-
ligious activists also underwent training of  trainers for advocacy 
purposes so as to enable them to disseminate the knowledge, 
skills and understandings they had gained among their respec-
tive communities/organizations by serving as trainers for their 
peers. It was hoped that the participants would be equipped with 
the necessary knowledge and skills to serve as anticorruption 
advocacy trainers. From the output perspective, the training led 
to the establishment of  a joint anticorruption forum titled the 
Interfaith Activists’ Anticorruption Forum.
Besides the provision of  training, materials capable of  be-
ing used in sermons and religious discourses by religious leaders 
were also developed by the Coalition. The objective here was to 
inculcate a critical awareness among people of  religion through 
the presentation of  anticorruption messages in the sermons 
preached as part of  the ritual activities of  each religion. In testing 
this material in places of  worship, both one-way and two-way 
communication methods were employed.
In order to ensure the development of  a common perception 
among all those involved in the interfaith anticorruption coalition, 
regular meetings were held every two months. Those attending 
the meetings consisted of  representatives of  each religion, place 
of  worship-based activists, and religion-based student organiza-
tions. Meanwhile, those participating in the training of  trainers 
program were made up of  pre-selected representatives from each 
religion. These regular meetings provided a forum for discussing 
the perceptions of  each religious grouping on corruption and 
how it should be dealt with, and to identify commonalities be-
tween all the religions that would permit the formulation of  joint 
strategies. After the discussions, the participants would draw up 
plans for follow-up action based on the common platform that 
corruption prejudiced everyone’s interests and therefore had to 
be eradicated, that such eradication could not be accomplished 
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by words alone and that concrete measures were required, that 
the eradication of  corruption would take a considerable period 
of  time given that many people were not fully aware of  the 
evils it produced, that socialization and “indoctrination” efforts 
would be needed to create such an awareness, that momentum 
needed to be built up to change the collective perceptions of  
society, and that greater networking would be required to ensure 
the eradication of  corruption. 
3. Advocacy (Public Hearings)
The planned advocacy efforts were intended to inform 
policy-makers at both the central and local levels of the results 
achieved so as to help bring about changes in government 
policy and ensure the incorporation of anticorruption messages 
in religious education curricula.
The original plan was that the Coalition would hold a pub-
lic hearing with the Minister of  Religious Affairs. However, the 
Department of  Religious Affairs turned down the request, sug-
gesting instead that representatives of  the Coalition meet with 
the Department’s Inspector General. However, the matters that 
the Coalition wished to discuss had very little connection with 
the functions of  the Inspector General. Besides the Department 
of  Religious Affairs, the Coalition felt it would be beneficial 
to also hold a public hearing with the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) as the KPK was viewed as having a highly 
strategic role to play in the fight against corruption. 
A joint study titled “Government Education Policy for 
Religious Harmony in the Yogyakarta Special District”, which 
was carried out by the Higher Education Council of  the Mu-
hammadiyah Central Executive Board and the Catholic Higher 
Education Association (APTIK), plus the results of  public hear-
ings in Yogyakarta, produced the following findings:
a.   The Yogyakarta Special District Local Legislative As-
sembly was very supportive of  the program run by the 
Interfaith Anticorruption Coalition, and was willing to 
support the establishment of  anticorruption education 
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as a special course.
b. The director of  the Yogyakarta Special District National 
Education Service did not agree with the establishment 
of  anticorruption education as a special course. How-
ever, he was prepared to have it incorporated as part 
of  existing courses, such as Pancasila, civics, religious 
education or economics. The director took the view that 
it would be very difficult to have anticorruption educa-
tion incorporated as part of  existing curricula. Instead, 
he suggested that the Interfaith Anticorruption Coalition 
be given the opportunity to talk to school principals 
and teachers under the coordination of  the National 
Education Service.
c. The Yogyakarta Special District Department of  Reli-
gious Affairs was also of  the opinion that it would be 
difficult to incorporate anticorruption education as part 
of  the existing curricula, save if  this were done via the 
Department of  Religious Affairs for the purpose of  
illuminating religion teachers and preachers. The Depart-
ment of  Religious Affairs said it had a large number of  
religion teachers and preachers who, if  provided with 
anticorruption information, would be able to dissemi-
nate this to students and congregations, with the said 
religion teachers and preachers serving in the front line 
of  socializing anticorruption values.
d. The KPK gave a warm welcome to the efforts being 
undertaken by the Coalition of  five religions in Yog-
yakarta. The Commission was greatly impressed with 
the work carried out by the Coalition in developing 
anticorruption modules and models. It added that if  
the revolution against corruption had started in West 
Sumatra, the revolution in anticorruption education was 
clearly being pioneered in Yogyakarta. It also said that 
it would like to see the work of  the Coalition being 
spread to other areas, and expressed its willingness to 
facilitate national meetings so as to design anticorruption 
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education programs at the national level.
e. The Minister of  National Education appeared not to 
be overly enthusiastic about what was being done by 
the Coalition, and was of  the view that the time had 
passed for public hearings. An instruction had already 
been issued by the President to the Minister of  National 
Education to incorporate anticorruption education in the 
curricula at all levels from elementary school up to higher 
education. He explained that anticorruption materials 
had been designed and that a ministerial decree in this 
regard was to be issued at the start of  2005. The minister 
also said that the Coalition was only concerned about 
higher education and non-governmental organizations, 
and had actually been left behind by the reform efforts 
being undertaken by the Government. The Department 
of  National Education was in the process of  devising 
anticorruption curricula and lessons that would subse-
quently be taught at all levels from elementary school 
upwards. This was connected with Presidential Instruc-
tion No. 5 of  2004 on the accelerated eradication of  
corruption, which in paragraph 11 directed the Minister 
of  National Education to ensure the provision of  educa-
tion that would inculcate an anticorruption outlook and 
anticorruption behavior at every educational level, both 
formal and informal.
f. The United Development Party (PPP) faction in the Re-
public of  Indonesia House of  Representatives expressed 
appreciation of  the efforts made by the Coalition. Fur-
thermore, the party’s members sitting on Commission 
X urged the Government to incorporate anticorruption 
material in school curricula.
g. The speaker of  the People’s Consultative Assembly 
was very enthusiastic about the work that was been 
undertaken by the Coalition. He said that it was entirely 
fitting that anticorruption education be incorporated in 
education curricula so as to ensure that anticorruption 
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behavior was internalized from an early age. By providing 
anticorruption education at school, he said, we would 
be saving an entire generation.
Lessons Learned
A number of  important constraints were encountered during 
the course of  the program, including the following:
1. Constraints encountered during testing of  anticorruption materials
a. Competence of  teachers
The teachers during the trials had difficulties in employing 
the books provided as there were no instructions on how to use 
them. In reality, the teachers should have had sufficient compe-
tence as regards, for example, the preparation and mastery of  
the materials, methods and other aspects. Accordingly, it would 
have been preferable had they been better equipped, with clear 
competency standards being applied.
In order to overcome this problem, the anticorruption 
education workshops included a systematic and comprehensive 
orientation program for the teachers.
b. Students
In some classes, the students were initially reluctant to talk 
about corruption. There were also differing interpretations as 
regards the meaning and scope of  the term “corruption”.
In order to overcome these problems, the teachers during 
the trials adopted a number of  different approaches, namely:
• Inculcating an awareness of  the importance of  the 
materials through, for example, the presentation of  case 
studies, illustrations and the use of  humor.
• Encouraging students to study and read materials con-
nected with corruption in Indonesia.
• Providing proper orientation so as to ensure a uniformity 
of  perception and views among students regarding the 
meaning and scope of  the term “corruption”.
c. Materials
As described above, the tryouts of  the anticorruption educa-
tion materials involved their incorporation into existing subjects, 
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particularly those concerning values and ethics, rather than setting 
anticorruption education up as a separate subject. For the teach-
ers involved in the tryouts, the materials were highly relevant to 
the subjects being taught, such as religious education (Islamic, 
Buddhist, Protestant, Catholic and Hindu), civics, Pancasila phi-
losophy, social and moral studies, and social pathology. However, 
no information was available about the relevance of  the material 
to subjects such as biblical hermaneutics, “Winaya” studies, and 
Taman Siswa” studies, and counseling. 
In order to overcome the difficulties faced, the teachers 
agreed to pioneer a number of  new breakthroughs so that the 
materials would be readily accepted. These breakthroughs were 
as follows:
• The teachers would be able to select and prioritize ma-
terials from the existing modules/books so as to bring 
them more into line with the substance of  the subjects 
being taught. For example, if  the anticorruption materials 
were being presented in civics or Pancasila philosophy 
classes, then the materials focused on would concern the 
genealogy of  corruption and anticorruption strategies. 
Meanwhile, if  the anticorruption messages were being 
presented during religion classes, then the prioritized 
materials would be those concerning religion, the inter-
nalization of  anticorruption values, and the roles to be 
played by people of  religion in socializing anticorruption 
values.
• The teachers would use a variety of  methods, rather 
than just those prescribed, including the discussion of  
case studies, games and problem-solving.
• Management would collaborate with higher education 
institutes to ensure that the incorporation of  anticor-
ruption education would be as wide-ranging as possible, 
and be taught on an ongoing basis.
d.  Methods 
The tryout manuals specified a number of  methods appropri-
ate to the purposes of  the training and the materials employed, 
Interfaith Coalition against Corruption
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namely, brainstorming, sharing ideas and experiences, explana-
tions, class work papers and discussions. So as to overcome 
any potential obstacles, the methods employed were varied. The 
teachers would normally employ two or more methods during 
each meeting, although there was no set formula employed. In 
fact, some teachers preferred to apply their own approaches, for 
example, by encouraging students to understand and experience 
for themselves the problems associated with corruption using 
various sources, and only then moving on to brainstorming, and 
sharing ideas and experiences.
2. Constraints among Religious Activists
In general, all the religious activists involved in the training 
said that they had benefited from it. Among the benefits felt was 
an increased awareness of  corruption. However, the two training 
sessions they participated in (anticorruption training and training 
of  trainers) were considered insufficient to properly equip them 
in their roles as anticorruption activists.
The second stage of  training (ToT) was generally felt to be 
insufficiently effective. The majority of  the participants were not 
able to properly put into effect what they had learned during 
the second stage in a number of  areas of  the coalition’s work. 
In fact, they were still unsure of  themselves in attempting to 
push anticorruption issues in their respective communities. This 
lack of  confidence was, in part, due to the fact that they had 
not fully mastered the necessary skills.
In order to overcome this problem, anticorruption com-
munities were established during the first stage of  training so 
as to strengthen socialization in each religious community, while 
the participants in ToT agreed to set up a Coalition of  Young 
Interfaith Anticorruption Activists.
3. Constraints on incorporation of  anticorruption messages in religious 
sermons
In this part of the program, the main constraints that were 
encountered concerned the relevance and consistency of the ap-
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proaches employed and the materials being promoted. Time limita-
tions resulted in inconsistencies between the approaches employed 
and the substantive messages contained in sermons and preach-
ing. On paper, the approaches used in the manuals (ethical and 
moral approaches) were highly relevant to the creation of public 
awareness. These approaches were also in line with the cultural 
strategy, which was inextricably linked to the process of actual-
izing religious values as part of the effort to eradicate corruption, 
and focused on interpretable religious definitions, religious-social 
issues, corruption as a sin (karma), the law relating to corruption, 
corruption from the moral perspective, morally uplifting tales, 
changing mind-sets, the consequences of corruption, the estab-
lishment of systems that could combat corruption, sanctions for 
those engaging in corruption, the latest approaches to supervision 
and control, and courage in preaching against corruption during 
religious study activities, religious rituals in places of worship, and 
during other types of religious meetings.
In reality, however, not all the approaches outlined in the 
manuals were fully covered. Little attention was paid to the is-
sues of  sanctions for those involved in corruption, the latest 
approaches to supervision and control, or courage in preaching 
against corruption. Thus, the ideal moral and ethical approaches 
postulated in the manuals were not fully reflected in the ser-
mons.
The content and scope of  the materials were deemed to 
be unduly limited, especially as they only covered six areas of  
discussion. However, the contents and scope of  the materials 
were found to be appropriate for the tryouts that were con-
ducted. Nevertheless, the harmonization between the approaches 
employed and the substance of  the materials could have been 
better.
In order to deal with these problems, emphasis was placed 
during the trials on improving the quality of  implementation and 
the competence of  the preachers. The tryouts on the preaching 
materials were conducted in a number of  religious forums for 
the purpose of  imparting awareness and the strategic cultural 
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basis among each religious community so that the members of  
these communities would be able to effectively participate in 
the fight against corruption. Some of  the preachers had a very 
high level of  understanding of  their religions and were very 
competent in their fields, so that it may be concluded that no 
constraints were encountered as regards to the methods and 
mastery of  materials. 
Some of  the other instructors also had quite a lot of  ex-
perience and were quite creative. They also had a conceptual 
understanding of  corruption and were able to develop their 
own materials (presenting concrete examples) having regard to 
the overall design of  the program.
The main challenge faced to date in this part of  the program 
is the existence of  different methods and approaches by the 
different members of  the coalition in responding to corruption. 
On the one hand, there are members of  the coalition who feel 
that the right way to respond to corruption is to mobilize the 
masses/members of  their religious community to put pressure 
on policy-makers implicated in corruption, while on the other 
hand there are those who say that the mobilization of  the masses 
contradicts religious teachings that condemn violence. In order 
to bridge these differences, the Coalition agreed to respond to 
corruption cases by engaging in dialog with the officials con-
cerned, and to encourage only particular religious communities 
to mobilize the masses for the purpose of  applying pressure.
In order to ensure the sustainability of  the program, the 
members of  the Coalition have committed themselves to drawing 
up a plan of  action for the future. The Interfaith Anticorrup-
tion Coalition will establish a presidium, which will continue to 
strengthen the program among the followers of  each religion. 
With regard to socialization of  the program among people of  
religion, the respective communities will be encouraged to be 
more assertive and sensitive as regards corruption, and to jointly 
fight against it by positioning the five religions as bulwarks of  
the anticorruption movement and ensuring the sustainability of  
the program in the future.
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In addition, collaboration with the Yogyakarta Special 
District’s National Education Service and the local office of  
the Department of  Religious Affairs in the Yogyakarta Special 
District will continue for the purpose of  providing anticorruption 
training to teachers/school principals and preachers.
Interfaith Coalition against Corruption
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When the Kiai Help 
Control Local Budgeting1
A.S. Burhan
Religion Yes, Corruption Yes
The results of  the latest Transparency International (TI) survey on corruption around the world have been released, but it was the 2002 version of  the survey2 that provided 
the inspiration for the Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement 
(Gerakan Anti Korupsi Berbasis Pesantren).3 This movement 
was started at the end of  December 2002, and wrapped up its 
activities in August 2004. The results of  the 2002 TI survey 
showed that developing countries that characterize themselves 
as being religious, or that are marked by pronounced displays 
of  religiosity, occupied the top positions as the most corrupt 
countries in the world. Indonesia occupied eighth position along 
with Bangladesh, Nigeria, Paraguay, Madagascar, Angola, Kenya, 
Azerbaijan, Uganda, and Moldova. The reality highlighted by the 
survey results gives rise to two problematic realizations. First, the 
secular nations – that is, nations that do not declare themselves 
to be based on religious teachings – are the cleanest countries 
and have the greatest commitment to fighting corruption, and, 
second, Islam, as the way of  life of  the people in some of  the 
most corrupt countries, seems to be incapable of  dissuading its 
1  This paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Pesantren-Based Anticor-
ruption Movement”, which ran from December 2002 to August 2004 and was supported by 
the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.
2  The Transparency International Corruption Survey for 2004 covered 146 countries and showed 
that Indonesia was perceived the fifth most corrupt country in the world, in company with the 
likes of  Angola, the Democratic Republic of  the Congo, the Ivory Coast, Georgia, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan. 
3  Pesantren are Islamic boarding schools, also known as madrasah. Kiai are the leaders/ patrons 
of pesantren.

Uncovering Corruption in AcehWhen the Kiai Help Control Local Budgeting
adherents from becoming involved in corruption and similar 
types of  abuses.
In the Indonesian context, where the majority (87 percent), 
of the people are Muslims, and where some groups are actively 
striving to introduce sharia (Islamic law), it would appear that 
religion is incapable of  containing the seemingly unstoppable 
tide of  corruption. After the overthrow of  authoritarianism, 
corruption actually became more widespread, systematic, and 
even came to be thought of  as almost part of  the national 
culture and psyche.
While the level of  corruption in a country cannot be directly 
related to the influence of  a particular religion, the prevalence of  
corruption in countries where religious belief  is strong, such as 
Indonesia, shows that the sensitivity of  people in these countries 
to the damage done by corruption is, generally speaking, low. 
The question therefore arises, what has been the contribution 
of  religious faith in this country to providing a moral-ethical 
foundation for addressing problems such as poverty, inequal-
ity, and other enemies of  all religions, particularly corruption? 
Should there not be a direct link between religion and the effort 
to eradicate, or at least reduce, corruption? We should not allow 
ourselves to be categorized as a nation that is concerned with 
the rituals of  religion, rather than the essence of  its teachings. In 
other words, it is not enough to go through religious formalities 
while simultaneously turning a blind eye to corruption.
Another question that arises is why rampant corruption 
in Indonesia does not encourage people of  religion to rise up 
and display a common front against the vice, which has done 
so much damage and harm to our country over so many years 
and in so many fields?
Given the increasingly systematic character of corruption in 
Indonesia, the anticorruption movement needs to focus on encour-
aging transparency and the introduction of the principles of good 
governance. The existence of transparency, public participation, 
justice (including gender equity), and public accountability must 
form part of the democratization of the political and economic 
systems. In the long term, the most pressing need is consistency 
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in administrative law so as to allow for a more equitable distribu-
tion of power in the political system. Meanwhile, the people – the 
victims of abuses of power – must take the initiative by establishing 
popular control over the actions of the government and state. This 
effort will need to involve people of all social strata and walks 
of life, including Indonesia’s pesantren, if  it is to ultimately prove 
successful. The eradication of  corruption using conventional, 
law-based methods and increased supervision/oversight by the 
organs of  state, as is the approach currently being applied by 
the government, offers no guarantees of  success or that any 
dent will be made in the machinery of  corruption.
The Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement was estab-
lished on the foundations of  similar anticorruption efforts in 
the past. The Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) National Congress in 2002 
issued a fatwa ruling that prayers need not be offered for the soul 
of  a deceased person who had been involved in corruption until 
such time as his ill-gotten gains had been repaid. Under sharia, 
according to the NU muftis, ghulul (corruption) was a betrayal of  
the people’s trust. In addition, the acceptance of  valuable gifts by 
an official was haram (forbidden to Muslims) as this constituted 
risywah (bribery) and violated the official’s oath of  office.
Following the issuance of  this fatwa by the NU, separate 
anticorruption movements emerged in the two largest Muslim 
organizations in Indonesia – NU and Muhammadiyah – which 
decided to combine their forces so as to organize a national 
anticorruption campaign through the issuing of  joint declarations 
in various cities around the country.
The fatwa issued by the NU, and the movement established 
by NU and Muhammadiyah had the potential to serve as the 
points of  departure for the involvement of  people of  religion 
in the national movement to cleanse Indonesia of  corruption. 
This perspective gradually started taking shape among people of  
religion in the midst of  general social permissiveness as regards 
corruption. 
It was important from the beginning to inculcate a realiza-
tion that while corruption was closely tied up with moral values, 
it also went much further than this. Before designing a joint 

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
effort to tackle corruption, it was essential that all understood 
the reality that corruption involved socio-cultural, political and 
legal factors, and that everyone had a proper comprehension 
of  the ethical system prevailing in the community. In addition, 
a high level of  awareness was required among policymakers of  
the need to wage war on corruption.
In the light of  all of  the above, the Pesantren-Based Anti-
corruption Movement decided to adopt as its principal goal the 
creation of  “anticorruption pockets” that would work to mo-
bilize kiai in their capacities as religious and community leaders 
to participate in and supervise the formulation of  public policy, 
and to particularly monitor the conduct of  public officials in the 
exercise of  their powers and in the spending of  public money. 
Among the steps undertaken were efforts to impart a more 
comprehensive awareness and understanding of  the effects of  
corruption on both the state and the people, and the dissemina-
tion of  anticorruption messages to the public founded on the 
religious and social perspectives. These efforts were intended to 
form an integral part of  a campaign encouraging the realization 
of  good governance at the local government level.
There are two strategic aspects that underpin the role of  the 
pesantren in bringing about change. First, as institutes of  religious 
education that are outside the control of  the state, the pesantren 
are autonomous and politically neutral. In addition, they are also 
sensitive to the needs of  the poor and marginalized. Second, 
the kiai are symbols of  morality and command respect in their 
efforts to uphold public ethics. They also play a role as cultural 
agents in developing social awareness. In short, therefore, the 
kiai represent an important group that is looked up to by the 
community. Their influence is strong, particularly among the lower 
strata of  society, and this places them in a special position in 
the eyes of  the decision-makers and power-holders in the gov-
ernment at both the local and national levels. By making use of  
the respect felt in the community for kiai, it was expected that 
the movement would be rendered more effective in preventing 
the further spread of  corruption in the bureaucracy.
Religion as an Inspiration in the Fight against Corruption
When the Kiai Help Control Local Budgeting
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So, what were the concepts that underpinned the Pesantren-
Based Anticorruption Movement? It needs to be remembered 
from the outset that the pesantren community was never completely 
blind to the problems caused by corruption. As stated above, 
there was already a fatwa in place denying blessing to deceased 
embezzlers until such time as restitution had been made. While 
this fatwa was a new and progressive departure, it also gave rise 
to various problematic questions. In general, it was true that the 
understanding of  what corruption actually meant and its relation-
ship to Islamic teachings was still very simple. Corruption was 
seen as something that solely concerned private morality, or even 
as something entirely normal, rather than as being a fundamental 
problem that threatened to undermine the entire nation.
The message of  Islam as regards corruption was mostly 
interpreted legalistically, with corruption being categorized as 
something that was forbidden. However, the influence of  the 
pesantren and their kiai had yet to be brought to bear on the 
surrounding social circumstances that encouraged corruption to 
spread. Instead, this group preferred to concentrate on issues 
connected with gambling and alcohol abuse. While these issues 
were, and are, also important, the problem of  corruption, which 
brought the nation to the edge of  disaster and which damages 
the interests of  everybody, including the kiai, had to be seen as 
an even greater evil, and one that required the intervention of  
the kiai themselves.
Against this backdrop, three main strategic measures were 
adopted by the Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement. First, 
heightening awareness through providing an insight into the 
anatomy of  corruption and the role to be played by Islam in 
combating it. As part of  this effort, the Pesantren-Based Anticor-
ruption Movement presented a critical analysis of  how corrup-
tion had developed in this country, and the terrible damage it 
was doing to the interests and the economic, social and cultural 
rights of  the people. Then, discussions were held to determine 
how this worrying situation should be viewed and understood 
by Islam (in other words, religious adherents and/or pesantren 
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figures), and how democracy and/or Islamic doctrine could 
provide possible answers. By Islamic doctrine here, we are talk-
ing about Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), which is highly focused 
on in pesantren circles.
During this stage, it was attempted to bring about a rein-
terpretation of  doctrine at the theological level so as to reach a 
consensus to the effect that the eradication of  corruption was 
not just a duty of  a worldly nature, but was also a holy duty 
or religious calling. It was also necessary to inculcate a realiza-
tion that state funds were in reality public funds – money paid 
by the people through their taxes. Thus, the supervision and 
control of  government spending was the obligation of  every 
citizen, including those in pesantren circles. It was hoped that this 
conception – besides providing a moral reference and inspira-
tional basis for the movement – would also be enshrined as a 
fatwa and disseminated through newsletters and radio, and in the 
mosques and religious councils, and thereby be communicated 
directly to the public.
This new interpretation was spread through the dissemi-
nation of  strong and inspirational Islamic moral teachings on 
corruption. Other activities included the publication of  books, 
production of  stickers and religious texts, and the holding of  
a number of  workshops and seminars. The most significant 
output from these activities included a stricter and more unam-
biguous formulation of  the religious foundations and rulings 
that outlawed corruption in Islam through fatwa and/or other 
rulings, case responses and dissemination of  the relevant legal 
background. One of  the activities held in connection with this 
was the holding of  a bahtsul masail (forum to discuss issues of  
public concern) of  kiai in Jakarta in 2004. During this gather-
ing, the most important issue discussed was the “developing of  
anticorruption jurisprudence”.4 Many of  the results have been 
published in book form and disseminated to all pesantren.
4 See Korupsi di Negeri Kaum Beragama: Ikhtiar Membangun Fiqh Anti Korupsi, Perhimpunan Pengem-
bangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Jakarta, June 2004; Memerangi Korupsi: Geliat Agamawan atas 
Problem Korupsi di Indonesia, Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Jakarta, 
June 2004; and Menolak Korupsi Membangun Kesalehan Sosial: Kumpulan Teks Khutbah Jumat, Per-
himpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Jakarta, May 2004.
When the Kiai Help Control Local Budgeting
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The importance of  this fiqh (jurisprudence) should not be 
underestimated as fiqh has always been central to the teachings 
of  the pesantren and as a reference for dealing with social prob-
lems among the members of  the NU in particular, and Muslims 
in general.
It was also necessary to undertake activities so as to produce 
a new interpretation of  the concept of  zakat (Islamic alms) 
– which occupies an important position as one of  the five pillars 
of  Islam. This needed to be reformulated as “a moral norm in 
the fields of  taxation and budgeting that holds in high regard 
the principles of  justice, the common good and concern for the 
weak.” The paying of  tax was a religious function, with only 
God having the power to collect it. Accordingly, state officials 
were only distributors of  the taxes collected and were required 
to spend this money so as to benefit the weakest groups in 
society – as stated in the Koran. The function of  the political, 
economic and social orders was to create equity and freedom 
from corruption, ensure effective control, and ethically distribute 
the taxes that had been collected. These were not options but 
rather imperatives binding on all citizens.
More than 10 years ago, the Indonesian Society for Pesantren 
and Community Development (Perhimpunan Pengembangan 
Pesantren dan Masyarakat, P3M) had suggested a more progressive 
interpretation of  zakat teaching so that it could serve as a moral 
reference and provide inspiration for religious thinkers in develop-
ing concern for and awareness about social problems. The idea 
was that religion would become involved in addressing concrete 
problems in society, such as inequality, poverty and corruption 
– in reality the biggest enemies of  religion. The argument was 
that religious organizations were positioned outside the control 
of  the state to serve as moral guardians capable of  effecting 
real social control rather than serving as tools for legitimizing 
the rule of  the power-holders or the exclusive interests of  their 
followers without having regard to the common good.
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Revitalizing the Bahtsul Masail Forum
The next significant step taken by the Pesantren-Based An-
ticorruption Movement was to try to encourage the concrete 
involvement of  the pesantren in eradicating corruption. It was 
hoped to effect a breakthrough whereby a strategic anticorrup-
tion movement would be developed that was in tune with the 
backgrounds of  those involved in the movement itself, that is 
to say, through the reconstruction of  their traditions. This was 
carried out through involving the kiai as agents for changing 
the perceptions of  the community so as to encourage them to 
become more aggressively involved in the effort to eradicate cor-
ruption in a systematic way, particularly through the bahtsul masail 
forum, as well as the issuing of  fatwa on matters of  importance 
connected with the fight against corruption, and disseminating 
these through Friday sermons and religious councils.
The bahtsul masail forum has long been a part of  NU tradi-
tion and is convened to discuss and resolve various problems that 
arise, ranging from religious doctrine to matters affecting the lives 
of  ordinary people. Because of  the importance of  this forum, 
it was selected to serve as a medium to heighten social concern 
and awareness. Ultimately, bahtsul masail forums in different areas 
would critically study and discuss various social issues, particularly 
corruption and abuses of  power by policy-makers when framing 
local government budgets. Thus, the bahtsul masail forums were 
expected to serve as effective means of  control through the 
adoption of  firm stances against injustice and corruption.
In the end, this control was realized through criticism and 
demands that local government budgets truly benefit the weakest 
sections of  society. This was brought about through the issu-
ance by the bahtsul masail forum (made up of  kiai) of  tausiyah 
(recommendations) urging that local government budgets allocate 
at least 70 percent of  total spending for efforts that would serve 
the concrete interests of  the public and promote community 
empowerment. The aim was to ensure that the popular economy 
(consisting of  the agricultural, small- and medium-enterprise and 
cooperative sectors) would be developed and improved, afford-
When the Kiai Help Control Local Budgeting
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able public services (health and education) provided, and better 
social security guarantees for the poor put in place (rice for the 
disadvantaged). Meanwhile, the remaining 30 percent of  budget 
funds would continue to be available for routine local govern-
ment expenditure.
Bahtsul masail forums were held in a total of  12 cities – Cianjur, 
Tasikmalaya, Garut, and Ciamis (West Java); Cirebon-Kuningan, 
Brebes, Jepara, and Pati (East Java); and Lamongan, Ponorogo, 
Blitar, and Sumenep (Central Java). Unfortunately, due to the 
limited capacity of  the program, only one forum was able to 
be held in each of  these cities.
The revitalization of  the bahtsul masail tradition by kiai and 
ulama and its focusing on local budget policies was of  the utmost 
important bearing in mind that traditionally up to 80 percent of  
local government spending had gone on such things as allow-
ances, bonuses and official travel. This was despite the reality that 
great numbers of  people had difficulty in keeping their children 
in formal education up to the high school level, let alone send 
them on to third level education. Many people could not afford 
basic health services, and the earnings of  small farmers and 
fishermen were barely enough to keep them alive.
This, then, was the approach adopted by the P3M in promot-
ing the Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement. As a result 
of  these efforts, the forums were transformed into a critical 
religious movement concerned with social problems, encouraging 
local governments to frame budgets that were beneficial to the 
public and take steps to wipe out corruption. This was all very 
different to the traditional manifestation of  the bahtsul masail, 
which usually only dealt with questions of  religious observance 
and private morality.
The next strategic move was to develop the capacity, reach 
and scope of  the Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement 
itself. In order to achieve this goal, senior pesantren students 
(santri) and young kiai were selected for capacity-building train-
ing and to serve as community organizers for the anticorruption 
movement. They were provided with special training on how to 
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analyze and make sense of  local government budgets and con-
duct simple audits. These analyses and audits were essential tools 
for the conducting of  investigations. The community organizers 
were also provided with training on advocacy and organizational 
techniques, particularly in connection with the effort to revitalize 
the bahtsul masail forum. Meanwhile at the institutional level, a 
process of  networking was commenced among strategic groups 
and organizations, such as the Nahdlatul Ulama, local civil society 
organizations involved in the fight against corruption, students, 
local politicians known to be clean or idealistic, and the manage-
ments and journalists of  local press outlets.
Besides the three strategic approaches described above, the 
Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement also initiated a number 
of  other, derivative activities, such as the publishing of  books, 
holding of  seminars and workshops, and the provision of  training 
to people of  religion for the purpose of  providing information 
on the importance of  eradicating corruption.
It was expected that the work undertaken would develop 
an awareness in pesantren circles of  the need to control corrup-
tion. It was hoped that this would then lead to the emergence 
of  a more systematic, rather than a merely reactive, movement, 
or, in other words, the positioning of  the pesantren as centers 
of  change.
Structural and Cultural Power
As explained above, the first stage of this anticorruption 
campaign lasted from the end of December 2002 until August 
2004. The entire program was undertaken by the the Indonesian 
Society for Pesantren and Community Development (P3M) with 
funding being provided by the Partnership for Governance Reform 
in Indonesia. On the ground, the program was strongly supported 
by intellectuals at both the national and local level, with further 
support coming from the existing P3M network. In addition, the 
movement was informally backed by NU institutions.
While the strategies adopted were generally appropriate and 
much support was forthcoming for the movement, it was never 
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going to be an easy task to realize the movement’s goals given 
that these were two-pronged: first, converting the pesantren into 
centers of  change and, second, ensuring that local governments 
brought in budgets that were more beneficial to the public than 
the power-holders. Given this reality, it was only to be expected 
that many obstacles would be encountered. Among the main 
obstacles were the following:
The first constraint concerned the fact that those who were 
to serve as the driving force of  the movement, namely, the kiai, 
often lacked autonomy both in the political and economic senses. 
The fact that many kiai were much too close to the power-hold-
ers prevented them from playing an optimum role in serving 
as role models and asserting their moral authority. In addition, 
the closeness of  the NU, a religious organization, to the center 
of  power served as a constraint on the effectiveness of  this 
organization as a prime mover in the war on corruption. This 
became particularly apparent in those cities where the Pesantren-
Based Anticorruption Movement was present.5
The second main constraint revolved around the capabilities 
of  young kiai and community organizers to properly analyze 
local government budgets and to use these analyses as tools to 
fight corruption. Traditionally, kiai have immersed themselves in 
texts rather than figures, and their knowledge of  management is 
minimal. Thus, more training was essential so as to allow them to 
understand the budgeting system and the operation of  power.
Besides this problem, the pesantren had traditionally had little 
contact with other anticorruption networks involving local NGOs 
and academics. To date, there are still no local forces that pos-
sess sufficient capacity and stamina to serve as fully effective 
instruments of  control over public policy, including corruption, 
or to challenge the hegemony of  the power-holders. Improving 
networks, contacts and the level of  collaboration is the key to 
resolving this problem.
5 For more information and a comparison between the circumstances prevailing in each city, see 
the final report on field evaluation by researchers from the Indonesian Institute of  Sciences 
(LIPI), see also Memerangi Korupsi: Geliat Agamawan atas Problem Korupsi di Indonesia, Perhimpunan 
Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat, Jakarta, June 2004.
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Another major constraint on our efforts concerned the com-
plexity of  the corruption problem at the local level. Very often, 
those involved in corruption resorted to violence and the hiring 
of  street thugs to get their way – a problem compounded by the 
weakness of  law enforcement efforts. Thus, structural changes 
will be needed as regards law enforcement in the regions, as well 
as an increased ability to draw on all potential allies in the war 
on corruption, including the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) and other institutions at the central level.
Actively Monitoring Corruption
Based on their experiences as part of  this brief  anticorrup-
tion campaign, those pesantren figures and community organizers 
who received training began to become involved in the effort 
to strengthen civil society. They were aware that it would be 
necessary to establish critical study forums to actively monitor 
the local budgeting process so as to ensure it was free from 
corruption and that proper funding was allocated for promoting 
the public good and empowering the community. Interestingly, 
many young kiai took the initiative of  establishing new, embry-
onic institutions to serve as “pockets” capable of  monitoring 
local government budgeting. Successor forums were set up in 
almost all of  the pesantren that participated in the Pesantren-Based 
Anticorruption Movement. For example, the Public Policy Study 
Committee was established in Pati, Central Java, the bahtsul masail 
and Scientific Study Forum (LK2P) in Lamongan, East Java, the 
Public Policy Transparency Center (FKIBM) in Brebes, Central 
Java, the Jepara People’s Justice Forum (FMJK) in Jepara, and 
the People’s Sovereignty Work Network (Jagat) in Cianjur. Pub-
lic Policy Study Committees were also set up in Ciamis, Garut, 
Cianjur, Sumenep, and Blitar.
Besides the establishment of  these embryonic civil society 
institutions, study groups concerned with ensuring equitable local 
government spending were also set up in Kuningan, Lamongan, 
and Sumenep. In addition, a number of  community organizers 
were invited to take part in the drafting of  equitable budgets 
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for 2005, such as in Brebes and Tasikmalaya.
The pesantren figures also became involved in applying pres-
sure for the eradication of  corruption and the putting of  those 
suspected of  corruption in the dock. By the end of  the campaign, 
many young kiai and community organizers who had received 
anticorruption training had become involved in these efforts, in 
alliance with NGOs, civil society organizations and other groups. 
Such groups appeared in Ciamis, Garut, Jepara and Pati.
Thus, we may conclude that the Pesantren-Based Anticor-
ruption Movement has achieved quite encouraging results in 
developing a new social awareness about the importance of  
addressing corruption from the theological perspective. A reason-
ably wide spread was achieved and implementation was carried 
out in a rather unique manner. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
continuation of  the anticorruption movement in pesantren  circles 
will be dependent on the continued existence of  a conducive 
socio-religious environment.
More specifically, the success of  future efforts will depend 
on a number of  factors. First, the extent to which the pesantren 
(particularly the patrons/kiai) and Nahdlatul Ulama are able to 
assert political and economic independence. In many cases, as 
pointed out in the field evaluation conducted by Asas Saidi, a 
senior researcher from the Indonesian Institute of  Sciences, and 
his colleagues; such independence is undermined by the close 
relationship between religion and politics. Theses ties are likely 
to act as persistent constraints on converting the pesantren into 
agents of  social change. The development of  the Pesantren-Based 
Anticorruption Movement in a number of  cities, including Blitar, 
Brebes, Jepara, and to some extent Sumenep, has been quite 
significantly obstructed by this factor.
Second, the success of  the Pesantren-Based Anticorruption 
Movement is highly dependent on the capabilities and commit-
ment of  the community organizers, both as regards their ability 
to understand complex legal documents, such as budgets, and 
their capabilities in forging links with other strategic groups, such 
as NGOs and the press.
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Finally, it must be acknowledged that the scope of  the 
Pesantren-Based Anticorruption Movement was actually quite nar-
row. However, the primary benefit that resulted was the encour-
agement of  kiai in their capacities as religious and community 
figures to play an active role in developing “pockets” that could 
exercise community and social control over public officials in 
their exercise of  power and their spending of  taxpayers’ money. 
The program constituted a pioneering effort to encourage those 
in pesantren circles to develop a vision of  justice – through the 
revitalization of  the bahtsul masail – that is orientated towards 
a fairer and more equitable distribution of  available resources 
among the poor and weak, and preventing the theft of  public 
funds.
Accordingly, while this program will require evaluation, criti-
cism, and a long hard slog before achieving success, it is clearly 
worthy of  continuation and expansion.
So, it’s time to get back to work!
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1  This paper summarizes the results achieved by the West Sumatra Concern Forum (FPSB) 
and Andalas University’s Western Region Legal Studies Center (PKHWB Unand). The work 
undertaken was supported by the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia from 2002 
to 2003. The PKHWB and FPSB are currently pursuing a follow-up program, also supported 
by the Partnership/ European Commission. The pioneering efforts undertaken by the FPSB 
led to the establishment of  an Anticorruption Caucus by concerned members of  the West 
Sumatra Legislative Council.
When the People’s 
Representatives 
Loot the Public Purse1
Saldi Isra
Politicians Holding the State to Ransom
The changes that have taken place in the relationship between 
the center and the regions provide a golden opportunity for the 
reform of  governance at the local level. From the perspective 
of  public administration, a change from highly centralized to 
decentralized government was essential. The objective was to 
prevent the reemergence of  the strong state-weak society pattern 
that had for so long subverted the will of  the people. The new 
decentralization strategy was put into effect through the Local 
Government Law (No. 22 of  1999), which delegated greater 
powers to Local Legislative Councils and specifically defined 
the roles to be played respectively by these councils and local 
administrations (local chief  executives).
Besides this “separation of  powers”, there are a number of  
other facts that show how Law No. 22 of  1999 increased the 
powers of  Local Legislative Councils, including the power to 
have the final say over the selection of  local governments heads. 
The changes that have occurred have strengthened the bargain-
ing position of  the Local Legislative Councils, and have given 
them a dominant role in selecting their respective local govern-
ment heads. In addition, in the performance of  their duties and 
obligations, local government heads are now accountable and 
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answerable to their Legislative Councils. This gives a Legislative 
Council the power to dismiss the local chief  executive prior to 
the end of  his term should, for example, the local government 
head’s annual report or other expressions of  accountability be 
rejected by the Legislative Council.2 
Initially, it was expected that the changes brought about by 
Law No. 22 of  1999 on the position and status of  Local Legisla-
tive Councils would have a positive effect on the practice of  local 
government. However, what actually happened was the opposite 
– the majority of  Legislative Council members around the country 
quickly forgot about the public interest and working to benefit 
the voters. Examples of  this were legion, with money politics 
becoming the norm in local government leadership elections 
and underhand dealings coming to characterize the interaction 
between these executives and their Legislative Councils.
According to Andrinof  A. Chaniago, instead of  controlling 
the behavior of  the executive as they are supposed to do, the 
politicians in our Legislative Councils have started to hold the 
state to ransom. They use every available opportunity to extort 
and intimidate the administration so as to get their hands on 
more money through the local government budgeting and ex-
ecutive accountability processes.3 Also of  interest is a report by 
Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), which found that there were 
432 cases of  corruption involving almost all local government 
regions in Indonesia in 2004 (see table). From the perspective 
of  the perpetrators, ICW found that of  these 432 cases, 124 
involved members of  Local Legislative Councils while 83 involved 
local government leaders.
Given the rapid spread of  corruption and misfeasance 
throughout Indonesia against a backdrop of  a radically changed 
2  Saldi Isra, “Potret Lembaga Perwakilan Rakyat”, in the Ilmu Pemerintahan journal, 18th Ed., 
Jakarta, Masyarakat Ilmu Pemerintahan Indonesia, 2002. 
3  Andrinof  A. Chaniago, “Rintangan-rintangan Demokratisasi di Indonesia”in Maruto MD & 
Anwari MWK (edit.), Reformasi Politik dan Kekuatan Masyarakat, Kendala dan Peluang Menuju 
Demokrasi, Jakarta, LP3ES, 2002.

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Source: Ll1 Autonomy: Fertile Ground for Corruption: 2004 ICW Final 
relationship between the center and the regions, it is clear that 
many local politicians have availed of  autonomy to, in effect, 
decentralize corruption from the center to the regions. This is 
facilitated by a number of  realities: first, the autonomy scheme is 
only focused on the delegation of  powers in the policy-making, 
finance and administration fields from the government to the 
regions without being accompanied by a delegation of  power 
to the people. Second, there is no state institution that has the 
capacity to effectively control abuses of  power and other irregu-
larities in the regions. And, third, local legislatures have failed to 
function effectively as control mechanisms. In fact, the opposite 
has more often than not been the case, with collusion between 
Legislative Councils and administrations being the norm rather 
than the exception. Thus, control over the administration of  
local government by local legislatures is rare, while the control 
exercised by civil society groups is still weak.4
Examples of  politicians plundering the public purse are 
legion. For instance, the scandal over kadeudeuh money (tradition-
ally a gift to express one’s gratitude for a certain deed) involving 
members of  the West Java Provincial Legislative Council opened 
the eyes of  many people as to how councilors attempt to enrich 
4  Indonesian Corruption Watch, Daerah, Lahan Subur Korupsi:, Laporan Akhir Tahun 2004, Jakarta, 
2004.

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
themselves at the expense of  the public through local govern-
ment budgets. Similarly with the demand for pensions made by 
the Central Java Provincial Legislative Council, or the case in 
West Sumatra where councilors voted to pay themselves insur-
ance premiums worth Rp 2.5 million per month and lump-sum 
payments of  Rp 200 million each per year.5 
These sort of  irregularities and abuses of  power have given 
the public a bad impression of  local autonomy. However, ac-
cording to Maswadi Rauf, the excesses that have occurred are, 
to some extent, understandable given that the actual rolling out 
of  autonomy took place against the backdrop of  a severe eco-
nomic crisis. In addition, it took place during a time of  explosive 
public euphoria following the fall of  the Soeharto dictatorship. 
The situation at the time was also marked by a generally chaotic 
environment and almost total lack of  legal certainty.6
If  the transition to local autonomy had taken place during 
normal times, it is quite likely that the various excesses that 
emerged would not have done so – at least not to the same 
extent. As things turned out, however, political decentraliza-
tion opened the door to local politicians to get their hands on 
resources within their regions – resources that are exceedingly 
vulnerable to corruption, collusion and nepotism. Ultimately, 
what was happening at the local level became very difficult to 
control. This situation was exacerbated by the almost total ab-
sence of  legal provisions that could provide an opportunity for 
the public to supervise and control the machinations of  local 
politicians and bosses.
Thus, it should have come as no surprise that the new pattern 
of  relations created following the introduction of  local autonomy 
gave rise to two competing centers of  power at the local level. 
On the one side there was the executive, charged with admin-
istering the region and managing its finances, but vested with 
5  Saldi Isra, “Kolusi Eksekutif-Legislatif  Daerah”in the Media Indonesia daily, Special End-of-Year 
Edition, Jakarta, 20 December 2002.
6  Maswadi Rauf, “Pemerintah Daerah dan Konflik Horisontal”, in Syamsuddin Haris (edit), 
Desentralisasi, Demokrasi dan Akuntabilitas Pemerintahan Daerah, Jakarta, Asosiasi Ilmu Politik 
Indonesia (AIPI) and Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, 2002.
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7  Robert E. Jaweng, “Ihwal Hubungan Kepala Daerah-DPRD, Apa yang Salah?” in Kompas 
daily, Jakartra, 23 September 2002.
only limited power, while on the other hand, the local legislature, 
now in the ascendancy through its control of  political power but 
deprived of  the power to completely control the purse strings 
(still mostly in the hands of  the executive). The existence of  
these two competing power centers, in the absence of  external 
control, led to widespread collusion designed to ensure that each 
side got what it wanted. The formula was quite straightforward 
– political domination on the one side plus financial domination 
on the other combing to achieve complete domination.
Accordingly, the strengths and advantages possessed by each 
side were combined to ensure the furtherance of  their respective 
interests. The additional powers given to the Local Legislative 
Councils as part of  the effort to ensure the creation of  an effec-
tive system of  checks and balances were ultimately emasculated 
and rendered completely ineffective through collusion with the 
executive. In fact, it was the Local Legislative Councils that ben-
efited most from the changed paradigm in executive-legislative 
relations at the local government level. According to Robert E. 
Jaweng, the local legislatures were now enjoying the fruits of  
power, and all the riches that these entailed.7
Engineering Opinion
With regard to irregularities and corruption in the local 
government budgeting process, many councilors started to inves-
tigate how they could manipulate their budgets for the purpose 
of  enriching themselves. This was made possible by Law No. 
22 of  1999, which gave the right to each Legislative Council to 
determine the council’s internal budget on its own. What hap-
pened was that councilors started to totally ignore restrictive 
aspects of  the regulations issued by the central government, and 
to set their council budgets however they liked based on items 
and allocations determined by no one else but themselves. A 
putative legal basis would be provided through an amendment 
to the Standing Orders (internal council regulations).
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The legal grounds adduced by the Legislative Councils to 
justify their actions were as follows: first, article 34(3) (g), article 
34(4) (c) and article 34(5) of  Law No. 4 of  1999 on the Com-
position and Status of  the MPR (People’s Consultative Council), 
DPR (House of  Representatives) and DPRD (Local Legislative 
Councils)(hereinafter referred to as Law No. 4 of  1999), which 
states that a Local Legislative Council has the right to determine 
its own budget, finances and administration, the exercise of  
which powers shall be provided for in the Legislative Council’s 
Standing Orders. And, second, article 19(1) (g) and article 21(1) 
(c) of  Law No. 22 of  1999, which provides that Local Legisla-
tive Councils have the right to determine procurement, finance 
and administration budgets, the exercise of  which powers shall 
be provided for by the Council’s Standing Orders.
In fact, if  Local Legislative Councils were actually serious 
about submitting to the legislation in the budgeting field, then 
there would be no question of  their Standing Orders taking 
precedence over the national legislation. Article 86(4) of  Law 
No. 22 of  1999 specifically states that the rules for the draft-
ing, amending and calculation of  local budgets shall be set out 
by Government Regulation. In addition, the issuance of  Gov-
ernment Regulations is mandated by article 5(1) of  the 1945 
Constitution, which states that the President shall give effect 
to legislation by issuing Government Regulations. Furthermore, 
article 4 of  Government Regulation No. 105 of  2000 on local 
financial management and accountability states that the manage-
ment of  local government finances shall be undertaken in an 
orderly, efficient, effective, transparent and accountable manner 
in line with the provisions of  the laws and regulations in effect 
and the principles of  equity and propriety. Meanwhile, article 
52(3) of  Government Regulation No. 1 of  2001 on rules for the 
drafting of  Local Legislative Council Standing Orders stresses 
that the types and cost of  Local Legislative Council activities 
shall be determined by Government Regulation on the status 
and finances of  Local Legislative Councils.
All of  the above provisions envisage or require the existence 
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of  Government Regulations that guide and control financial 
management at the local level – whether by the local executive 
or by the legislature. In line with this requirement, the central 
government has issued Government Regulation No. 109 of  2000 
on the financial status of   local government leaders and deputy 
chief  executives, and Government Regulation No. 110 of  2000 
on the financial status of  Local Legislative Councils. In the par-
ticular case of  internal financial management by Local Legislative 
Councils, article 2 of  Government Regulation No. 110/2000 
explicitly provides that the standard remuneration of  the leaders 
and members of  a Local Legislative Council shall consist of  the 
following components: (a) representation allowance; (b) package 
allowance; (c) rank allowance; (d) commission membership allow-
ance; (e) special allowance; and (f) income supplement allowance. 
In addition, the take-home pay of  members may be further 
increased by the following allowances: (a) welfare allowance; (b) 
bereavement allowance; and (c) wardrobe allowance.
If this regulation was properly complied with, it would actually 
be very difficult for Local Legislative Council members to loot 
the public purse, especially as Government Regulation No. 110 
of 2000 explicitly sets out permissible percentages governing each 
budget item. For example, the representation allowance paid to 
the Council speaker may not exceed 60 percent of the governor’s 
basic salary. Similarly, the income supplement allowance shall be 
governed by the same rules as those applying to civil servants.
Based on the monitoring and surveillance we have conducted 
in the regions, it was found that the West Sumatra Provincial 
Legislative Council was one of  the worst offenders as regards 
flouting the provisions of  Government Regulation No. 110 of  
2000. Various modus operandi were employed by the members 
of  this Council to feather their own nests at the expense of  the 
taxpayer. First, the Council’s Standing Orders were accepted as the 
paramount regulations governing its own financial management. 
The Council voted to pay itself  far more allowances than were 
permitted by Government Regulation No. 110 of  2000. These 
additional allowances were then added to the allowances envisaged 
by Government Regulation No. 110 of  2000 so that the local 
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councilors ended up enjoying the best of  both worlds. According 
to calculations carried out by the West Sumatra Concern Forum 
(FPSB), the members of  the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative 
Council paid themselves 27 different types of  allowances. In 
fact, some budget items were even divided up into sub-items, 
for example, the healthcare allowance was divided up into three 
sub-items, namely (1) A healthcare allowance; (2) medical insur-
ance premiums; and (3) a checkup allowance.
The second common ruse was to duplicate budget items. 
For example, under article 10 of  Government Regulation No. 
110 of  2000, a healthcare allowance may be paid to cover the 
cost of  medical care and treatment. This allowance is paid in 
the form of  medical insurance premiums. However, what hap-
pened in West Sumatra was that even though the local budget 
contained an allocation for healthcare allowances amounting to Rp 
367,014,000, it went ahead and also voted through an allocation 
worth Rp 1,562,672,000 for medical insurance premiums.
The third modus operandi was to invent all sorts of  new 
allowances, such as “dignity” allowances worth Rp 600,000,000, 
rice allowances (Rp 62,832,000), constituency visit allowances 
(Rp 137,500,000), leaders and members support allowances 
(Rp 330,000,000), faction allowances (Rp 660,000,000), overseas 
comparative study allowances (797,500,000) etc.
In fact, if  there was a proper understanding of  the regula-
tions, plus a large helping of  bona fide, Local Legislative Councils 
would never have been able to set their own budgets as they 
pleased. As the majority of  the local budget in West Sumatra’s 
case came from the central government, obviously the central 
government had the right to set parameters that could not be 
exceeded. Otherwise, autonomy would enable Local Legislative 
Councils to spend money however they liked without having any 
regard to superior regulations in the hierarchy of  laws.
Most legal observers are of  the view that the unwillingness 
of  Legislative Council members to accept Government Regula-
tion No. 110 of  2000 has nothing to do with the fact, as often 
claimed, that it conflicts with higher legislative instruments. The 
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sad reality is that they refuse to accept it as it would only serve 
to circumscribe their freedom to enrich themselves at the expense 
of  the public. Given the willingness of  councilors to loot the 
public purse, it should come as no surprise that protests broke 
out in a number of  areas.
Experience of  the FPSB
Although it only formally came into existence in 2002, the 
establishment of  the West Sumatra Concern Forum (FPSB) was 
very closely connected with the election campaign for the West 
Sumatra Governorship for the 2000-2005 term. This campaign 
lasted from the end of  1999 to the start of  2000, and involved 
the participation of  various elements of  society eager not only 
to provide input to help the Local Legislative Council elected in 
1999 elect a governor who was capable of  meeting the needs 
of  the West Sumatran people, but also to encourage the council 
take action against the incidences of  money politics that had 
taken place during the gubernatorial election campaign. Unfor-
tunately, these efforts came to naught. Not only did the effort 
to ensure the election of  a governor from the new generation 
of  politicians fail, so also did the effort to ensure the taking of  
effective action against money politics.
After the election of  the new governor, NGO activists and 
other elements of  the community held a series of  meetings to 
discuss and adopt a stance on the outcome of  the gubernatorial 
election. After a couple of  meetings, it was concluded that the 
majority of  Local Legislative Council members resulting from 
the 1999 election were no different from the Council members 
during the twilight years of  the New Order. This conclusion gave 
rise to the question: What must be done in the face of  disdain 
on the part of  the majority of  Council members for the will of  
the people? It was decided that all components of  society would 
have to closely scrutinize the behavior of  the Local Legislative 
Council, particularly as regards budgeting and spending.
Based on the results of  these meetings, a series of  discussions 
were held on the financial structure of  the Legislative Council 
budget. These found that a number of  items in the budget were 
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clearly questionable, if  not downright unacceptable. One of  the 
items that was greeted with incredulity was titled “Aspiration 
Funds”. This amounted to Rp 200 million per year, and was 
managed by the Legislative Council members themselves. In 
2001, a number of  groups involved in the discussions8 on the 
Legislative Council budget agreed to bring an action against the 
Council in the Padang District Court. However, after a number 
of  hearings the action was struck out with the Court ruling it 
had no jurisdiction to hear the case.
The outcome of  the case gave a new sense of  almost bound-
less self-confidence to the members of  the Council in drawing 
up financial arrangements that became increasingly remote from 
the provisions of  Government Regulation No. 110 of  2000 as 
time went on. By the same token, the decision also encouraged 
those involved in bringing the action to adopt a more systematic 
approach to the problem. The decision to take more focused 
and structured steps was taken at the same time as the process 
of  drafting the 2002 provincial budget started. In order to 
strengthen the movement against the 2002 draft budget, it was 
decided towards the end of  2001 to create an umbrella organiza-
tion that would concentrate on conducting a sustained campaign 
against the draft 2002 budget. Thus, the West Sumatra Concern 
Forum was born at the start of  2002 to watch the drafting of  
the budget from “outside”.
In order to further promote discussion of  the draft local 
budget, the FPSB undertook the following activities: First, an 
academic discussion on the 2002 draft budget was held involv-
ing the following participants: (1) experts who had earlier been 
involved in drafting the West Sumatra Development Program; (2) 
experts in local government financial management from Andalas 
University and Padang State University – the two best known 
institutes of  further education in Padang; and (3) experts in lo-
cal government financial management law. The discussions that 
were held were not confined to members of  the FPSB but also 
8  Almost all of  the meetings were held at the offices of  the Padang Legal Aid Institute.
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included law enforcement personnel, community figures, practi-
tioners. etc. It was concluded at the end of  the discussions that 
the structure of  the local budget, and the amounts involved, were 
in contravention of  the provisions of  the laws and regulations 
in effect, and in particular Government No. 110 of  2000.
Second, the outcome of  these discussions were forwarded 
to the Legislative Council in the hope that it would see fit to 
make the necessary amendments to the budget so as to bring 
it into line with the requirements of  Government Regulation 
No. 110 of  2000. In order to facilitate the Legislative Council 
in this regard, the FPSB also drafted a concept budget based 
on Government Regulation No. 110 of  2000. Unfortunately, 
the Local Legislative Council gave no response to the FBSB’s 
proposals. The majority of  the Council’s members continued to 
maintain the draft budget was fully in line with the prevailing 
regulations.
After being ignored by the Council, the FPSB approached a 
number of institutes of further education to ask them to conduct 
a study on the draft budget and submit their conclusions to the 
Legislative Council. This initiative received a positive response 
from Andalas University and Padang State University, which then 
proceeded to carry out the proposed study, most of the findings 
of which turned out to be the same as those of the study previ-
ously committed by FPSB. Unfortunately, the Legislative Council 
was once again unresponsive and refused to make the suggested 
changes.
Third, as it appeared impossible to change the mind-set of  
the Legislative Council, the FPSB then decided to inform the 
Governor of  West Sumatra of  the irregularities that had occurred 
in the drafting of  the 2002 local budget. During a meeting with 
the governor, the FPSB not only explained the deviations that had 
occurred but also asked the governor to explain to the Provincial 
Legislative Council that the proposed budget would need to be 
amended so as to bring it into line with Government Regulation 
No. 110 of  2000. During this meeting, the FPSB also asked the 
governor to withhold his signature from the 2002 draft budget if  
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the necessary changes were not made by the Council. Strangely, 
instead of  accepting the FPSB proposals, the governor actually 
tried to convince the FPSB that the budget had been drafted in 
line with the regulations.9
Fourth, having failed to get the governor on board, the 
FPSB then decided to go to the Department of  Home Affairs10 
to request the Ministry of  Home Affairs to use his powers to 
order the Legislative Council to revise the 2002 draft budget. 
However, no response was forthcoming from the Department 
of  Home Affairs either.
Having failed in all of  its efforts to date, the FPSB decided 
to take legal steps by reporting the violations that had occurred 
to the authorities. Prior to making such a report, however, there 
were three fundamental aspects that would need to be discussed 
in depth: (1) to which institution (the police or prosecution 
service) should the report be submitted; (2) who should be re-
ported – the executive or legislature, or both the executive and 
legislature; and (3) who should submit the report.
With regard to the first issue, the FPSB agreed to submit 
the report to the West Sumatra Provincial Prosecutor’s Office. 
This decision was based on the consideration that a report to 
the prosecution service would bypass one of  the rungs of  the 
investigation ladder. In addition, the initial discussions held by the 
FPSB on the 2002 draft budget had been attended by a number 
of  prosecution service officials. Thus, it was expected that the 
prosecution service would therefore have a better understanding 
of  the issues involved.
The second question – who should be reported – gave 
rise to quite a debate. In the end, the FPSB decided that the 
reporting of  the Local Legislative Council members should be 
prioritized. This, of  course, gave rise to the question as to why 
only the legislators would be reported and not the governor given 
that the governor was also intimately involved in the discussion 
9  During the meeting, this writer pointed out to the governor that if  he failed to warn the 
Legislative Council, he could be categorized as colluding with it.
10 The representatives of  the West Sumatra Concern Forum who visited the Department of  
Home Affairs failed to meet with the Ministry of  Home Affairs. 
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of  the draft budget. In addition, the draft budget could never 
have been passed into law had it not been signed by the  local 
government leader. 
The main reason for prioritizing the Legislative Council 
members was the fact that they were elected to effect control 
over the executive, particularly as regards the effort to reduce 
corruption. As part of  the local budgeting process, the legislature 
should have been able to correct irregularities or violations in 
the draft budget presented to it by the executive. However, the 
local legislators in West Sumatra had neglected this duty and 
instead become deeply involved in financial engineering so as 
to enrich themselves.
Many members of  the Legislative Council had failed to 
maintain their personal integrity and the integrity of  the House. 
They had instead conspired with the executive in order to obtain 
luxurious facilities and massive financial gains. This was despite 
the fact that it was of  the utmost importance that such induce-
ments be eschewed if  the legislature were to be able to play a 
meaningful and credible role in reducing the incidence of  cor-
ruption. The failure to maintain both personal and institutional 
integrity resulted in the local budget being used as a vehicle for 
personal enrichment. Not only did the councilors fail to uphold 
the honor of  their House and act on public demands for the 
eradication of  corruption, but they themselves became person-
ally involved in this particular evil. Accordingly, it was right 
and fitting that the members of  the Council be the first to be 
reported to the authorities.
With regard to the question of  who should submit the report, 
it was initially thought it would be better if  the report was made 
anonymously. This was based on the consideration that there was 
no witness protection legislation in place and that there was a 
significant chance that a revenge attack would be made on the 
complainant. However, it was eventually decided that it would 
be better if  the report was made openly as this would facilitate 
confirmation by the media. The decision to go public was based 
on a rather uncertain legal foundation, namely, article 41(2) (e) 
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of  Law No. 20 of  2001 on the Eradication of  Corruption, 
which states that members of  the public who report incidences 
of  corruption have the right to obtain legal protection.
Based on the above considerations, on 9 February 2002 the 
FPSB reported the indications of  corruption in the West Sumatra 
Provincial Legislative Council to the West Sumatra Provincial 
Prosecutor’s Office. Under article 41(2) (d) of  Law No. 31 of  
1999, a complainant is entitled to receive a response to a report 
that he has submitted to the legal authorities within a period of  
not more than thirty (30) days. Unfortunately, no response was 
forthcoming from the prosecution service within this period.
After the expiry of  the 30-day period, the FPSB decided 
on another approach – to send a formal legal letter to the West 
Sumatra Provincial Prosecutor’s Office. After the letter was sent, 
nothing more was heard about it. Amid all this uncertainty, 
the National Ombudsman Commission (KON) was working in 
collaboration with Andalas University’s Legal Studies Center in 
Padang for the establishment of  a Local Ombudsman Commis-
sion in West Sumatra. This opportunity was availed of  by the 
FPSB to report the West Sumatra Provincial Prosecutor’s Office 
to KON. The complaint from the FPSB was received directly by 
KON chairman Antonius Sudjata and member Teten Masduki, 
who promised to study the complaint at the earliest possible 
opportunity. After around two weeks, the FPSB received a copy 
of  a letter sent by KON to the Attorney General’s Office on 
foot of  the complaint received from the FPSB.
Whether as a result of  the measures taken by the FPSB or 
whether it was simply because the West Sumatra Prosecutor’s 
Office was unable to prevaricate any longer, it became apparent 
in April 2002 that the Prosecutor’s Office was making a move to 
investigate the FPSB complaint. One of  the first steps taken by 
the prosecution service was to send the results of  its study of  
the FPSB complaint to the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative 
Council. The letter read as follows:
 
In the attachments to the above letter,11 the West Sumatra 
When the People’s Representatives Loot the Public Purse

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
The West Sumatra Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Padang
N o :  B - 6 6 2 / N 3 / F d . 1 / 0 4 / 2 0 0 2 
                   Padang, 24 April 2004
Nature: Normal
Encls: One set of  attachments
Re: Examination of  FPSB Report
To: The Speaker of  the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative 
Council in Padang
Please find attached our preliminary findings on a report sub-
mitted by the West Sumatra Concern Forum (FPSB, photocopy 
attached) in a letter dated 9 February 2002 concerning informa-
tion on corruption in the preparation of  the 2002 West Sumatra 
Provincial Budget.
Please be informed accordingly.
For the West Sumatra Provincial Chief  Prosecutor 
Signed,
Halius Hosen, SH,
Senior Prosecutor, ID No, 230013341
Cc:
1. Republic of  Indonesia Attorney General (as report)
2. Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes in Jakarta 
3. Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence in Jakarta 
4. Governor of  West Sumatra in Padang
5. Files
11  The attachments contained (1) the results of  the preliminary examination, (2) an opinion, 
and (3) an advice note signed by the Assistant for Special Crimes, Berlin Sinaga, SH.
Provincial Chief  Prosecutor put forward ten opinions on the 
FPSB report, with points seven to ten to the effect that what 
had been done by the members of  the West Sumatra Provincial 
Legislative Council fulfilled the elements necessary for proving 
the crime of  corruption.
Points seven to ten read as follows:
“Seven, that West Sumatra Provincial Legislative Council 
Resolution No. 02/SB/2002 dated 31 January 2002 (on 
the approval of  the West Sumatra Legislative Council of  
the Draft Regulation on the 2002 Provincial Budget and 
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the adoption of  the said budget), violated Government 
Regulation No. 110 of  2000 on the financial status of  
Local Legislative Councils.
Eight, in deciding whether the said violation constitutes 
an illegal act that may be categorized as corruption given 
the differing interpretations regarding the financial status 
of  Local Legislative Councils, with the West Sumatra 
Provincial Legislative Council employing Council Standing 
Order No. 18/SB/1999 dated 21 December 1999 in order 
to give effect to article 19(1) and (2) of  Law No. 22 of  
1999 on local government, and Government Regulation No. 
110 of  2000 as the implementing regulation for article 39 
of  Law No. 4 of  1999 on the status and composition of  
the MPR, DPR and Local Legislative Councils. In order 
to arrive at a definitive interpretation on this issue, expert 
testimony will be required.
Nine, the enactment of  article 16(2) of  Government Regula-
tion No. 110 of  2000 in essence means that the allocation 
of  additional funds for Legislative Council activities beyond 
what is permitted by Government Regulation No. 110 of  
2000 may be overruled and annulled. Thus, what was done 
by the Local Legislative Council through its Decision No. 
02/SB/2002 dated 31 January 2002 cannot be classified as 
a “Test” as the provisions of  Article 16(2) of  Government 
Regulation No. 110 of  2000 allows for the annulment of  
a local regulation governing the running of  the Legislative 
Council, which would include the allocation of  funding for 
the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative Council.
Ten, should the local budget regulation be passed and 
not annulled by the Ministry of  Home Affairs so that the 
leaders and members of  the Legislative Council receive 
remuneration packages that conflict with the provisions of  
Government Regulation No.110 of  2000, the case/issue 
may be followed up on in accordance with Law No. 31 
of  1999 in conjunction with Law No. 20 of  2000 on the 
eradication of  corruption.”
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12  The detention was effected by the head of  the Pre-prosecution Section of  the West Sumatra 
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office, Khaidir Ramli, SH. Since 24 February 2004, Khaidir Ramli 
has been working for the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK).
Based on the above examination, the West Sumatra Provin-
cial Prosecutor’s Office recommended that two significant steps 
be taken: (1) should the draft local regulation on the 2002 pro-
vincial budget be passed, the Governor of  West Sumatra must 
immediately propose to the Ministry of  Home Affairs that it 
be annulled, and (2) if  it is not annulled and the leaders and 
members of  the West Sumatra Provincial Legislative Council 
continue to receive remuneration packages based on the local 
regulation, then the matter should be dealt with in accordance 
with the provisions of  Law No. 31 of  1999 in conjunction with 
Law No. 20 of  2001.
After almost all of  the members of  the Local Legislative 
Council had received the above opinions of  the 2002 local budget 
and no action was taken on foot of  them, the West Sumatra 
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office sought clarifications from a number 
of  members of  the Council. The prosecution service investigation 
began to gather pace after testimony was sought from a number 
of  members of  the FPSB. This process reached a peak with the 
detention of  Masfar Rasyid12, the Deputy Speaker of  the Legisla-
tive Council (United Development Party faction), on 5 February 
by the prosecution service (Kompas, 6 February 2003). 
Besides bringing pressure to bear on the prosecution service 
to act on the FPSB report, the media and students also played 
significant roles in uncovering irregularities in the 2002 West Su-
matra budget. The central role played by the media (particularly 
the print media) not only involved wide coverage of  every step 
taken by the FPSB, but also the publication of  opinion pieces 
by members of  the FPSB on matters pertaining to the 2002 
budget. The coverage afforded by the media greatly assisted 
the FPSB in molding and shaping public opinion, and in elicit-
ing public support. Meanwhile, the role played by the student 
movement consisted of  both staging demonstrations and acting 
as an extension of  the FPSB in bringing important issues to the 
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attention of  the public. 13
Anticorruption Virus from West Sumatra 
After the West Sumatra budget corruption case was brought 
before the courts, the next question that arose was whether the 
courts would be willing or capable of  dealing with the case in a 
fair and just manner? Given past experiences with other corruption 
cases that came before the courts, this question was extremely 
important given that the judges had shown a tendency to acquit 
corruption suspects using all manner of  legalistic arguments. The 
difficulties in West Sumatra were further compounded by the fact 
that the case was highly complex from the legal perspective.
After a trial lasting for around one year, the fear that the 
court would acquit the councilors proved to be unfounded. In 
the middle of  May 2004, the Padang District Court found 43 
members of  the West Sumatra Legislative Council guilty of  cor-
ruption. This decision was not only historic for West Sumatra 
but also helped unleash a rash of  corruption investigations into 
Local Legislative Council members in other parts of  the country. 
Within less than one month, corruption cases in local legislatures 
had been revealed in West Java, Lampung and Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam. 
Thus, the West Sumatra case set a new and historic precedent 
for the fight against corruption in Indonesia. In line with the 
new spirit of optimism, Kompas daily ran the following editorial, 
titled “Corruption Eradication starts in West Sumatra”, on 8 
June 2004:
The optimism expressed in this Kompas editorial turned out 
not to be misplaced. While the Padang District Court had set a 
precedent by convicting the 43 councilors, an even greater prec-
edent was set by the West Sumatra High Court on appeal. While 
the District Court had acquitted the councilors of  the primary 
charges (instead convicting them on the subsidiary charges)14, the 
High Court took the view that primary charges had also been 
13  Among the important actions taken by the students was the distribution of  10,000 leaflets 
in a number of  markets in Padang, and thousands of  booklets setting out the arguments 
against the 2002 local budget.
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“PERHAPS some will see the conviction on corruption 
charges of  43 members of  the West Sumatra Legislative Assembly 
by the Padang District Court as a special case. Nevertheless, the 
conviction of  the Local Legislative Council speaker provides hope 
that the real fight against corruption has started in West Sumatra.
Why do I use the word “hope”? Because the legal process is still 
in the initial stages. We still have a long way to go before it fully 
runs its course.So, we “hope” that what has happened in West 
Sumatra will truly serve to punish those responsible for corrup-
tion. We all hope that the West Sumatra case will snowball and 
produce similar results in other areas around the country.What is 
most required at the present time is seriousness in fighting against 
corruption. The graft taking place all around us not only leads to 
injustice but also damages the nation’s economy and moral fiber.
Many say that what we have in Indonesia is structural corruption. 
Everyone is involved - the only thing that differs is the degree.
In the West Sumatra case, it is encouraging and praiseworthy to 
see that the successes achieved were the results of  work by or-
dinary people. The West Sumatra Concern Forum (FPSB), a civil 
society organization in West Sumatra, took the lead in fighting 
institutionalized corruption in the province. Its unceasing struggle 
against injustice and abuse of  power eventually forced the justice 
authorities to act.The end result was the conviction and sentenc-
ing of  43 members of  the West Sumatra Legislative Council for 
enriching themselves with the money of  the West Sumatra people. 
Now, the speaker and 24 members of  the Payakumbuh Legislative 
Council are being questioned in connection with similar charges 
– misusing budget funds.The snowball effect from what hap-
pened in West Sumatra will not be immediately felt everywhere. 
However, the effects are already apparent in a number of  areas, 
including Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, West Java and Lampung.
We all earnestly hope to see justice prevail in our courts. That is 
the only way in which this nation can be saved from disaster.
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proven beyond all reasonable doubt.15
On final appeal to the Supreme Court, the justices rejected 
the arguments of  the councilors on 2 August 2005 and upheld 
the decision of  the Padang High Court (Padang Expres, 3 Au-
gust 2005). Thus, the councilors’ convictions achieved final and 
conclusive legal effect.
Following the decision of  the Supreme Court, the West 
Sumatra anticorruption “virus” truly started spreading all around 
the country, and even started to affect local chief  executives 
(governors, regents and mayors).
In this regard, in my article titled “Corruption amid Starva-
tion” (Kompas, 28 May 2003), I pointed out that local budgeting 
was not the sole prerogative of  the legislature, but also deeply 
involved the executive. Thus, the prosecution service also needed 
to investigate the roles of  local chief  executives. In the context 
of  Indonesian local government, it is impossible to formulate a 
budget without the involvement and approval of  the administra-
tion. Thus, the participation or collusion of  the administration 
in the formulation of  a budget should be very easy to prove. 
In the legal theory of  collusion, all those who participate in the 
commission of  a crime must bear responsibility for that crime. 
Involvement may take various forms, such a perpetrating the 
crime, commissioning the perpetration of  the crime, and col-
luding in the perpetration of  the crime. 
While a final and conclusive legal decision has been handed 
down in the West Sumatra Legislative Council case, it has not 
been fully resolved. The execution of  the court’s decision is now 
awaited – without execution, all of  the work undertaken to date 
will be rendered less meaningful.
Lessons Learned
So, what are the lessons to be learned from the West Su-
14  Because the councilors were convicted based on the subsidiary charges, the District Court 
sentenced each of  the leaders to only two years and six months in prison, and each member 
to two years.
15  Following the councilors conviction on the primary charges by the Padang High Court, 
the sentences of  the Council leaders were increased to five years each, while those of  the 
members were increased to four years each.
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matra case? Most importantly, uncovering corruption must be 
carried out systematically and steadfastly. If  one method fails, 
then another method should be employed. Also, as corruption 
involves a vast network, joint action is needed to combat it.
In conclusion, it must be remembered that the experience of 
the FPSB is just one example of what can be achieved. Also, this 
article primarily reflects my personal understanding of the campaign 
waged by the FPSB. It is quite possible that my colleagues and 
partners could have different viewpoints. What is important, how-
ever, is that we are all united in the struggle against corruption.
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Western Area Legal Studies Center or PKHWB at Andalas University, 
was established in 1999, through the head of  Andalas University. PKHWB 
was established to; 1) conduct research to push for the development of  
law; 2) Increase capacity and integrity within the law enforcement; 3) 
Increase capacity and expand legal knowledge, especially in the context 
of  national law development.
PKHWB has been involved in several activities, according to its 
mission. For example a) increasing public awareness on laws and working 
together with the Ministry of  Justice and Human Rights; b) workshop 
and training, working together with National Ombudsman Commission in 
creating a local Ombudsman Commission; c) workshop on “Developing 
an Ideal Coordination System and the Function of  the Law Enforcement 
Institution in West Sumatra”; d) socializing the general elections bill; e) 
Examination of  government Regulation PP 110 of  2000, on Financial 
Position of  the Provincial Legislative Council. Currently, PKHWB is imple-
menting the project, Strengthening Regulations, Enforcement, Integrity Assurance 
and Public Participation on Local Budget in West Sumatra, working together with 
Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia.
PKHWB is supported by lecturers and professors from Andalas 
University. 
The West Sumatra Concern Forum or FPSB, was established Janu-
ary 2002 in Padang, West Sumatra. FPSB has a vision to promote 
good governance, with the mission; a) to promote democracy in the 
government; b) to push for clean government that is free of  corrup-
tion, collusion and nepotism; c) to enforce a social transformation to 
establish a government that is clean and free of  corruption, collusion 
and nepotism.
At the beginning of  its establishment, FPSB spotlighted irregulari-
ties in the local budget in West Sumatra Province, filing a complaint 
about members of  the Provincial Legislative Council to the West 
Sumatran Supreme Court on corruption charges during the 2002 fis-
cal year. At the moment the forum is working on an anticorruption 
caucus program for members of  the parliament in West Sumatra. 
In responding to the postponement of  the execution of  Provincial 
Legislative councilors charged by the Supreme Court, the FPSB is 
looking into the obstacles surrounding the delay of  imprisonment 
by seeking and gathering information as well as support from related 
institutions; therefore, the verdict can be executed according to the 
Supreme Courts decision. 
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1  This paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Implementing a Local 
Integrity System to ensure transparency and accountability in the management of  Land and 
Building Tax (Indonesian acronym: PBB), and in the procurement of  goods and services”, 
which ran from 2 January 2004 to 30 November 2005 and was supported by the Partnership 
for Governance Reform in Indonesia .
Tracking the Spending of 
Tax Revenues1
Heni Yulianto
Five Region Program 
 
The level of  people’s knowledge and awareness of  tax is sues in Indonesia is extremely low. One of  the reasons for this is that the information on tax and public service 
charges provided to the public is generally minimal, if  provided 
at all, and is not accessible on an ongoing or regular basis. As a 
consequence, the public generally are not aware of  how, where, 
and, particularly importantly, on what their taxes are being spent. 
In reality, public funds, raised from taxes and public service 
charges, should be put towards the provision of  better quality 
public services.
Public funds are raised from various types of  taxes and 
charges, including income tax, value-added tax, land and building 
tax, land and building use charges, and a myriad of  other taxes 
and charges. Taxes may be imposed by the central government 
and the regions. Under the Indonesian taxation system, local 
governments are free to impose various taxes and charges, such 
as motor vehicle tax and motor vehicle registration transfer 
charges at the provincial level, and hotel and restaurant tax, 
category C mining tax, and various charges on such places as 
markets, entertainment spots, etc., at the regency/municipality 
level. Land and building tax is one of  the taxes that the public 
are most familiar with as it is paid by people at almost all social 
levels – from people in the lower income brackets up to the 
most well-to-do.
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It appears that as things stand at the moment, government 
has no interest whatsoever in supplying clear and straightforward 
information on the tax system.This has resulted in a lack of  
awareness on the part of  the public about taxation issues, which 
in turn has had an impact on the ability of  the public to demand 
accountability in the management of  tax receipts by government. 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that government 
rarely involves the public in the decision-making process.
For example, much of  the data and information contained 
in annual tax demands are not in line with the situation actually 
prevailing on the ground. For instance, it may be the case that a 
particular taxpayer owned one hectare of  land in the previous fiscal 
year. However, some of  that land was sold so that the taxpayer 
is now only left with half  a hectare. However, the tax on the 
land is still charged at one hectare. Another problem that often 
occurs is that taxpayers receive more than one tax demand. In 
March, for example, a particular person receives a tax demand, 
and then receives the same demand again in September. 
Taxpayers also face various other problems, for example, 
where should they submit complaints if  they feel hard done by? 
On the ground, it is frequently the case that taxpayers do not 
know where their local tax offices are. If  they do know, more 
often than not the tax office is located far away. For example, in 
Kotabaru Regency, one of  the locations where this program was 
implemented, the nearest tax office is in Banjarmasin – between 
12 and 15 hours away. The cost of  actually getting to Banjarmasin 
may actually be much more than the amount of  tax in dispute. 
While a Tax Suboffice was opened in 2005 in Pelaihari (at the 
urging of  TI Indonesia), this is still between six and nine hours 
traveling time from Kotabaru. This sort of  situation is not only 
encountered in the program areas, but throughout Indonesia.
If this unsatisfactory state of affairs is allowed to persist, it will 
only result in increasing numbers of taxpayers failing to pay their 
taxes. Such reluctance to pay tax is highly undesirable, particularly 
at the present time when the state is earnestly striving to increase 
the tax take so as to keep the wheels of government turning.
It is this reality that formed the background to the decision 
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by Transparency International Indonesia (TI Indonesia) to initiate 
a program for the reform of  the taxation system. This program 
was designed to improve access on the part of  taxpayers so that 
they can trace how every rupiah of  their tax payments are being 
spent, and is particularly significant given that tax receipts are 
playing an increasingly dominant role in financing the national 
budget. In fact, tax revenue accounted for 80 percent of  the 
total budget in 2004.
Given the vast geographical size of  Indonesia, the program 
took the form of  pilot projects in five regions around the 
country, namely, Tanah Datar Regency (West Sumatra), Wono-
sobo (Central Java), Jakarta, Kotabaru (South Kalimantan), and 
Bulukumba (South Sulawesi).
Public Services for Ordinary People
The program involved encouraging the reform of  the taxa-
tion legislation so as to make it more pro-taxpayer, particularly 
as regards ordinary, man-in-the-street taxpayers. The main reason 
for focusing the program on ordinary people was the fact that 
it is these people who are not receiving the basic public services 
they deserve. These public services include the right to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, education and healthcare. Accordingly, a 
team of  TI Indonesia legal draftsmen, experts and tax consultants 
drew up a White Paper on reform of  the taxation system.
At the time of  writing (October 2005), the White Paper had 
been completed and forwarded to the speaker of  the House of  
Representatives. At around the same time, draft amendments 
to the taxation code prepared by the government through the 
Directorate General of  Taxation (a unit of  the Department 
of  Finance), were submitted by the President to the House of  
Representatives. It is now hoped that the TI Indonesia White 
Paper will be availed of  so as to improve on the government’s 
proposed amendments.
Among the fundamental issues dealt with in the TI Indonesia 
White Paper were changes to the paradigms underpinning the 
taxation system and the obligation of  taxpayers to pay taxes, 
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simplification of  the service procedures, the setting up of  an 
independent body to oversee the operation of  the taxation sys-
tem, and the instituting of  greater balance between the rights and 
obligations of  the revenue service and those of  taxpayers. Based 
on a new paradigm of  people being voluntary taxpayers rather 
than being compelled to pay tax, it is hoped that the position 
of  members of  the public vis-à-vis the state will become more 
equitable. In this way, the taxes paid by the public will come to 
be seen as requiring the provision of  commensurate services 
and efforts to improve public welfare.
Efforts were also undertaken to encourage the Director-
ate General of  Taxation to improve the services provided to 
taxpayers, including in the area of  land and building tax, with 
the offices responsible for dealing with this tax being brought 
closer to the public. This would facilitate taxpayers in submit-
ting complaints to the revenue service, and these could in turn 
be quickly acted upon.
In the five pilot project areas, the offices responsible for 
land and building tax were generally located quite far removed 
from the taxpayers they served. Program activities in this regard 
included lobbying efforts and approaches to local leaders (execu-
tive and legislature) at the national, provincial, regency, district 
and sub-district levels so as to convince them of  the importance 
of  bringing these offices closer to the people.
Another reform that needs to be instituted by the Director-
ate General of  Taxation is the keeping of  separate accounts for 
the revenues raised from different taxes. This is necessary so as 
to increase transparency, and entails the depositing in separate 
accounts of  the revenues raised by local governments from dif-
ferent forms of  taxes and charges. It is expected that this would 
allow the sources, whereabouts and uses of  funds to be easily 
traced by the public.
The pilot programs included efforts to encourage local 
revenue and governmental authorities to consistently involve 
the public in budgeting and policy-making. This also involved 
pushing local governments to allocate funding for the reform 
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of  the taxation system in their respective regions.
In order to ensure optimum performance by the revenue 
authorities, taxpayers must be able to play a supervisory role as 
regards the levying of taxes and charges in the areas in which 
they reside. In order to ensure that the necessary activities could 
be engaged in by the public and to improve the quality of the 
supervision effected, regular meetings were held and training pack-
ages provided. At the present time, Taxpayer Forums have been 
established in the five pilot areas. The setting up of these forums 
represented the culmination of a long process and a lot of hard 
work on the part of field personnel familiar with the situation 
and circumstances pertaining in each area. These field personnel 
were highly reliable, competent and of unimpeachable integrity, 
and came to be trusted by the communities in each area. 
Three-way Relationship
Transparency and mutual understanding were the key factors 
in the three-way relationship between TI Indonesia and regency 
governments, between residents and regency governments, and 
between residents and TI Indonesia. All of  the experiences gained 
during the implementation of  the program up to the establish-
ment of  the Taxpayer Forums showed just how important these 
two aspects were. 
A Taxpayer Forum represents a multi-stakeholder forum 
especially established to critically review taxation and budgetary 
policies. Following the commencement of  the program in 2004, 
forums were established in the five pilot areas with a view to 
their being subsequently established in other areas. In order to 
ensure integration and proper coordination, a Taxation Monitoring 
Network was set up to serve as an umbrella in Jakarta.
The process of establishing the Taxpayer Forums was far from 
straightforward. A study on transparency and accountability in the 
taxation system conducted in 2002-2003 found that regular meet-
ings were already being held in each community to discuss taxation 
issues, as well as other issues affecting the community. Thus, it 
was decided to avail of these vehicles during the initial stages until 
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such time as special Taxpayer Forums could be set up.
In Wonosobo, for example, regular meetings to discuss taxa-
tion issues were held every thirty-six days. In order to intensify 
approaches at the personal level, informal meetings were also held 
in the intervals between the thirty-six day meetings. Meanwhile, 
in Tanah Datar Regency, activities and meetings were arranged 
in line with the agendas of  the local customary leaders in the 
Nagari Traditional Law Center (BKAN) and the Minangkabau 
Traditional Law Institute (LKAAM) – both customary repre-
sentative bodies.
In Tanah Datar, lack of  education and awareness, as well 
as a reluctance to organize (a hangover from the New Order), 
were the principal constraints encountered during the effort to 
establish a Taxpayer Forum. Another no less important factor 
was the level of  support forthcoming from local leaders. Prior 
to the fall of  the New Order, people were afraid to organize 
and assemble, even when this was in their own interests. Thus, 
if  the support of  the local leader – the regent, for example 
– was not forthcoming, it would not be possible to establish a 
Taxpayer Forum, or, if  it was established, it would remain weak. 
Village people would lack the courage to become involved if  the 
Taxpayer Forum was not supported by the local government.
Experience gained from the efforts to establish civil society 
organizations in Tanah Datar prior to the setting up of  the 
Taxpayer Forum showed that if  the local leader was not accom-
modating, then the organization would find it very difficult to 
attract members. During the early stages of  this program, rela-
tions between TI and local leaders were not intensively cultivated. 
Initial agreements were confined to the conducting of  studies 
on taxation transparency and accountability in each area. Instead, 
outspoken local figures were selected as the prime movers for 
the establishment of  civil society organizations. These figures 
were encouraged to be critical of  government policy, particularly 
in the taxation field. However, despite the holding of  meetings 
each week over a period of  three months in 10 villages in Tanah 
Datar, local people were still reluctant to participate.
Tracking the Spending of Tax Revenues
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The fear felt by people was not without reason. Some 
time after the regular meetings had been initiated, TI Indonesia 
reached an agreement with the local government on the hold-
ing of  a workshop to which all elements of  the community 
would be invited, including representatives of  civil society. By 
this time, TI Indonesia was beginning to comprehend the fear 
that was infecting people. When discussing the invitations to 
the workshop, the Tanah Datar regent said he could not accept 
the presence of  civil society organization representatives, and, 
further, could not accept the presence of  civil society organi-
zations in his regency. According to the regent, a number of  
key figures in the civil society organizations in question were 
former village officials during the New Order who were now 
actively opposed to the regency government’s programs. From 
this it was apparent that people were unwilling to take part in 
the meetings due to the fact that this could bring the wrath of  
the local government and leaders down upon them as some of  
the key figures in local CSOs were critical of  the administration 
and therefore persona non grata. 
On the other hand, West Sumatra had also been the scene of  
a heroic struggle (the Paderi War) led by Tuanku Imam Bondjol 
against the imposition of  tax (landrente) on lands and buildings 
owned by residents.
Learning from these experiences, modifications were made 
to the original strategy for the establishment of  citizens’ fo-
rums. Now, the setting up of  Taxpayer Forums in the villages 
where meetings had previously taken place was preceded by ap-
proaches to the regent, and local district head and village head. 
The process would start off  with a discussion on the taxation 
situation in each village and would conclude with the formal 
establishment of  the Taxpayer Forum by the regent or other 
senior regency official.
Following this change in strategy, the number of  Taxpayer 
Forum members increased rapidly. In addition, the fact that the 
forums had been officially established by a senior official meant 
that they could not be excluded by the regency government 

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
from its activities. 
In order to strengthen the Taxpayer Forums, in addition 
to the routine and other meetings held at the village level, 
campaigning was also undertaken and various training packages 
provided. These packages included coaching on how to lobby, 
advocate and critically read budget and policy documents, and 
training for journalists.
The success and benefits of  the training were clear to be 
seen from the interactive radio shows on taxpayer rights, situation 
comedy films on taxation issues, the running of  public service 
advertisements, the publishing of  comics and a newsletter, and 
various others activities. During the radio talk shows, members 
of  the public were free to pose their questions directly to of-
ficials, such as the heads of  local government agencies and tax 
officials. A fundamental aspect underlying the success of  the 
campaign was the involvement of  experts who were not only 
capable of  designing campaign activities and materials, but also 
of  forging collaboration with the media.
Prior to their participating in the training, most of  the ques-
tions raised by members of  the Taxpayer Forums on the radio 
shows concerned administrative and technical aspects of  land 
and building tax. However, after receiving training and other 
information, the scope of  the questions widened to encompass 
such issues as the use of  taxation revenue, why schools were 
not being repaired, the exorbitant cost of  healthcare, etc.
Participation and Citizens’ Rights 
Opposition from both the local government and people was 
frequently encountered during the initial stages of  the program. 
This opposition was primarily a result of  the fact that taxation 
and budgetary issues are always highly sensitive. For the local 
government, taxation is a source of  money with the result that 
officials are loath to provide information on the issue to the 
public. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens feel that talking about taxa-
tion issues is only inviting trouble.
Despite the constraints, the intensive approaches employed 
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proved successful in overcoming all opposition. As regards local 
leaders and officials, the approaches used included lobbying and 
actively participating in every government forum. During these 
forums, TI Indonesia consistently and patiently put forward its 
views and proposals on the necessity of  governance reform, 
transparency, and the importance of  public participation in 
policymaking if  leaders wished to maintain the support of  the 
people. 
As regards the people themselves, the importance of  public 
participation in the development process was constantly stressed 
during the regular discussions and meetings.
At every meeting, TI Indonesia stressed that the public must 
become involved in overseeing the administration of  government 
and the implementation of  development policies at the regency 
level, such as the construction of  bridges, roads, irrigation works, 
schools, etc, while at the same time refraining from all forms 
of  violence and anarchy. All development projects essentially 
belonged to the people as they were funded by the taxes paid 
by the people.
The program’s success was apparent from the fact that the 
regency governments in all of  the pilot areas eventually agreed to 
allocate funding for improved access to taxation information, and 
the maintaining of  separate accounts for different types of  tax 
revenue. The program also succeeded in encouraging civil society 
to play a part in overseeing the spending of  tax revenues.
The question of  taxation, particularly the levying of  land and 
building tax, became a hot topic in each of  the pilot areas. As 
a consequence, increasing numbers of  people were made aware 
of  their entitlements to quality public services in return for the 
taxes they pay. The roles played by the Taxpayer Forums gained 
increased significance as time went on. In Tanah Datar, Wonosobo 
and Bulukumba, these forums took the initiative of  questioning 
the lack of  accuracy in land and building tax demands, or the 
fact that many people received two demands even though the 
first demand had already been paid.
For the future, the Taxpayer Forums will need to be strength-
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ened and consolidated through the making available of  more 
resources – information, funding, human resources, etc. – so as 
to force administrations to provide more comprehensive budget-
ary information, particularly in respect of  spending on public 
services as part of  the effort to satisfy the fundamental needs 
of  people for food, clothing and shelter.
Tracking the Spending of Tax Revenues
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Development and 
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as a member of  the 
Indonesian Corrup-
tion Watch (ICW) 
Working Group.
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The Establishment of the 
Corruption Eradication 
Commission1 
Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas
Background 
Despite the necessity to root out corruption in order to create an equitable, prosperous and fair society as man dated by the 1945 Constitution and the state ideology, 
Pancasila, this objective had been proven to be difficult to real-
ize. Accordingly, the effort to root out corruption needed to 
be further professionalized, intensified and sustained, bearing 
in mind the very damaging impacts of  corruption on national 
finances and development, and the economy.
In addition, the government agencies responsible for dealing 
with corruption have not effectively and efficiently dealt with 
the problem of  corruption. 
It was against this background that the Corruption Eradi-
cation Commission (KPK) was established as an independent 
body specifically charged with the task of  eradicating corruption 
from Indonesian society. The KPK was set up by the Corrup-
tion Eradication Commission Law (No. 30 of  2002), which was 
enacted on 27 December 2002. Under this legislation, the KPK 
is assigned the following five duties:
1. To coordinate with other authorized agencies in the effort 
1  This paper describes the empirical history of  the program titled “Initial Start-up Support”, 
which ran from 14 January 2004 to 30 July 2004 and was supported by the Partnership for 
Governance Reform in Indonesia. It was followed by support to the development of  standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) from August 2004 to May 2005. This program was funded by 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) with the Partnership being the Implementing Agency. 
At the present time, a program titled the “KPK Crash Program” is underway (September 
2005 - September 2006) with the support of  the Partnership/ European Commission.
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to eradicate corruption;
2. to supervise other agencies authorized to eradicate corrup-
tion;
3. to conduct examinations, investigations, and bring prosecu-
tions against those involved in corrupt acts;
4. to take preventive action so as to dissuade those likely to 
engage in corrupt acts; and
5. to monitor the administration of  state.
One year after the enactment of  Law No. 30 of  2002, the 
House of  Representatives selected the leaders of  the Corruption 
Eradication Commission on 29 December 2003, and these were 
then appointed by the President. The current leadership of  the 
KPK is as follows: Taufiequrachman Ruki (former Inspector 
General of  Police), Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas (former President 
Director of  PT Timah), Sjahruddin Rasul (former Deputy for 
Accountability at the Finance and Development Control Board/
BPKP), Tumpak Panggabean (former Secretary to the Deputy 
Attorney General for Special Crimes), and Amien Sunaryadi 
(former manager at Pricewater House Coopers and auditor with 
the Finance and Development Control Board/BPKP).
The five commissioners of  the KPK have the joint duty to 
ensure that the KPK and its staff  will fulfill the public’s expecta-
tions in the fight against corruption. In order to do so, however, 
appropriate resources, structures and procedures will be required. 
Resources shall include human, physical and financial resources, 
the organizational structures to accommodate the KPK’s human 
resources, as well as necessary systems and processes made avail-
able for the performance of  their duties..
Working out of  Restaurants 
Shortly after being sworn in on 29 December 2003, we 
– the commisioners of  the Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK) – commenced our work. Given the backgrounds of  the 
five newly appointed commisioners, the first thing that needed 
to be done was to get to know each other, develop teamwork 
and ensure a common perception. This was a new and very 
exciting experience for all concerned, with the KPK being built 
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up from scratch.
As almost always happens with organizations funded out of  
the national budget, the processes by which start-up funding was 
disbursed and the procurement of  office space were long and 
complicated. However, imbued with a desire to fulfill the hopes 
of  the people, the five newly appointed commissioners of  the 
KPK were not going to let themselves be held back by a lack 
of  offices or equipment.
Instead of  working in offices equipped with all the necessary 
facilities and with the backing of  a full support staff, the KPK 
executives were forced to hold their discussions in restaurants. 
Frequently, meetings were arranged using cell phones or by text 
message – somewhat ironic given that the KPK was supposed 
to be a “superbody” vested with extraordinary powers. Thank-
fully, in the end we were offered the loan of  a building on Jl. 
Veteran III, and were finally able to move our discussions out 
of  restaurants.
Besides the questions of  resources, structures, systems and 
processes, every organization needs to have a vision, mission and 
objectives. As the KPK is an organization specifically designed 
to eradicate corruption, it is also important that it adhere to set 
standards and a code of  ethics.
It was clear at this stage that the KPK, as a newly established 
organization, would benefit greatly from the support of  indepen-
dent third parties that were capable of  assisting it to emerge as 
a professional organization in as short a time as possible.
It was at this time that we received support from the Part-
nership for Governance Reform in Indonesia in the following 
five key areas:
1. Facilitating the KPK in formulating its vision, mission, code 
of  ethics and strategic plans;
2. Developing a human resources management system and 
guidelines;
3. Developing a basic  internal communications system;
4. Developing communications with the public; and
5. Integrating the Public Officials Audit Board (KPKPN) into 
The Establisment of the Corruption Eradication Commission
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the KPK.
Vision, Mission, Code of  Ethics and Strategic Plans 
In January 2004, after all of  the participants at a meeting 
had congratulated Amien Sunaryadi, the youngest KPK executive, 
who by coincidence was celebrating his birthday, each of  the five 
KPK executives outlined their visions for the new organization, 
and a spirited discussion then ensued.
As the leaders of  a state agency that had been vested with 
extraordinary powers, it was agreed that rules of  conduct would 
need to be drawn up so as to set clear parameters delineating 
the limits beyond which the leaders of  the KPK would not 
transgress. As each of  the Commission’s five executives had very 
different backgrounds, it was clear that they would likely have 
differing views as to how these guidelines should be drawn. It 
was here that the assistance of  an facilitator assigned by Amrop 
Hever was of  great benefit.
A Code of  Ethics binding on the Commission’s executives was 
consequently drawn up, while at the same time, the Commission’s 
strategic plans were being drafted. This Code set out in detail 
what was permissible and what was impermissible, as well as the 
sanctions to be applied in respect of  any violations.
The Code of  Ethics requires the commissioners to accept 
the following responsibilities:
• to abide by the teachings and precepts of  their respec-
tive religions;
• to comply with and abide by legal and ethical rules;
• to use public resources efficiently, effectively and ap-
propriately;
• to firmly uphold jointly agreed principles, values and 
decisions;
• to clearly differentiate between what is appropriate, 
becoming and feasible and what is inappropriate, unbe-
coming and unfeasible.
• to participate in the making of  difficult decisions;
• to always maintain impartiality in the performance of  
duties and the exercise of  functions and powers;

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
• to be willing to accept the consequences of  every deci-
sion;
• to never stop learning and listening;
• to be willing to act firmly;
• to always work to the optimum;
• to leave behind all negative practices from the past;
• to abandon all forms of  individual or institutional ar-
rogance/feelings of  superiority;
• to identify all conflicts of  interest or possible conflicts 
of  interest that arise, and to inform other executives of  
such conflicts of  interest as soon as possible;
• to be committed and loyal to the KPK and to col-
leagues;
• to set aside personal or group interests so as to permit 
the achievement of  the jointly agreed objectives;
• to eschew all inducements that could be interpreted as 
having the potential to influence the substance of  deci-
sions;
• to notify the other executives of  any meetings with 
third parties that have been or will be held, whether 
connected with KPK duties or otherwise;
• to refuse payment for food, accommodation or enter-
tainment by any third party;
• to show independence by not displaying closeness or 
familiarity with particular persons in public.
• to restrict as much as possible meetings in public places 
such as hotels, restaurants, office or hotel lobbies, etc.
• to inform the other commissioners of  the names of  
family members, friends and other parties with whom 
frequent communication is engaged in.
Besides responsibilities, the Code of  Ethics also contains pro-
hibitions, which are as follows:
• using public resources for personal or group interests;
• receiving valuable inducements in connection with Com-
The Establisment of the Corruption Eradication Commission
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mission work;
• requesting or receiving help or assistance in any form 
from any person where such help or assistance has the 
potential to pose a conflict of  interest; or
• playing golf  with any party or parties so as to directly 
or indirectly give rise to a conflict of  interest, no matter 
how insignificant.
Should any of  the commissioners of  the KPK violate this 
Code of  Ethics, they will leave themselves open to the imposition 
of  sanctions, the severity of  which will depend on the gravity 
of  the violation committed. The precise sanctions to be imposed 
will be determined by the Ethics Committee, which consists of  
both KPK commissioners and advisors, and one or more per-
sons from outside the KPK, who are selected by a combined 
meeting of  the KPK commissioners and advisors.
Given the enthusiasm and common purpose of  the Com-
mission, and the willingness of  each commissioner to listen to 
and work with his colleagues, plus the help provided by the 
facilitator, within only two days the Commission had drawn up 
its strategic plans (as well as short-term plans), a Code of  Ethics 
binding on KPK leaders, the draft KPK organizational structure, 
and an interim KPK budget.
Management System and Guidelines 
In any organization, human resources comprise one of  the 
key factors necessary in realizing that organization’s objectives 
and goals. The five commissioners of  the Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission (KPK) wanted to see the Commission develop 
as an institution built on a foundation of  strong, professional 
and competent human resources of  unimpeachable integrity. In 
order to ensure that this vision was realized, recruitment would 
need to be carried out carefully and correctly.
The KPK executives were of  the opinion that if  an institu-
tion like the KPK failed to hire the correct people, it would be 
unable to achieve the desired results.  In addition, in the post-
recruitment period it would be necessary to ensure that career 
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development and other supporting systems be managed well.
The Partnership and the Commission agreed to work together 
on developing detailed job descriptions and criteria, formulating 
recruitment criteria and examination materials, and on the actual 
carrying out of  recruitment. The terms of  reference for this 
collaborative effort were as follows:
• studying the organizational structure and principal duties 
and functions of  the KPK as set out in the work plans 
and strategic plans;
• developing job descriptions and criteria (the necessary 
competences, qualifications, knowledge, skills and atti-
tudes) for each division. The job descriptions and criteria 
that were drawn up needed to accommodate the needs 
of  the KPK in the pursuit of  its vision and mission, 
and the mandate given to it in upholding the law.
• Developing recruitment criteria and examination/test 
modules;
• applying the examination/test modules based on the job 
descriptions and criteria as formulated;
• conducting a study on a suitable remuneration system.
The recruitment process for the deputies and directors com-
menced with the placing of  advertisements in the newspapers in 
May 2004. More than 1,100 people applied for these positions. 
After going through a tight selection process involving a series 
of  tests and examinations set by various appraisers under the 
coordination of  Daya Dimensi Indonesia (DDI), three deputies 
and seven directors were selected, consisting of  seven people 
from the private sector and three with backgrounds in the public 
service.
As there is a provision in the Criminal Code stipulating that 
criminal investigators must be either police officers or public 
prosecutors, the KPK also recruited a number of  such staff. This 
involved the submitting of  requests to the Attorney General’s 
Office and the Republic of  Indonesia Police to nominate a 
number of  staff  members to work as KPK investigators.
At the start of  2004, after the commissioners of  the KPK 
The Establisment of the Corruption Eradication Commission

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
had been selected, the KPK received assistance from a number 
of  other institutions, including the Development and Finance 
Control Board (BPKP), the Department of  Finance, the State 
Secretariat, etc. With the winding up in the middle of  2004 of  
the Government Officials Wealth Audit Commission (KPKPN) 
– which had previously been charged with the task of  auditing 
the assets of  high ranking public officials – all of  the officers 
who had worked for the KPKPN were now transferred to the 
KPK. However, in order to ensure that staff  of  the necessary 
caliber were obtained, it was made mandatory for all of  the 
KPKPN staffers to undergo selection tests.
Following the examination of  temporary and former staffers 
of  the KPKPN at the end of  2004 and in January 2005, a total 
of  80 officials were returned to their original institutions as they 
were considered more suitable to  work at the institutions they 
were originating from.
With the completion of  the recruitment process of  the 
deputies and directors, and the reselection process of  the former 
KPKPN staff, the KPK now had a total of  120 personnel. This 
figure, however, was still far from what the KPK would require 
to satisfactorily perform is duties. Accordingly, another round of  
recruitment was held at the start of  July 2005. At the time of  
writing in September/October 2005, a total of  16,500 hopefuls 
had applied to join the KPK, with the number of  vacant posi-
tions numbering only 150.
Through the formulation of  job descriptions and criteria, 
recruitment criteria, examination modules and the implementation 
of  transparent and open recruitment processes, the KPK has 
shown itself  capable of  attracting professional and competent 
staff  from both the public and private sector.
Human Resources Development
After staff  had been recruited, it was necessary to design a 
human resources management system so as to ensure that the 
KPK’s staff  could perform their duties optimally. This was be-
cause the human resources management system and guidelines 
employed in the civil service so far could not possibly be applied 
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by the Commission if  it was to achieve its objectives. Similarly, 
private sector models of  human resources management were 
also incapable of  being fully applied bearing in mind that the 
KPK was a public agency. Accordingly, a new human resources 
management system needed to be developed that would enable 
to KPK to achieve its goals.
The following efforts were made as part of  this task:
• The development of  human resources management 
policies and guidelines based on best practice in both 
the public and private sectors;
• The identification of  areas of  conflict between the poli-
cies and guidelines referred to above on the one hand 
and the policies and regulations employed by the civil 
service in general on the other hand, and a consideration 
of  whether the KPK’s policies and guidelines needed to 
be modified or whether the general civil service policies 
and regulations needed to be amended; and
• The formulation of  human resources policies and guide-
lines so as to be workable and practical by instituting 
whatever changes were found to be necessary.
Besides the above, a study was also conducted on an appro-
priate remuneration system for the KPK. The KPK leadership 
agreed that the current system of  public service remuneration in 
Indonesia would not support the creation of  a conducive work 
culture in the Commission and would be incapable of  motivat-
ing Commission staff  to perform optimally.
Given that Law No. 30 of  2002 conferred wide-ranging 
powers on the KPK and that the Commission needs to exercise 
these powers correctly and avoid any possible abuses of  power, 
it was essential that the remuneration system selected be the 
correct one, right from the very beginning. If  this turned out 
to be the case, it could subsequently be employed as a model 
for the reform of  the remuneration system in the bureaucracy 
as a whole.
To provide such a model, the KPK remuneration system 
needed to be based on appropriate formulation and be capable 
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of  ensuring that all Commission staff  shall perform optimally. 
This would require salary levels to be competitive with other 
institutions or bodies so as to avoid key staff  members being 
enticed to leave the KPK. However, there was also an awareness 
that high salaries would be unacceptable to both the public and 
government. Therefore, it was decided that it would be necessary 
to design a new remuneration system for the KPK.
The basic objective of  this effort was to identify appropri-
ate salary components, structures and levels for KPK executives 
and staff.
The designing of  an appropriate remuneration system in-
volved the following efforts:
• Identifying the salary components, structures and levels 
applicable in the public service;
• Conducting a study on salary components, structures 
and levels in the Indonesian private sector based on 
type of  work, risk and workload, and then comparing 
these with the work undertaken by KPK officers.
• Developing salary components and structures for the 
KPK and determining the most appropriate salary levels 
based on the results of  the studies described above; 
and
• Ensuring that the salary components and structures de-
veloped for the KPK would facilitate the Commission 
in the performance of  its work and achievement of  its 
goals based on Law No. 30 of  2002.
With almost 22 months having elapsed since the establish-
ment of  the KPK, a government regulation on the KPK staffing 
and remuneration system has yet to be approved – mainly due 
to bureaucratic obstacles and an unwillingness on the part of  
some institutions to embrace change.
To fill the vacuum until such time as a government regula-
tion has been issued, the KPK leadership has sought approval in 
principle to pay cash advances to its staff. Any overpayments or 
underpayments resulting from the payment of  such cash advances 
vis-à-vis the future government regulation could be calculated 
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at a later date. Thankfully, approval has been given for this ar-
rangement by the Minister of  Finance, and it is currently being 
employed as a basis for setting salaries.
The proposed KPK remuneration system consists of  a com-
bination of  a salary and allowance components. Staff  members 
will be prohibited from accepting any other types of  fees and 
emoluments, such as payments for attending meetings, project 
fees, speaker’s fees, etc. While it will be impossible to match the 
remuneration levels offered by the private sector, it is neverthe-
less hoped that the KPK will be able to attract dedicated and 
competent people to serve in its ranks.
On the many occasions where KPK members have been 
asked to speak at various events, they have consistently refused 
to accept speaker’s fees, transport money and accommodation 
money. This has surprised not a few event organizers as it is 
something quite unheard of  in Indonesia. Similarly, KPK members 
also refuse to accept money for attending meetings or events, 
or for serving as members of  working groups. This is because 
members of  the KPK are determined to only accept remunera-
tion from the KPK.
Internal Communications System 
The ways in which corruption is committed are becoming 
increasingly sophisticated. Accordingly, the Corruption Eradica-
tion Commission needs to develop as an organization that is 
equipped with state-of-the-art equipment, including an up-to-date 
communications system. This is essential given that the KPK 
must produce two pieces of  admissible evidence before a case 
of  alleged corruption can be brought to court. Of  course, mod-
ern working methods supported by IT and top-flight expertise 
will greatly assist the KPK in coming to grips with corruption 
cases committed using the most-up-to-date technology. With the 
assistance of  the Partnership, the Commission has developed a 
local area network in the KPK headquarters, and this has greatly 
assisted the Commission in the performance of  its duties.
As is only to be expected of  the senior policy-makers in a 
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modern organization in this era of  the virtual office, the depu-
ties and directors always bring their laptops with them wherever 
they go, and through these they can access the KPK network 
wherever they go and maintain contact with staff  in the office. 
To date, paperless management in the Commission has been a 
success even though it took some time for the commissioners 
used to the hardcopy approach to get familiar with e-mail and 
e-filing.. This coming to grips with new technology is indeed a 
rarity in an Indonesian government agency.
With regard to eradicating bribery, by October 2005 the 
KPK had arrested red-handed a member of  the General Elec-
tions Commission (KPU), the lawyer of  Abdullah Puteh, and his 
lawyer on cassation (final appeal), and a Supreme Court clerk. 
These arrests involved the application of  pioneering meth-
ods for the Indonesian law enforcement sector, and would have 
been impossible without the use of  modern technology, and, of  
course, the dedication of  our staff.
Integrating the KPKPN into the KPK
Long before the leadership of  the KPK was selected, the 
Public Servants Audit Commission (KPKPN) was already in 
existence. This agency was established in 2001 by Law No. 28 
of  1998 on the State Organizer who is Free of  Corruption, Col-
lusion and Nepotism. The principal duties of  the KPKPN were 
to monitor and verify the assets of  public servants, audit their 
asset declarations, and receive and investigate complaints from the 
public, NGOs, the community and government agencies regard-
ing suspicions of  corruption, collusion and nepotism involving 
public officials. In addition, the KPKPN was also authorized to 
launch investigations at its own initiative in respect of  the assets 
of  public officials and the provenance of  such assets.
Law No. 30 of  2002 on the KPK provided that the roles 
and functions of  the KPKPN would be transferred to the KPK 
and form part of  the KPK’s corruption prevention strategy. The 
Partnership played a significant role in helping ensure the suc-
cess of  integrating the KPKPN into the KPK by, among other 
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things, enlisting the services of  the University of  Indonesia’s 
School of  Psychology. Through their help, we were able to 
somewhat reduce the level of  resistance to change that always 
emerges during a process of  this kind.
The problems arising out of  the integration of  the KPKPN 
into the KPK were mainly the result of  resistance by former 
KPKPN staff. The KPK found it difficult to convince them that 
the process would produce positive effects for the fight against 
corruption. Despite the initial resistance, the process became easier 
after the KPK collected complaints from the former KPKPN 
staff  and took action to address them.
The assistance from external parties was of  immense benefit 
during this process. This was clearly shown by the change in at-
titude of  the KPKPN staff  after having consultations with experts 
from the University of  Indonesia’s School of  Psychology.
Public Consultation and Changing Paradigms
It was clear from the outset that individual adjustments would 
have to be made so as to produce mutual understanding and a 
common perception among the executives of  the KPK given 
their varied backgrounds: some from the police, some from the 
civil service, and some from the private sector, plus the age gaps 
(the youngest commissioner was 45 and oldest 62).
The original plan to provide training to the leaders of  the 
KPK was modified given the lack of  time. Their first job was 
to draw up strategic plans and a code of  ethics. This was ac-
complished at the end of  January 2004 after intensive discussions 
between the Commission leadership and various parties who 
voluntarily provided assistance. The second task was a discussion 
of  simple training, which took place over the course of  half  a 
day during the discussions on the KPK’s vision. This discussion 
was also integrated into human resources management system 
development activities, and involved the assistance of  Daya Di-
mensi Indonesia.
The Partnership also assisted with the organizing of  out-
bound executive training for the leaders of  the KPK in order 
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to accelerate bonding and improve teamwork among them. In 
addition, after the deputies were selected, the executives, deputies 
and the secretary-general underwent mind-setting training to help 
them change their paradigms and preconceptions. By participat-
ing in this program, they arrived at a common perception as to 
the future of  the organization, and developed a willingness to 
better listen to and respect the views of  others. Similar training 
programs are now undertaken on a routine basis in line with 
the type of  cases being handled by the KPK and the expecta-
tions of  the public.
All KPK staff, from the leadership level down to security 
staff, participated in an outbound program in Puncak, West 
Java, from 18-19 September 2005. As a result, all staff  members 
were introduced to the values underlying the work of  the KPK, 
namely, integrity, professionalism, productivity, religious faith, 
transparency, teamwork, and innovation.
The active involvement of  the public will play an indispens-
able role in ensuring the success of  the KPK’s work. Accordingly, 
discussions with various public groups that have the potential to 
help eradicate corruption were held in five areas: Medan, Jakarta, 
Denpasar, Makassar, and Balikpapan. These public discussions 
focused on disseminating information on the KPK’s strategic 
plans and leadership Code of  Ethics, and were also intended 
to elicit feedback and criticism from various perspectives and 
viewpoints.
In order to assist with the effort to provide information on 
the KPK’s activities, it was decided that it was necessary to build 
a press center at the KPK offices. This serves as a base for the 
members of  the press who have taken such a keen interest in 
the work of  the KPK to date, starting with the interrogation of  
Abdullah Puteh and members of  the General Elections Com-
mission (KPU) suspected of  soliciting and receiving kickbacks 
from KPU suppliers. 
As pointed out earlier in this paper, the fight against cor-
ruption will be unlikely to bear fruit if  all responsibility is placed 
solely on the shoulders of  the KPK. Rather, the effort must 
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involve all elements of  society. As part of  the public consulta-
tion process, all feedback and criticism received from members 
of  the public were considered and put to use in fine-tuning the 
KPK’s strategic plans and as reference material in the planning 
of  work programs by the different KPK directorates.
Informants and TV Crews
While public consultation was originally only intended to 
elicit feedback and criticism as regards the KPK’s vision, mis-
sion and strategic plans, it was later developed so as to ensure 
the wide-ranging participation of  the public in the corruption 
eradication program.
The number of  corruption reports submitted by the public 
has been rising rapidly. As of  the end of  September 2005, the 
total number of  reports that had been received amounted to 
more than 7,000. This clearly shows the level of  trust and hope 
that the public is placing in the KPK, even though it is obvious 
that not every report will in reality involve corruption. In fact, 
some informants are motivated more by personal and emotional 
considerations, such as a desire for revenge on the part of, for 
example, a dismissed employee, a losing bidder in a tender, the 
loser in a court case, etc.
The types and nature of  the reports submitted to the KPK 
vary greatly. Some are sufficiently comprehensive so that all 
that remains to be done is to find the necessary supporting 
evidence, while others consist of  mere newspaper clippings. 
Some informants come to the KPK offices taking great care 
to conceal their identities, while others arrive complete with 
television crews, apparently determined to appear on the next 
TV news broadcast.
All reports received by the KPK are studied and analyzed. 
Some clearly reveal prima facie evidence of  corruption, while 
others show minimal indications of  criminality. Not all complaints 
received came within the jurisdiction or purview of  the KPK. 
After examination, where appropriate the reports are either acted 
upon by the KPK itself  or are forwarded to the appropriate 
The Establisment of the Corruption Eradication Commission

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
body, such as the relevant local audit board (Bawasda), inspector-
ate general, the police or the prosecution service. Even in the 
case of  those reports that are handed over to other agencies, 
the KPK will continue to conduct monitoring and coordination 
in respect of  the progress achieved. 
An informant has the right to seek information on the 
progress of  the KPK investigation into a case he has reported, 
and the KPK is always willing to provide such information, 
where feasible.
Many of  the informants who show up at the KPK offices 
are in a highly agitated state, convinced that their reports are 
of  the utmost importance.
KPK staff  are aware that public participation is of  the es-
sence in the fight against corruption. In order to maintain their 
zeal and also to improve the quality of  reports, the KPK has 
organized both internal and external training.
With regard to internal training, this is provided to im-
prove the technical capabilities of  KPK staff  so as to expedite 
investigations, and to equip staff  to be able to deal with highly 
emotional/angry informants. Meanwhile, the external training that 
has been provided has mainly consisted of  efforts to inform the 
public about the type of  reports that fulfill the requirements. This 
effort includes training on how to conduct initial investigations, 
the distribution of  leaflets, etc.
In order to mobilize the necessary resources, the KPK held 
a coordination meeting with donors on 4 March 2004. With the 
increasing discussion of  corruption in the United Nations, Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)  and other forums, the 
willingness of  donors to contribute to the fight against this evil 
has increased. The task now is to convert this willingness into 
concrete support and financial assistance. In this regard, the KPK 
has consistently received solid support from donors, including 
the Partnership. This included Initial Startup Support, assistance 
with the drawing up of  standard operating procedures (Asian 
Development Bank and the Partnership), on-the-job overseas 
training (ASEM Trustfund/World Bank), Preventing corruption 

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
by strengthening legislators capacity (Danida-Denmark), a so-
called Crash Program supported by the Partnership (which was 
just commencing as this paper was being written), operational 
support from the Asian Development Bank for the KPK in 
Aceh,  and others.
Lessons Learned
The success of  this Initial Start Up Support depended on 
various factors, including the following:
• the KPK knew precisely what was needed in terms of  
donations;
• the KPK as the recipient of  the donations was able to 
formulate its needs in budgeting, planning and time-
frame terms. The budgeting, planning and scheduling 
processes had to be in line with the KPK’s operations. 
For example, the budget and scope of  the work had to 
be revised on two occasions due to the rapidly evolving 
nature of  the KPK’s work;
• Projects were carried out in a transparent manner in 
line with budgets and plans.
As a new state agency, the KPK has become the subject of  
great expectations on the part of  the public. These expectations 
will, however, be difficult to fulfill if  the KPK does not resolve 
all of  its internal and institutional challenges. The drawing up of  
the Commission’s vision, mission, Code of  Ethics and strategic 
plans represents the laying of  firm foundations for the future 
development of  the organization.
While attempting to fulfill the expectations of  the public 
and ensure internal consolidation, the KPK must also respond 
to and take action in respect of  those corruption cases that have 
become the focus of  public attention. It obviously will not be 
easy to accomplish all of  these things at the same time.
However, as a new institution the KPK possesses the advan-
tage of  having the opportunity to develop a new organizational 
paradigm that is capable of  eradicating corruption in Indonesia 
and ensuring that it does not reemerge. Thus, continued support 
for the efforts of  the KPK in achieving internal consolidation 
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will be of  the utmost importance in ensuring that the Commis-
sion is capable of  creating and internalizing an organizational 
character and culture that are in line with its mission.
Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas, has been a commissioner of  
the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) since December 
2003. Prior to this, he served as the President Director of  PT 
Timah Tbk and the chairman of  the Board of  Management of  
Transparency International Indonesia.
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Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Mobilizing the People of 
Papua to fight Corruption1
Bambang Sugiono, Maftuh Effendi, 
and Yusak E. Reba 
Legislation but no ancillary regulations 
Law No. 21 of  2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua Prov ince has been instead in the region formerly known as Irian Jaya, since 21 November 2002. This legislation was 
intended to provide for the following: (1) a more satisfactory 
distribution of  powers between the central and local levels, (2) 
the protection of  the identity of  the indigenous inhabitants of  
Papua, who have become increasingly marginalized in the province, 
and (3) increasing development funding in order to improve the 
economic capacity of  the people of  Papua Province, particularly 
marginalized groups.
The new legislation provides the legal and policy framework 
necessary for extending greater powers to the provincial, regency 
and municipality governments in Papua Province so as to allow 
them to arrange and manage their own affairs. These powers 
cover the areas of  government administration and the exploita-
tion of  natural resources to improve the quality of  life of  the 
people, especially in the fields of  education, healthcare, physical 
infrastructure and the popular economy.
As a consequence of  the enactment of  the Papua Special 
Autonomy Law, the funding allocations for Papua Province 
from the national budget must be significantly increased, while 
1  This paper describes the empirical history of the program titled “Strengthening Civil Society 
Organizations and the Bureaucracy in Preventing and Eradicating Corruption during the Imple-
mentation of Special Autonomy in Papua Province” (April 2003-February 2005). Funding for 
the program was provided by three organizations: the Partnership for Governance Reform in 
Indonesia, particularly for improved communications with the legislative and executive branches 
of the local government, the CSSP for advocacy with a view to encouraging greater civil society 
participation, and the ICCO for a public information campaign in the media.
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the management of  natural resources, particularly forestry and 
marine resources, must be improved so as to increase local 
government revenues.
In order to give proper effect to the Papua Special Autonomy 
Law, 20 provincial regulations and 11 special district regulations 
need to be issued, and under article 75 of  the Papua Special 
Autonomy Law, these should have been issued by not later than 
two years after the enactment of  the legislation.
Now, almost three years after the legislation was introduced, 
not one of these provincial and special district regulations have 
been placed on the statute books (most of the required regula-
tions concern the management and utilization of special autonomy 
funds, and the instituting of social control over government). As 
a result of this legislative failure, the spending of the annual 2 
percent subvention from the central government’s General Al-
location Fund (DAU) has gone ahead without the conducting of 
any kind of needs assessment or the putting in place of objective 
parameters based on the set formula of 60 percent of the funding 
for the provincial government and the remaining 40 percent for the 
regency and municipality governments. Under the legislation, these 
funds should be spent on education and healthcare. However, there 
are to date no ancillary regulations that could serve to prevent the 
misuse of public funds through the instituting of effective political 
and social control. Given this deficiency, a clear threat exists to 
the achievement of the objectives of special autonomy for Papua 
Province. The results of an investigation published in Jayapura’s 
Cenderawasih Pos newspaper on 23 April 2003, highlighted 22 cases 
that appeared to involve the misuse of  development funds by 
project treasurers and administrators.
Given these circumstances, the Institute for Civil Society 
Strengthening (ICS) – together with a number of  other civil 
society organizations in Papua Province – decided that systematic 
efforts would be needed to promote a cultural movement and 
law reform at the local level so as to reduce the opportunities 
for corruption. It was believed that this effort was an essential 
precondition to the instituting of  good governance in the prov-
ince. It was geared to the prevention, and eventual eradication, 
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of  corruption involving abuse of  power and misuse of  public 
funds by the power-holders in Papua and their cronies.
The three main goals of  the movement were as follows: 
first, providing a proper understanding of  the consequences of  
corruption and encouraging the public to be courageous enough 
to fight it. This was to be achieved through organized advocacy 
and public campaigning. Second, the application of  public pres-
sure to those involved in corruption in the local government 
bureaucracy, local political institutions and economic players 
associated with the power-holders through the seeking out of  
information and conducting of  investigations to uncover cases 
of  corruption and bring them before the courts. Third, the de-
velopment of  a partnership between all of  those concerned with 
the anticorruption effort for the purpose of  eliciting the views 
of  the public and advocating the enactment of  local regulations 
that would make it more difficult for corruption to occur, as well 
as encouraging an improvement in the public services provided 
by government institutions.
In order to achieve the above goals, there were three factors 
that would be required: first, a partnership between all those 
committed to the fight against corruption, including individuals 
in both governmental and non-governmental institutions; second, 
an increased awareness on the part of  the public about corrup-
tion and greater courage to tackle it; and third, political will on 
the part of  local administrations and legislatures to deliberate, 
enact and put into effect local regulations that could reduce the 
opportunities  for corruption and ensure the provision of  better 
services to the public by government institutions.
Developing the Right Strategy for the Movement
There were three crucial issues that led to the enactment of  
the Papua Special Autonomy Law as part of  an effort to resolve 
Papua Province’s problems: 1) political conflict arising from the 
demands for Papuan independence, which were viewed by the 
Republic of  Indonesia government as expressions of  separat-
ism; 2) social conflict resulting from the failure to satisfactorily 
resolve the earlier political conflict; 3) and the low level of  
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economic development enjoyed by Papua, particularly indigenous 
Papuans, compared to the majority of  other provinces in Indo-
nesia. Accordingly, the Papua Special Autonomy Law had three 
primary goals: in the political field, to bring about power-sharing 
between the central and local governments through decentraliza-
tion; in the social field, to ensure recognition and respect for 
the socio-cultural identity and the fundamental rights of  indig-
enous Papuans as part of  Indonesian unity in diversity; and in 
the economic field, to increase the allocation of  development 
funds so as to improve the economic capacity of  the people, 
particularly indigenous Papuans as the most marginalized group 
in Papuan society.
In order to support the attainment of  these three goals, Papua 
Province was to be allocated 2 percent of  the General Alloca-
tion Fund at the national level. The amountof  additional funding 
would be agreed upon between the central government and the 
House of  Representatives based on the proposals submitted by the 
province for each fiscal year. Based on this formula, the funding 
allocated to Papua Province increased significantly following the 
introduction of  the special autonomy package, with the result 
that development projects and programs in the province could 
be expanded and accelerated. However, as a consequence of  the 
fact that there were no clear accountability procedures in place, 
or political or social control over the spending of  the additional 
funding, the way was left wide open for increased corruption on 
the part of  the power-holders and their cronies.
With the intention to counter this tendency towards increased 
corruption, the ICS – together with its civil society partners 
– developed a strategy involving the establishment of  a coalition 
between pro-democracy and anticorruption activists. Two principal 
approaches were employed by the coalition. First, a “repressive” 
approach involving investigations, the uncovering of  incidences 
of  corruption, advocacy for the putting of  embezzlers in the 
dock, and clear and transparent legal processes, and, second, 
anticipatory action involving the conducting of  studies to iden-
tify people’s aspirations and the holding of  public consultations 
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to design draft legal products in the form of  local regulations, 
and subsequently advocating the deliberation and enactment of  
these regulations by the local executive and legislature. Both of  
these approaches, which complemented each other, were to be 
put into effect through a gradual culturally oriented strategy, 
including the encouraging of  public participation. This gradual 
strategy also consisted of  another element – the putting in place 
over time of  performance indicators with which the public 
would be familiar.
The Robert Klitgaard Formula: C = D + M - A
The anticorruption movement in Papua Province took its cue 
from the results of  a study and investigations conducted by the 
ICS in collaboration with its civil society partners.2 Based on the 
findings of  this study and the associated investigations, it was 
found that the dominant culture of  the bureaucracy was one of  
nepotism and opaqueness, that there was a serious lack of  social 
and political control resulting from the cozy relationship between 
the political elite and the local government bureaucracy,.There was 
virtually no public accountability, there was weak communication 
between politicians and the voters, law enforcement was poor 
due to the limited jurisdiction and powers of  the Administrative 
Court, there were no local regulations capable of  preventing cor-
ruption and ensuring appropriate punishment for those involved 
in corruption, and those staffing the law enforcement agencies 
often actually assisted in the commission of  corruption. Taken 
collectively, these factors tended to provide fertile ground for 
widespread corruption and impunity.
2 Results of  the study titled “Identifying public perceptions about the implementation of  
Papuan special autonomy in seven regencies of  Papua Province: Jayawijaya, Biak, Merauke, 
Sorong, Manokwari, Fakfak, and Jayapura.” This study, which was supported by the European 
Union and conducted from January to March 2003, focused on public perceptions regarding 
three aspects: 1) the utilization of  special autonomy funds in the healthcare, education and 
popular economy sectors; 2) the drafting and issuance of  government regulations on the 
Papuan People’s Council; and 3) legal, political and social control over the implementation of  
the Papua Special Autonomy Law by the provincial, regency and municipality governments 
in Papua. The results of  the study were presented during a seminar to evaluate one year of  
implementation of  the Papua Special Autonomy Law held at the Hotel Matoa, Jayapura on 
9-10 May 2003.
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On 1 March 2003, activists from various civil society or-
ganizations3, all of  whom were involved in particular areas of  
advocacy, agreed to develop and expand the anticorruption 
movement. The forum recommended that all pro-democracy 
and anticorruption players – consisting of  individuals from lo-
cal government institutions, law enforcement agencies, political 
parties and non-governmental institutions – be invited to reflect 
and develop a critical attitude, conduct investigations, and design 
a format for preventing corruption. The forum agreed that the 
best way to put pressure on the embezzlers was through “repres-
sive” and anticipatory measures.
This was also the approach adopted by the government of  
Hong Kong in its fight to rid the territory of  corruption. The 
government there availed of  the formula designed by Robert 
Klitgaard, and used it when drafting the necessary legislation to 
weed out corruption. The said formula was as follows: C = M 
+ D - A, with C representing corruption, which was equal to 
M (monopoly power) plus D (discretion by officials), minus A 
(accountability).4
The forum in Papua resolved to expand the public move-
ment it was promoting so as to encourage and design advocacy 
campaigns to ensure the enactment of  the necessary local leg-
islation to make it more difficult for the embezzlers and ensure 
that appropriate sanctions were imposed on them, and all who 
assisted them, including bureaucrats, politicians, and members 
of  the law enforcement institutions. The situation was particu-
larly acute in Papua Province given the almost total absence 
of  comprehensive and detailed regulations providing for public 
3 The said civil society organizations consisted of  The Institute for Civil Society Strengthen-
ing (ICS) Papua in Jayapura, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Papua in Jayapura, Konsultasi 
Independen Pemberdayaan Rakyat (KIPRa) Papua in Jayapura, Forum Partisipasi Masyarakat 
untuk Pembangunan Merauke (FORPAMER) in Merauke, Yayasan Nanimi Wa Bilisu in Sorong, 
Lembaga Pemberdayaan  Ekonomi Rakyat (eLPERA) in Fakfak, Yayasan Santa Lusia di Biak, 
Lembaga Penelitian, Pengkajian, dan Pengembangan Bantuan Hukum (LP3BH) in Manokwari, 
Pusat Kajian Demokrasi Universitas Cenderawasih (Democratic Center Cenderawasih Univer-
sity) in Jayapura, and the Papua provincial branch of  the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in 
Jayapura.
4 For more information on this formula, see Robert Klitgaard, Membasmi Korups , Yayasan Obor 
Indonesia, Jakarta, 2001.
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participation, transparency and accountability – which obviously 
had adverse consequences for the efforts to eradicate corruption 
from the local bureaucracy and political scene.
The plan was to develop the anticorruption movement 
gradually. During the first five years (2002-2007), the following 
three main activities were to be undertaken:
1. Conducting organized advocacy and public campaigns focused 
on the eradication of  corruption and the bringing to surface 
those involved in corruption in Papua Province. The objec-
tive would be to persuade people to be more courageous in 
combating corruption, which would involve regular public 
campaigns, including the use of  talk-back radio, the inser-
tion of  anticorruption messages in the local print media, the 
distribution of  stickers and T-shirts displaying anticorruption 
messages, such as “Corrupt Power-holders, Bankrupt Nation”, 
“Come down hard on the Corruptors”, “Reject monopolies, 
ensure accountability”, “Yes to anticorruption politicians”, 
“Transparent policies prevent corruption”, and “Corruptors 
are enemies of  the people”. In order to obtain feedback 
from the public on the effectiveness of  the campaign, an 
evaluation team was established consisting of  journalists, 
academics and religious leaders.
2. Investigating and uncovering corruption cases, and encourag-
ing the taking of  legal action against those involved so as to 
put pressure on dishonest members of  the local government 
bureaucracy, political parties, and well-connected business-
people. This would be carried out through the seeking out of  
information on institutions vulnerable to corruption, such as 
local administrations and legislatures (particularly as regards 
a lack of  transparency in project management), the police, 
the prosecution service, and the courts when handling cases 
involving the spending of  public funds. Such information 
would then be followed up on by specific case investiga-
tions, encouraging people to lodge complaints, and applying 
pressure to ensure that those suspected of  corruption were 
put in the dock. In addition, routine focus group discus-
sions involving concerned individuals and those employed 
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by corrupt institutions would be held, studies conducted on 
public policy and public services, workshops held to discuss 
the effectiveness of  law enforcement efforts in eradicating 
corruption, advocacy training workshops held for civil soci-
ety organization activists to help them uncover corruption, 
routine meetings convened to consolidate the anticorruption 
network in Papua Province, and public pressure consistently 
applied to uncover corruption in the Papuan Police and 
Prosecution Service. 
3. Conducting studies to identify the wishes and views of the 
public, drafting and advocating the adoption of local legal 
products that would make things more difficult for those 
involved in corruption, and bringing pressure to bear for 
improved public services. The objective here would be to 
encourage the issuance of comprehensive and detailed local 
regulations that would guarantee the public’s right of participa-
tion, policy transparency, and public accountability in policy 
implementation for the purpose of preventing corruption in 
the bureaucracy and among local politicians and their cronies. 
This would be carried out through the establishment of a 
partnership of anticorruption civil society organizations, public 
dialogs to encourage policy transparency, the conducting of 
studies and advocacy on the setting up of a Papua Ombuds-
man Commission, the provision of legislative drafting train-
ing so as to improve policy transparency, the conducting of 
studies on the relevant local and central legislation, drafting 
local ordinances on issues affecting the public interest in a 
transparent and participatory way, including ordinances that 
would prevent abuses of power, such as an ordinance requir-
ing public participation in the framing of local legislation, an 
ordinance on transparency and accountability in public policy, 
and an ordinance establishing a local ombudsman commis-
sion.
With regard to strategy formulation and implementation, 
those responsible for the successful implementation of  this work 
would be the members of  the anticorruption and pro-transparency 
coalition, consisting of  individuals drawn from NGOs, academia, 
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traditional/tribal organizations, local government, the police, the 
prosecution service, the public courts and the administrative 
court, and journalists in seven Papuan regencies and municipali-
ties. The ICS would play the role of  initiator and facilitator in 
formulating and implementing strategy, and for program design 
and implementation. Meanwhile, the actual implementation of  
the anticorruption drive would be carried out by the civil society 
anticorruption coalition consisting of  individuals drawn from 
civil society organizations, academia, traditional/tribal organiza-
tions, local government, the police, the prosecution service, the 
courts and the media.
In the last two years, the Partnership for Governance Re-
form in Indonesia has been the biggest source of  funding for 
the design, implementation and evaluation of  the anticorruption 
program. However, the ICS as the initiator institution has also 
continued to provide funding support.5
With regard to the second activity described above, advocacy 
was conducted from February to June 2003, in collaboration with 
the local press, and members of  the Papua Local Legislative 
Council from the Bulan Bintang Party and Keadilan Sejahtera 
Party – for the purpose of  ensuring the prosecution of  22 
treasurers and administrators of  development projects funded 
out of  the 2002-2003 Papua provincial budget. The advocacy 
campaign was successful in eliciting responses from the governor 
and deputy governor, who ordered the Development and Finance 
Supervisory Board, the local audit board, the Regional Planning 
and Development Management Board (BP3D), and the Papua 
Provincial Secretariat’s Finance Bureau to conduct audits on the 
projects. Advocacy at the wider level has also been quite suc-
cessful in molding public opinion and spurring the involvement 
of  lawyers, the police, the prosecution service and the courts in 
ensuring that corruption cases that would previously have been 
dealt with administratively would now be prosecuted before the 
5  ICS is funded by members’ dues, profits from its photocopying and car rental businesses, and 
part of  the fees earned by ICS activists working as facilitators, from speaking engagements 
and as the authors of  articles promoting democracy.
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courts as criminal offenses.
However, the prosecutions that have been taken have suffered 
from a lack of  transparency and undue delay. To date, the pres-
sure applied by the ICS and its fellow civil society organizations 
to ensure that the prosecution service in Papua provide updates 
on the progress of  these cases has failed to bear fruit.
In addition, the efforts to encourage the Corruption Eradi-
cation Commission to become involved have been greeted by 
apologies due to lack of  time and personnel on the part of  the 
Commission. Thus, many of  these cases are still on the back 
burner.
Another serious obstacle to the advocacy process has been 
the uttering of  a variety of  threats – both psychological and 
involving violence – by individuals claiming to be acting on 
behalf  of  law enforcement institutions, local governments and 
community groups.
Promoting Transparency 
Over the last three years, the anticorruption movement has 
succeeded in eliciting the views of  the public, drafting instru-
ments, publicizing the anticorruption drive in the local media, 
and initiating deliberations in the Papua administration and the 
Papua vLegislative Council on three draft provincial regulations 
that could provide the basis for the future progress of  the an-
ticorruption movement6. These bills are as follows: the Draft 
Provincial Regulation on Public Participation and Transparency 
in the Administration of  Papua Province, the Draft Provincial 
Regulation on the Legislative Process in Papua Province, and 
the Draft Provincial Regulation on the Establishment of  an 
Ombudsman Commission in Papua Province.
6  The processes involved, the problems identified, the white papers and the drafts of  the 
provincial ordinances have been published in book form as 1) Developing the anticorruption move-
ment through local legislation: A normative study (Membangun Gerakan Anti Korupsi melalui Peraturan 
Perundang-undangan Daerah: Suatu Kajian Normatif); 2) Study on planning and policy transparency in 
Papua Province (Kajian Perencanaan dan Transparansi Kebijakan di Provinsi Papua); 3) Establishing an 
Ombudsman Commission in Papua: Identifying the problems and necessary steps for realization (Memben-
tuk Ombudsman Papua: Identifikasi Masalah dan Langkah Implementasi); and 4) Understanding and 
combating corruption: Instituting the principles of  good governance in local administrations (Memahami dan 
Melawan Perilaku Korupsi: Mewujudkan Prinsip “Good Governance” dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan 
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These three bills have been discussed in detail and all efforts 
made to ensure they are free from ambiguity in four aspects: 1) 
law enforcement procedures; 2) imposition of  sanctions, includ-
ing sanctions for law enforcement officials and law officers who 
break the law; 3) time-bound targets for law enforcement and 
legal processes, and 4) public accountability for law enforcement 
and legal institutions. This is an important first step to improv-
ing the quality of  local legislation in Papua, much of  which is 
ambiguous, provides excessive discretion to officials, is difficult to 
access on the part of  the public, and fails to provide sufficient 
deterrents for law enforcement officials and legal officers who 
fail to perform their duties.
The process of  intense interaction that has been gone 
through has also encouraged a more open attitude on the part 
of  government officials and institutions in Papua Province, as 
shown by their positive response to the three bills presented by 
the civil society organizations. However, no significant policy 
changes have been made to date as little headway has been made 
on enacting the three bills into law. On the positive side, there 
has been an increase in communications and cooperation between 
the partner civil society organizations.  This includes members 
of  the local press, Local Legislative Councils, and local political 
party leaders, as shown by their active involvement in and support 
for the efforts of  the coalition to elicit the views of  the public 
and ensure the deliberation of  the three reform bills. 
The provision of  legislative drafting training so as to improve 
policy transparency was followed by skills training designed to 
improve the capabilities of  activists in conducting advocacy and 
drafting white papers/bills as part of  the effort to encourage 
policy transparency at the regency and municipality levels in 
Papua Province.
For the future, the constraints encountered to date must 
be overcome by further developing the anticorruption move-
ment through improved cooperation between those concerned 
individuals and institutions that possess experience in anticor-
ruption advocacy – such as those involved in the University of  
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Indonesia’s post-graduate police studies program, Indonesian 
Corruption Watch (ICW) in Jakarta, the Indonesian Forum for 
Budget Transparency (FITRA) in Jakarta, the Attorney General’s 
Office, and the Corruption Eradication Commission – as part 
of  the effort to uncover and resolve corruption cases in Papua 
Province, and to ensure the drafting and enactment of  local 
regulations that would reduce the room for corruption, and lead 
to improved public services. In addition, regular publication of  
the movement’s achievements will be required so as to increase 
public trust and support in Papua.
In order to ensure structural, substantive and cultural har-
mony in law enforcement in Papua, emphasis will need to be 
placed on the following aspects in the future: the public must 
be involved in the legislative drafting and formulation process, 
regulations must be based on concrete needs and be well-drafted 
and realistic as regards implementation, the public must be guar-
anteed the opportunity of  voicing criticism, and information 
about law enforcement efforts must be conveyed through the 
media so that it can be easily accessed by the public.
The provisions of  all local legislation must be tightly drafted 
so as to avoid any opportunity for ambiguity and erroneous in-
terpretation, and involve all of  the institutions concerned with 
the law and law enforcement. In addition, provisions requiring 
public accountability must be put in place, and strong sanctions 
and clear procedures introduced. Protection will also need to be 
provided for whistle-blowers, and scope afforded to the public 
to conduct oversight through the setting up of  an effective 
complaints mechanism.
Pressing Issues
For the next stage of  the campaign – which will involve 
both “repressive” and anticipatory measures as part of  the ef-
fort to transform cultural values and the local legal system so 
that effective action can be taken to uproot corruption – the 
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most important precondition will be that both program initiators 
and implementers be truly clean from all forms of  corruption, 
no matter how insignificant, so that the public can be kept on 
board.
 The most pressing steps that now need to be taken are 
as follows: first, conducting a critical study, and publishing its 
findings, on those local regulations that provide opportunities 
for corruption; second, instilling an awareness among the public 
of  the importance of  local regulations in supporting the anti-
corruption drive; and third, developing the political will on the 
part of  local administrations and legislatures to repeal those local 
regulations that afford opportunities for corruption and replace 
them with appropriate legislation that will once and for all close 
the door to this extraordinary crime.***
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Maftuh Effendi, a judge of  the Jayapura 
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as a legal and social behavior analyst.
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a lecturer in law and 
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1  The writer is the coordinator of  Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW). The programs pursued 
by ICW that were supported by the Partnership are as follows: “Facilitating Public Participa-
tion in the Discussion Process on the Anticorruption Commission Draft Law” (April 2002 
– September 2003) and “Citizen Monitoring of  Campaign Finance” (November 2003 – May 
2005 funded by the European Commission).
Eradicating Corruption:
From Acceptance to 
Resistance
 Teten Masduki1
Transformation of  Corruption
Under the cleptocratic New Order regime – a time when corruption was transformed from being a sideline into the principal pursuit of  government bureaucrats and of-
ficials – political and business patronage led to abundant natural 
resources, state economic facilities and government procurement 
contracts falling into the hands of  a small group of  individu-
als in the coterie of  the power holders. The people had to pay 
dearly for all this through poor public services.
The corruption that spread so widely during this period was 
most probably the result of the excessive centralization of political 
and economic power in the hands of President Soeharto without 
any form of accountability being applied. Political scientists have 
concluded that the power held by Soeharto was in reality absolute, 
given that all forms of checks and balances had been rendered 
ineffective as a result of the fact that the political parties, elections, 
the legislature and the courts were all controlled by the President. 
There was almost no functioning opposition during the New Or-
der years. Meanwhile, social control also proved to be ineffective 
as civil society – particularly the press and student organizations 
– were subjected to an extraordinary level of regimentation.
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Since the fall of  Soeharto and the institution of  a much 
more democratic system of  government equipped with function-
ing multiparty arrangements and a free press, corruption has 
evolved from something practiced by an oligarchy to something 
now practiced on a multiparty basis. The center of  corruption 
is no longer focused on the presidential palace, but has spread 
into the legislature and to the regions. This change took place 
in line with the changes that have occurred in the political 
system since the 1999 general elections, with the role of  the 
Office of  the President becoming more circumscribed and that 
of  the legislature being strengthened. During the same period, 
the system of  government was decentralized, with many powers 
being devolved to the regions.
In brief, the transition from an authoritarian system to a 
democratic one has not automatically led to a diminution of  
corruption, even though it is much easier now for the public 
to become aware or be informed of  such cases. New political 
forces – which claim to be reformist – are themselves frequently 
also up to their necks in corruption, often to the same extent 
as those old forces that they condemned and replaced. In fact, 
the courts, bureaucracy, and business world are still controlled 
by the old forces and reform in these institutions has only 
scratched the surface.
Unfortunately, the reform agenda to data has been primarily 
directed at the overhaul of  government institutions and the sys-
tem of  governance. This is probably due to the perception that 
the prevalence of  graft in Indonesia represents a failure of  the 
governmental system. Corruption is seen as the consequence of  
failures on the part of  the courts, legislature, budgeting system, 
oversight and control, the bureaucracy, etc. Perhaps this perception 
is well-founded, and that reform in these areas will give rise to 
a country that no longer has problems with the representation 
of  the people in democratic institutions, and which actually has 
public representatives that actively work for greater prosperity 
for the people and improved public services.
However, the corruption eradication agenda to date has failed 
to pay adequate heed to the people as the principal victims of  
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corruption. Despite reforms to the legal system, there are still 
no mechanisms that would enable members of  the public to 
bring misfeasors and embezzlers to court, whether on a legal 
standing or class action basis. In reality, those who have been 
harmed by corruption have the potential to resist the practice 
– after all, the ouster of  president Soeharto from power was 
accompanied by anticorruption slogans. Unfortunately, after that 
various aspects of  the reform movement failed to fully accom-
modate the aspirations of  the people.
Public Investigations 
Corruption in Indonesia is no longer a crime that is perpe-
trated covertly. The charging of  unofficial levies – or, in reality, 
extortion by bureaucrats – in the provision of  public services is 
already widely acknowledged and admitted. Overruns in govern-
ment goods and services procurement projects as regards cost, 
amount of  work involved and prices paid are commonplace, 
with the cost frequently swelling to three or more times the 
normal price. Bureaucrats and officials seem not to worry about 
conspicuously displaying their wealth, even though it would be 
impossible for them to amass such wealth based on their of-
ficial salaries. Thus, it is nothing unusual to meet a “corruptor” 
in Indonesia. However, it would be extraordinary to meet an 
honest public servant or official.
All this is possible as corruption here involves a tiny risk 
compared to the potential gains. The possibility of  being caught 
and thrown into jail is very small indeed, while the proceeds 
of  corruption are normally more than enough to pay off  law 
enforcement officers and judges, as well as those responsible for 
effecting oversight and control. A corrupt official runs very little 
risk of  having his progress up the career ladder interfered with 
– in fact, precisely the opposite is normally the case. In fact, 
the recruitment and career advancement systems in the public 
service provide fertile ground for corruption and are tailor-made 
to suit those with deep pockets. Even among the public, a cor-
rupt official may even be perceived as being more generous and 
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“philanthropic” than an honest one.
To date, the prevalence of  corruption has only managed to 
elicit resigned acceptance among members of  the public. Those 
who become its victims do not want to remember the incidences 
of  extortion they have been subjected to, let alone report them 
to the law enforcement agencies or make them public. The rea-
son for this is that they lack the courage to go up against those 
involved in corruption, who have power, guns and money, and 
are virtually free to do anything they want. This mind-set is only 
to be expected from a people that lived for so long under an 
authoritarian regime and that has yet to gain confidence in the 
new system of  government. 
The lamentable realities described above were the primary 
reasons for the establishment of  Indonesian Corruption Watch 
(ICW) in 1998 – exactly one month after Soeharto stepped down. 
In essence, the foundation of  ICW was intended to encourage 
collective public participation in eradicating corruption, no matter 
how insignificant, from people’s daily lives. In other words, to 
transform acceptance into resistance. ICW positioned itself  as a 
trusted friend and shield for those courageous enough to report 
incidences of  corruption but who wanted their identities to be 
kept confidential so as to protect them from the consequences 
of  their decisions to go public. In such circumstances, ICW was 
determined to protect these brave individuals.
At the outset, it proved very difficult to get the program 
off  the ground. Very few whistle-blowers turned up with suf-
ficient information – possibly because many still doubted that 
action would be taken on foot of  their reports or were still 
unsure about the actual extent to which ICW itself  was clean. 
It is no secret that confidential information of  this nature could 
constitute a potent weapon for blackmail.
It was only after we had investigated and made public a 
number of  graft cases that the public had thought would never 
be touched by the law enforcers – due to the fact that the power 
holders, influential generals or tycoons were involved – that a 
slow trickle of  whistle-blowers began to a arrive in our offices. 
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This slow trickle later turned into a flood.
A significant “ice breaker” in this regard was our report 
revealing an account held by Attorney General Andi Muham-
mad Ghalib in a private bank in Jakarta. There was a very 
large amount of  money in this account derived from transfers 
from tycoons being investigated by the prosecution service on 
suspicions of  corruption. At that time, the Attorney General 
was widely believed to be holding up the effort to eradicate 
corruption amid the antigraft euphoria that accompanied the 
investigation of  Soeharto.
As expected, our report to the Republic of  Indonesia Military 
Police (Den Pom ABRI) was not followed by a prosecution. In 
the end, Andi Ghalib was removed from office by President B.J. 
Habibie to facilitate the investigation of  his case, and was not 
restored to office again.
Besides giving a commitment that every report would be 
fully investigated and acted upon, another strategy employed for 
the purpose of  encouraging people to come forward involved 
the building of  a wide network involving various groups, par-
ticularly labor unions in the banking sector and in state-owned 
enterprises.
The collaboration of the labor unions plays an important role 
in uncovering corruption. This is because the members of the 
labor unions are directly affected by the state of the enterprise 
for which they work. The consequences of corruption within an 
enterprise are frequently felt by the workers in the form of wors-
ening conditions and even dismissal. In addition, clean members 
of the bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies/the courts also 
have a major role to play in uncovering corruption cases.
The active involvement of  whistle-blowers – even if  they 
remain anonymous in order to protect themselves – from the 
time of  planning an investigation up to the advocacy stage forms 
an essential part of  the effort to instill public confidence and 
trust in the conduct of  the investigation. The public also gains 
valuable insight into the workings of  the law enforcement agen-
cies/courts. In general, whistle-blowers get a feeling of  satisfaction 
when the cases they have reported receive wide coverage in the 
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It takes guts to spill the beans!
While many people feel the affects of  corruption in their daily lives, 
identifying the principal actors is not always so straightforward. The large 
number of  people involved, the complicated modus employed, the opaque 
nature of  government in Indonesia, and the involvement of  the law enforce-
ment agencies and courts in corruption all make it difficult to combat the 
practice.
Given these circumstances, Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) encour-
ages social groups to develop their capabilities in uncovering corruption cases 
using various approaches. The provision of basic anticorruption training is the 
most common method employed, covering the imparting of knowledge about 
corruption, detection skills, program analysis skills, and knowledge about how 
to prepare special reports and conduct effective advocacy. The idea here is to 
establish pockets of resistance to corruption around the country.
It has been clearly shown that this approach is capable of  heightening 
awareness among members of  the public and encouraging them to report 
corruption cases. In 2004, ICW received 415 reports of  suspected corruption 
from private individuals and community groups throughout Indonesia.
In the particular case of  corruption in Jakarta, ICW conducts indepen-
dent investigations and passes on the results of  these to the law enforcement 
agencies. One example of  such a case is that involving markups at Radio 
Republic of  Indonesia (RRI) worth Rp 40 billion. This case is now being 
investigated by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). Another 
example is the case involving a markdown worth Rp 300 billion in the sale 
of  a plot of  land belonging to the National Housing Agency, which is cur-
rently being investigated by the Coordinating Team for Corruption Eradica-
tion (Timtas Tipikor).
Among the new anticorruption networks that have been established are 
Prodem in Kendari, the LPS-HAM in Palu, Bontang Corruption Watch (BCW) 
in East Kalimantan, G2W in Garut, PIAR in Kupang, Gerak, SORAK, and 
SAMAK in Aceh, Rahima in Cirebon, and many others besides. These come 
on top of  the anticorruption networks established previously, such as SOMASI 
in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB), Maraks in Surabaya, Pattiro in Semarang, 
Komite Anti Korupsi (KoAK) in Lampung, BAKO in West Sumatra, Perak 
Institute in Makassar, Gemawan in Pontianak, Pokja 30 in Samarinda, etc.
The drafting of  a report on a suspect case of  corruption is not confined 
to the preparing, writing and forwarding of  the report to the law enforcement 
agencies. It also involves building up an anticorruption network, inter-group 
capacity building, and promoting common cause so as to ensure even greater 
courage in fighting against corruption.
(Adnam Topan Husodo)
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media. Such coverage also gives them a better understanding of  
what has happened if  the person or persons whom they have 
reported are not sent to jail at the end of  the process.
Feeding the Media 
Every case where the documentation has been completed 
is given a legal opinion, and revealed to the public through the 
media. This is an essential part of  transparency and account-
ability in handling reports, and is necessary so as to maintain 
public trust. Corruption cases where the data or information is 
incomplete – or which are difficult to follow up on – are passed 
on to journalists to be used as they see fit.
After investigative capabilities, public trust is the most 
important element in ensuring a flow of  information on graft 
cases from the public. 
However, there is no way of  knowing whether a reported 
case will eventually get as far as the courts. The failure to put a 
defendant in the dock often gives rise to a sense of  frustration 
or even a suspicion that the case in question has been sabo-
taged. This sort of  perception is unavoidable given the reality 
that judicial corruption is still rampant in Indonesia.
The findings of  research conducted by ICW in 2001 on 
the judicial mafia in a number of  regions of  Indonesia (Jakarta, 
Medan, Makassar, Samarinda, Yogyakarta, amd Surabaya) showed 
how corruption had spread to involve almost all actors in the 
courts, including judges, lawyers, prosecutors, police officers, 
registrars/clerks, and even secretarial staff  and parking attendants. 
Apparently, judicial corruption is now regarded as something 
normal, and the courts are no longer places where justice is 
obtained. Rather justice is now up for sale to the highest bidder. 
Whoever can cough up the most money will win the case.
Given these conditions, it is often impossible to ensure that 
a corruption case is acted upon and the culprit put in jail. Ac-
cordingly, it is absolutely essential that increased public pressure 
– in the form of  better oversight and control in respect of  the 
courts – be brought to bear.

Uncovering Corruption in Aceh
The public has the potential to directly exercise control over 
the courts by conducting independent assessment of  judicial de-
cisions. Such assessments do not need to come up with specific 
evidence of  the payment of  a bribe or preferment of  some 
other form of  inducement. However, every crime will always 
leave a trace and, in the judicial sphere, this will be apparent 
from the decision.
Public examination of  judicial decisions represents an alterna-
tive method by which the public may critically review controversial 
court decisions that have an impact on society and indicate the 
presence of  judicial corruption.
The overall purpose of  public assessment is to ensure the 
effecting of  oversight and control in respect of  legal decisions. 
This oversight and control is effected based on the assumption 
that many judicial decisions are tainted by graft – both from the 
substantive and procedural perspectives – and fail to satisfy the 
people’s sense of  justice.
Spreading the Anticorruption Message
In waging war on corruption, ICW has never suggested it 
has a monopoly over the struggle. In fact, exactly the opposite 
is the case, and it has consistently tried to spread the anticor-
ruption message and to have it incorporated as an important 
part of  the agendas of  all non-governmental and civil society 
organizations, farmers’ and fishermen’s associations, labor unions, 
other workers’ organizations, and so forth. Based on its desire 
to decentralize the anticorruption movement, ICW has resolved 
not to establish branch offices around the country.
For ICW, building up an anticorruption network is by far 
and away the best method for expanding the scope of  the 
movement. When networking,  ICW does not confine itself  to 
anticorruption institutions that have already been established 
around the country, but also focuses on the establishment of  
pockets of  resistance to corruption. 
ICW has a clear approach to networking based on its found-
ing principles and code of  ethics. While ICW will always be 
open to the establishment of  new anticorruption networks, the 
Eradicating Corruption: From Acceptance to Resistance

Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
Public Examination of  Cases as Part of  Fight Against 
Judicial Corruption 
The extent of  judicial corruption in Indonesia’s courts can be seen from 
Daniel Kaufman’s study, Bureaucratic and Judiciary Bribery, 1998. Meanwhile, the 
findings of  a survey on judicial corruption conducted by the Partnership 
for Governance Reform in Indonesia in 2001 showed that the courts are 
the most corrupt institutions in the country in the opinion of  the public. 
Similar findings were arrived at by another survey conducted by Transparency 
International in 2004.
One of  the factors leading to the endemic character of  judicial corruption 
is the lack of  an effective internal oversight system within each law enforce-
ment agency and in the courts. Internal oversight is frequently hampered by 
an excessive devotion to esprit de corps, human-resource weaknesses, and 
the fact that many of  those responsible for effecting oversight are in fact 
involved in the chain of  corruption themselves.
In order to overcome the weaknesses that exist as regards internal over-
sight, external supervision and control needs to be effected by the public. 
The existence of  people and groups in society that possess a commitment to 
uprooting the deeply entrenched networks of  corruption within our courts 
is essential.
One effort that may be undertaken by the public is the evaluation and 
appraisal of  legal decisions – a process frequently referred to as public ex-
amination. This work is of  the utmost importance as it involves the active 
participation of  the public in supervising the judicial process.
Public participation in exercising control over the courts through case 
examination was pioneered by ICW in 2001 in the Supreme Court review of  
Tommy Soeharto’s conviction in an asset swap deal involving the National 
Logistics Agency (Bulog) and the Goro wholesale chain. The ICW also ex-
amined the decision in the Arifin  Wardiyanto case in Yogyakarta.
These two examinations produced something akin to a snowball effect, 
and were subsequently used as models for judicial monitoring by a number 
of  civil society organizations and institutes of  higher education in Padang, 
Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Malang and Denpasar, as well as a number of  other 
regions in Indonesia. To date, a total of  18 cases that proved controversial, 
had a widespread impact on society, or revealed indications of  judicial cor-
ruption (5 civil cases, 12 criminal cases, and one Supreme Court practice 
direction) have been examined by the public, facilitated by non-governmental 
organizations and institutes of  higher education.
(Adnan Topan Husodo)
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members of  these must adhere firmly to the fundamental prin-
ciples for which the ICW is fighting. These principles are divided 
into three categories: First, the application of  the principles of  
good governance to networking. ICW does not select network 
partners for advocacy and campaigning purposes randomly, but 
rather there must be an agreement to apply the principles of  
transparency and accountability in each activity that is undertaken. 
Second, the principle of  credibility. Every community group that 
wishes to collaborate with the ICW must have a good record as 
regards organizational and group credibility bearing in mind that 
this is of  the essence in the fight against corruption. Third, the 
principles of  capacity and capability – in order for the anticor-
ruption drive to achieve maximum results, all those involved in 
networking with ICW must have the capacity and capability to 
properly manage their programs and finances so that all their 
activities can be accounted for correctly and honestly.
As it is not such an easy task to find network partners that 
are capable of  satisfying the above requirements, ICW has posi-
tioned itself  as a facilitator for the promotion of  ethics among 
community organizations and groups involved in the struggle 
against graft. In addition, ICW also takes part in the effort to 
improve the capacity of  network members through the application 
of  various methods, such as providing anticorruption training, 
training on how to conduct investigations, technical financial 
assistance, advocacy training, etc.
The other role of  ICW is to promote coordination and me-
diation in respect of  the advocacy work undertaken by partners 
in the regions. In its most straightforward form, this involves 
arranging meetings for the purpose of  reporting suspected graft 
cases to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and 
notifying these to journalists so as to ensure press coverage. 
Not all networking activities start with the programmatic 
approach. Activities can also be commenced on foot of  com-
plaints or case studies. For example, ICW has developed networks 
covering different parts of  the country. Among the organizations 
participating in these networks are the Aceh Anticorruption 
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Movement (GeRAK), Peoples’ Solidarity against Corruption 
(SAMAK) and Anticorruption Solidarity (SoRAK) in Aceh, the 
West Sumatra Concern Forum (FPSB), Bako Sumbar, and Padang 
Legal Aid Bureau in West Sumatra, and the Anticorruption Com-
mittee (KoAK) in Lampung. In Jakarta, almost all organizations 
concerned with upholding human rights have become strategic 
partners in the advocacy effort.
As for other areas, in Garut there is Garut Government Watch 
(G2W), in Semarang the Pusat Telaah dan Informasi Regional 
(Regional Studies and Information Center – Pattiro), Malang 
Corruption Watch in Malang, the Anticorruption Community 
(MARAKS) and Surabaya Legal Aid Bureau in Surabaya, Bali 
Corruption Watch in Bali, People’s Solidarity for Transparency 
(Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk Transparansi – Somasi) in West 
Nusa Tenggera, the People’s Resistance Movement (Gerakan 
Masyarakat untuk Perlawanan – Gemawan) in Pontianak, Work-
ing Group 30 (Pokja 30) in Samarinda and the Perak Institute 
in Makassar.
Many of  the organizations who report cases to ICW have 
the potential to become part of  the anticorruption movement. 
For example, the Southeast Sulawesi Anticorruption Commu-
nity (Masyarakat Antikorupsi Sulawesi Tenggara – MARA) in 
Southeast Sulawesi, the Social Action and Advocacy organiza-
tion (Aksi Sosial dan Advokasi – ASA) in Kendal regency, the 
People’s Advocacy and Information Center (Pusat Informasi dan 
Advokasi Rakyat – PIAR) in Kupang, the Fahmina Institute in 
Cirebon municipality, Bontang Corruption Watch in Bontang 
municipality, etc.
Besides networking among organizations, many clean indi-
viduals working for government institutions serve as informants 
and as tireless front-line troops in the war on corruption.
Strengths and Weaknesses
The making public of  the results of  investigations through 
the general media, as well as internal electronic media, entails a 
number of  both strengths and weaknesses. Among the strengths 
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are the fact that each report is made known to a large number 
of  people and can therefore serve to encourage the imposition 
of  social sanctions on those involved even if  it turns out that 
legal sanctions are not applied. Given the current level of  press 
freedom and the large number of  media outlets, it is very easy 
to get the press onboard for the fight against graft.
However, this approach also suffers from many weaknesses. 
These constraints range from the “envelope culture” – or brib-
ery, in other words – prevailing in many sections of  the press 
to the interests of  the press owners. Given these constraints, 
it is necessary to develop close, personal relations with honest 
and idealistic journalists. It is, of  course, only natural that those 
suspected of  corruption will also try to boost their images in the 
media, and that not all media outlets or major magazines believe 
that social sanctions should be imposed on those responsible for 
the misfeasance or embezzlement of  public funds.
Frequently, a crooked official, advocate or hired expert or 
observer will be the main source of  information to counter 
allegations of  corruption laid against a particular person. This, 
accompanied by the fact that white-collar crime falls into a grey 
area that is often beyond the scope of  the prevailing law, means 
that differing interpretations frequently appear in the media. Using 
sources partial to those involved in misfeasance and corruption, 
the reporting carried in the media can often serve to help cover 
up corruption and confuse the public.
Because the media is generally more concerned with what 
is happening right now, existing corruption cases are frequently 
overshadowed, or pushed out of  the limelight, by newly emerg-
ing cases. As a result, it is not unusual for the old cases to be 
forgotten about in such circumstances. In addition, the media 
tends to direct much of  its focus to corruption cases involving 
important personages or enormous sums of  money. However, 
this can lead to a tendency to ignore graft cases that do not in-
volve important public figures or large amounts of  public money. 
Thus, corruption that impacts directly on people’s quality of  life, 
such as graft in the health and education sectors, normally fails 
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to attract the attention it deserves.
The media is also insufficiently interested in public education 
so as to enable people to understand the character, effects and 
causes of  corruption, despite the fact that such comprehension 
is essential if  corruption is to be eliminated. Generally speaking, 
the media is more interested in the legal aspects. Unfortunately, 
this leads to frequent interviews with the lawyers of  corruption 
defendants and legal experts to the detriment of  more wide-
ranging public participation. The coverage of  corruption cases 
as described above reveals the fact that many weaknesses still 
affect our efforts to deal with the problem.
Revealing incidences of  corruption based on reports from the 
public is not always beneficial. People can have various motives 
for spilling the beans on graft. This could include anger at be-
ing transferred or fired, failure to win a tender, or even political 
competition or rivalry at work. However, in graft cases that are 
difficult to prove, such as those involving drugs, money-laundering, 
or highly complex modus, in reality the motivation for blowing 
the whistle will not be a primary consideration in deciding how 
to handle the case. Danger arises, however, when a watchdog 
lacks independence or there is an insufficient distance from the 
interests of  the whistle-blower. Thus, it is essential at all times 
that the anticorruption movement maintains its distance from 
political parties, business interests and the power holders.
Another problem is that the reports received from the public 
are too wide-ranging in scope. The fact that they do not focus 
on one particular sector complicates matters bearing in mind 
the limited human resources available. This may, however, be 
overcome by involving experts from various disciplines on a 
voluntary basis, and an appropriate allocation of  tasks among 
network members. At the moment, many community organiza-
tions are starting to specialize, with some, for example, focusing 
on budgeting, some on procurement, some on the tax sector, 
some on transportation, etc.
Resistance to the anticorruption movement is quite common. 
The hiring of  thugs to physically terrorize and intimidate activists, 
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and the threat of  defamation suits or prosecutions, are two of  
the most common ways by which it is sought to divert activ-
ists from pursuing their investigations. The use of  the criminal 
law by corrupt officials and businesspeople in courts that are 
themselves corrupt obviously constitutes a major threat to the 
anticorruption movement – one that is particularly potent given 
the absence of  legal protection for whistle–blowers.
Balanced Relationship
Beyond our wildest expectations, the simple model described 
above has provided inspiration for anticorruption activists all over 
the country, and is currently being applied in a number of  vari-
ants in line with the emergence of  a great variety of  watchdogs 
throughout Indonesia. These methods are in reality nothing new 
and they work in the same way as investigative reporting works 
in the media. However, what is new is the fact that they are 
now being applied by watchdogs and are not confined solely to 
investigative work, but also include campaigning, shaping public 
opinion, lobbying and applying pressure to the law enforcement 
agencies and courts, as well as policy makers. However, it must 
be remembered that most of  the corruption cases reported by 
the public never make it to court.
This approach is worthy of  being further developed, espe-
cially given that 80 percent of  development funding comes from 
taxes. Logically, the taxpayers want to see their money being 
used in the public interest rather than being stolen by embez-
zlers.  One variant of  the above approach was titled the “Anti 
Rotten Politician Movement” – a campaign run during the 2004 
general elections. Within a relatively short space of  time, this 
movement spread to almost all parts of  the country – something 
that clearly revealed just how anxious the public was to prevent 
“rotten” politicians being elected to public office. The provision 
of  information about the records of  legislative and presidential 
candidates constituted important political education for the voters 
and helped prevent irrational voting during the elections.
While “rotten” politicians were still elected to the House 
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of  Representatives and Local Legislative Assemblies despite the 
Anti Rotten Politician Movement, the number of  such politicians 
was much less than it could have been. In fact, their election 
was primarily due to the fact that the electoral system facilitated 
this.
Don’t vote for ‘Rotten’ politicians!
Given that the country’s political parties had set themselves up as a pro-status 
quo oligarchy, there was no other choice but to heighten the awareness of  the voters 
so as to prevent the wool being pulled over their eyes. The basic idea underlying the 
campaign was to ensure that the voters would be able to force change both among 
the politicians and the political parties. In order to do this, people’s ways of  thinking 
would need to be changed from irrational to rational, from blind loyalty to critical 
thinking, and from being emotional to being objective. Driven by ICW and a number 
of  NGOs in Jakarta, the Anti Rotten Politician Movement almost immediately led to 
changes in voter behavior and the Indonesian political constellation.
The establishment of  the movement was first announced on 29 December 2003 
at the Proclamation Monument in Jakarta, and it immediately drew a great deal of  
support from various circles. Amid a heavy downpour, at least 2,500 people filled 
the square to listen to speeches marking the formal establishment of  the movement. 
After the signing of  the declaration by all in attendance, the war against the reelection 
of  rotten politicians started in earnest.
This declaration of  war was emulated around the country. At least 200 civil 
society organizations, including student unions, issued similar declarations. Such dec-
larations were made in Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Lampung, Jakarta, West 
Java, Central Java, East Java, Bali, Western Nusa Tenggara, Southeast Sulawesi, South 
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, 
and many other areas besides.
The term “rotten politician” was applied to all those who engaged in corruption, 
damaged the environment, violated human rights, or committed sexual crimes. The 
adoption of  these criteria clearly showed that this was to be a negative campaign 
rather than a black campaign. Negative campaigning is a normal part of  democracy 
as it conveys to the public something that is true and that people have a right to 
know, with the basic idea being to improve the quality of  democracy. Publicizing 
the records of  the “rotten politicians” would allow the people to avoid casting their 
votes for these candidates.
The Anti Rotten Politician Movement became immensely popular during a very 
short space of  time due to the fact that much creativity was employed in designing 
socialization methods. Among the methods used were campaign theme songs pro-
duced by popular musicians like Franky Sahilatua and Harry Roesli (deceased), the 
dissemination of  stickers and posters, public discussions, talk shows on many radio 
stations and even the publication of  a newsletter titled Sosok, which contained a list 
of  “rotten” politicians.
(Adnan Topan Husodo)
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Given the widespread involvement of  the public in the ef-
forts to oversee the provision of  public services, it was essential 
that a Report Card System (RCS) be developed and applied to 
the education sector in Jakarta. In the end, this was found to 
have transformed the previously passive attitudes of  the public 
into active efforts to encourage better government services. This 
approach is now to be expanded to the healthcare sector.
The only constraint affecting this approach is that it requires 
organization. Fighting against “rotten politicians” requires that 
the majority of  voters form an alliance. Demanding better quality 
services in the education sector requires independent teachers’ 
organizations and parents associations. Similar requirements also 
apply in other sectors. The problem is, however, that under the 
New Order many social institutions were destroyed so that it 
may be said today that the majority of  people are not actually 
involved in organizations.
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Report Card System – Making Sure Your Voice is Heard
The report card system is a method that is intended to encourage the 
public to play an active role in overseeing and improving the quality of  public 
services. The principle under which it operates involve the combining of  
quantitative and qualitative research. The method was first pioneered by the 
Public Affairs Centre (PAC) in Bangalore, India.
The RCS represents a form of  advocacy research. As part of  the system, 
encouraging networking between groups that have an interest in the education 
sector is an essential element. In this regard, ICW took two steps. First, it 
established or strengthened parents’ groups and, second, it encouraged the 
establishment of  networks in the education field.
The establishment or strengthening of  a parents group was normally 
preceded by the holding of  Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The prob-
lems faced by parents were identified by a questionnaire, and efforts made 
to resolve them. Generally speaking, the problems faced were highly micro 
in nature, particularly as regards relations with the school.
Among the parents, and the community at large, the biggest weak-
ness identified was a lack of  information on the provision of  education, 
particularly as regards the rights of  parents. The main reason for this was a 
lack of  transparency on the part of  the schools and those responsible for 
running the education system. The role of  the ICW was now to open up 
access to information, to continuously promote greater inter-group solidar-
ity, and to move from addressing micro problems to resolving those of  a 
more macro nature.
The success of  the campaign is to be seen in the greater transparency 
brought about as a result of  the pressure applied by community groups. In 
addition, the groups in a number of  places were able to pressure the educa-
tion agency to replace school principals who had been involved in corruption 
and to make schools free of  fees, as happened in State Elementary School 
No. 3, Mangga Dua, Jakarta.
The parents and community groups presented the results of  their ap-
praisals on a regular basis to policy makers, such as the education agency, 
Local Legislative Council, and Department of  National Education. It was 
hoped that a consideration of  these appraisals would be capable of  produc-
ing improvements in education policy. For example, in Garut, the parents 
groups were able to pressure the local administration and legislative council 
to issue a regulation on the education system.
In order to make the government better aware of  its obligations to 
provide quality public services, particularly in the education sector, collective 
and sustained pressure will be required. For this reason, ICW continues to 
strengthen its network of  community groups so that members of  the public 
can play an active role in oversight and supervision. ICW is currently applying 
the RCS method in Jakarta, Garut, Solo, Semarang, and Kupang.
(Adnan Topan Husodo)
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For the future, it is clearly not enough for the anticorruption 
movement to be confined to watchdogs, such is the case at the 
moment. Rather, the anticorruption agenda must be made the 
agenda of  every person in Indonesia. How is this to be done? 
The fight against graft must be made part of  the agenda of  
every religious institution, business, cooperative society, labor 
union, teacher, farmer, fisherman, consumer, etc.
Corruption has not reached its current prevalence due to 
some fundamental weakness in our country, but rather because 
of  imbalances in the relationship between the citizen, state and 
business community. The anticorruption movement must be 
made part and parcel of  the democratization movement so as 
to restore balance to these relationships.
Teten Masduki, born in Garut, West Java, 
on 6 May 1963, received his higher educa-
tion in the Department of  Mathematics 
and Chemistry at the Bandung Institute of  
Teaching Science (IKIP). However, he is best 
known as the chairman of  Indonesian Cor-
ruption Watch (1998 to date). He has also 
served as the coordinator of  the Labor Law 
Reform Consortium (Konsorsium Pembaru-
an Hukum Perburuhan), (1996-1998), and as 
the coordinator of  the Labor Solidarity Fo-
rum (Forum Solidaritas Buruh), (1992-1993). 
In addition, he is a 
member of  the Na-
tional Ombudsman 
Commission.
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List of Acronyms
ACC :  Anti Corruption Committee 
ADB :  Asian Development Bank
ADTK :  Aceh Damai Tanpa Korupsi (Peaceful Aceh 
without Corruption)  
AJI :  Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of  Inde-
pendent Journalists)
APEC :  Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASA :  Aksi Sosial dan Advokasi (Social Action and 
Advocacy)
ASEM :  Asia-Europe Meeting
Bakar :  Barisan Koalisi Rakyat Melawan Korupsi (People 
against Corruption Coalition Front)
Bawasda :  Badan Pengawas Daerah (Audit Board at Pro-
vincial/Regency/Municipality level)
BCW :  Bontang Corruption Watch
BEM :  Badan Eksekutif  Mahasiswa (Student Union)
BKAN :  Balai Kerapatan Adat Nagari (Nagari Adat 
Center)
Bongkar :  Barisan Organisasi Rakyat Pembongkar Korupsi 
(People’s Front for the Eradication of  Corrup-
tion)
BPD :  Bank Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Develop-
ment Bank)
BP3D :  Badan Perencanaan dan Pengendalian  
Pembangunan Daerah (Provincial/Regency/ 
Municipality Audit Board)
BPK :  Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Supreme Audit 
Agency)
BPKP :  Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan 
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(Finance and Development Audit Board)
BULOG :  Badan Urusan Logistik (State Logistics Agen-
cy)
CSO :  Civil Society Organization
DAU :  (General Allocation Fund)
Den Pom ABRI :  Detasemen Polisi Militer Angkatan Bersenjata 
Republik Indonesia (Military Police Detach-
ment) 
DPD :  Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Repre-
sentatives Council)
DPR :  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of  Repre-
sentatives)
DPRD :  Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Provin-
cial/Regency/Municipal Legislative Council)
eLPERA :  Lembaga Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Rakyat 
(Institute for the Strengthening of  the Social 
Economy)
FITRA :  Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran 
(Indonesian Forum for Budgetary Transpar-
ency)
FKIBM :  Forum Kajian Ilmiah dan Bahtsul Masail (Baht-
sul Masail and Scientific Studies Forum)
FMJK :  Forum Masyarakat Jepara untuk Keadilan 
(Jepara People’s Forum for Justice)
Formappi :  Forum Masyarakat Pemantau Parlemen 
Indonesia (Indonesian People’s Forum for 
Parliamentary Monitoring)
Forpamer :  Forum Partisipasi Masyarakat untuk Pemban-
gunan Merauke (Public Participation in the 
Development of  Merauke Forum)
FPSB :  Forum Peduli Sumatera Barat (West Sumatra 
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Concern Forum)
G2W :  Garut Government Watch
GAK :  Gerakan Anti Korupsi (Anticorruption Move-
ment)
GaSAK :  Gabungan Solidaritas Anti Korupsi (Anticor-
ruption Solidarity Association)
GeRAK :  Gerakan Anti Korupsi (Anticorruption Move-
ment)
IAI :  Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (Indonesian As-
sociation of  Accountants)
ICS :  The Institute for Civil Society Strengthen-
ing 
ICW :  Indonesian Corruption Watch 
IPW :  Indonesian Procurement Watch 
Jagat :  Jaringan Kerja untuk Kedaulatan Rakyat 
(People’s Sovereignty Network)
JAMAK :  Jaringan Mahasiswa Muslim Anti Korupsi 
(Muslim Students Anticorruption Network)
JARAK :  Jaringan Akar Rumput Anti Korupsi (Aceh 
Anticorruption Grassroots Network)
KIPP :  Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (Inde-
pendent Election Monitoring Committee)
KIPRa :  Konsultasi Independen Pemberdayaan Rakyat 
(Independent Consultation for People’s Em-
powerment)
KKN :  Corruption, collusion and nepotism
KMAK :  Koalisi Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (People’s 
Anticorruption Coalition)
KoAK :  Komite Anti Korupsi (Anticorruption Com-
mittee)
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KOAR :  Komando Rakyat Anti Korupsi (People’s 
Anticorruption Commandos)
KOBAR :  Koalisi Barisan Rakyat Anti Korupsi (People’s 
Anticorruption Coalition Front) 
Komnas HAM :  Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National 
Commission on Human Rights)
KON :  Komisi Ombudsman Nasional (National Om-
budsman Commission)
Kopel :  Komite Pemantau Legislatif  (Legislature 
Monitoring Committee)
Korupa :  Komunitas Rumah Panggung (Theater Com-
munity)
KPK :  Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption 
Eradication Commission) 
KPKPN :  Komisi Pemeriksa Kekayaan Penyelenggara 
Negara (Public Officials Audit Commission)
KPU :  Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Elections 
Commission)
LBH :  Legal Aid Institute
LBH-P2i :  Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Pemberdayaan 
Perempuan Indonesia (Women’s Empower-
ment Legal Aid Institute)
LK2P :  Lajnah Kajian Kebijakan Publik (Public Policy 
Study Committee)
LKAAM :  Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau 
(Minangkabau Traditional Environmental Law 
Institute)
LKPMP :  Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Masyara-
kat dan Pesantren (Community and Madrasah 
Development and Studies Institute)
List of Acronyms
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LMPI :  Lembaga Masyarakat Peduli Informasi (People 
concerned with Information Institute)
LP3 UMY :  Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengembangan Pen-
didikan Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogya-
karta (Eduation Research and Development 
Institute at the Muhammadiyah University, 
Yogyakarta)
LP3BH :  Lembaga Penelitian, Pengkajian, dan Pengem-
bangan Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid Develop-
ment, Research and Studies Institute)
LPM :  Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat (People’s 
Empowerment Institute)
MARA :  Masyarakat Antikorupsi Sulawesi Tenggara 
(Southeast Sulawesi Anticorruption Commu-
nity)
Maraks :  Masyarakat Anti Korupsi (The Anticorruption 
Community)
Mataraja :  Masyarakat Transparansi Aceh Jaya (The Aceh 
Jaya Transparency Community)
MATRAS :  Masyarakat Anti Korupsi Singkil (The Singkil 
Anticorruption Community)
MPR :  Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s 
Consultative Council)
NAD :  Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam
NGO :  Non-Govermental Organisation 
NTB :  Nusa Tenggara Barat (West Nusa Tenggara)
P3M :  Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan 
Masyarakat (The Indonesian Society for 
Pesantren and Community Development))
P4B :  Second round voter registration
panwaslu :  Election Supervisory Commission
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PBB :  Land and Building Tax
PDMD :  Penguasa Darurat Militer Daerah (Military 
Emergency Commander)
PIAR :  Pusat Informasi dan Advokasi Rakyat (People’s 
Advocacy and Information Center)
PKS :  Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
PPP :  Partai Persatuan Pembangunan
PPSK :  Pusat Pendidikan dan Studi Kebanksentralan 
(Central Bank Study and Education Center)
Pusaka :  Pusat Transparansi Kebijakan Publik (Center 
for Transparency in Public Policy)
RCS :  Report Card System
RRI :  Radio Republik Indonesia (Indonesian State 
Radio)
SAKSI :  Solidaritas Untuk Transparansi (Solidarity for 
Transparency)
SAMAK :  Solidaritas Masyarakat Anti Koruspsi (People’s 
Solidarity against Corruption)
Somasi :  Solidaritas Masyarakat untuk Transparansi 
(People’s Solidarity for Transparency)
SoRAK :  Solidaritas Gerakan Anti Korupsi (Anticor-
ruption Solidarity Movement)
SRDK :  Solidaritas Rakyat Untuk Demokrasi Keadilan 
(People’s Solidarity for Democracy and Jus-
tice)
SMART-CS :  specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-
bound, challenging, strength.
STIMIK SuAK :  Solidaritas untuk Anti Korupsi (Anticorruption 
Solidarity)
Syarikat :  Masyarakat Santri untuk Advokasi Rakyat 
(Theological Students for Public Advocacy)
List of Acronyms
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Fighting Corruption: From Aceh To Papua
TI-I :  Transparency International Indonesia 
WAC :  Watampone Anti Corruption (Watampone 
against Corruption)
UMY :  Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Mu-
hammadiyah University Yogyakarta)
Walhi :  Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (Indonesian Forum 
for the Environment)
YLBH :  Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (Legal Aid 
Foundation)
YLKI :  Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia (In-
donesian Consumers Organization)
YMAMI :  Yayasan Masyarakat Mandiri Indonesia (In-
donesian People’s Self-reliance Foundation)
